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ABSTRACT
AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE ROLE OF CONTRACT DRUG PURCHASING IN HOSPITALS
BY
DAVID JOHN WOLFSON
Whereas health care resources are limited, demands upon them are
insatiable. Drug expenditure has received particular attention
in attempts to regulate increasing costs. For hospitals, contract
purchasing is designed to regulate drug expense.
This thesis examines the contract mechanisms.
Information was collected from pharmacists and supplies officers
in all English health regions and pharmaceutical companies supplying
the bulk of hospital drug requirements.
The main findings of the research are:-
There is a large, unexplainable difference in price charged
to various health regions for an identical drug. Price charged
is independent of all obvious correlates •
.2 Despite the oligopgonistic power of the National Health Service
there is no centralised interchange of price or purchasing
information between health regions.
3 Pharmaceutical suppliers view hospital drug purchasing as
fertile for opportunistic pricing within the context of total
profit regulation.
4 There is an ill-defined working relationship between pharmacists
and supplies officers in the implementation of drug contracts,
often amicable locally but tense and competitive nationally.
The overall impression is of a purchasing mechanism which, due to
its political sensitivity, has, by default, become increasingly
outmoded and represents a triumph of public accountability over
individual negotiating skill. The overall regulation of pricing is
in substantive conflict with the hospital contract system. One
encourages UK research, the other not, while the savings in hospital
purchase are redundant in the context of both overall corporate
and Governmental financing.
Cost savings are unknown. Other methods of acquisition such as
prime vendor buying should be considered, as a means of improving
purchase efficiency for both supplier and purchaser.
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INTRODUCTION
British society as a whole takes pride in its carrying of
responsibility for payment of medical expenses rather than forcing
this role upon those who use the services available. The present
National Health Se~e (NHS) system dates from 1948, although it was
preceded by a scheme which began in 1911. According to the N.H.S.
Act 1946, a free and comprehensive health service would be provided
for all. The cost, however, exceeded all expectations and whereas
it was predicted that with a Health Service operation in existence
the volume of disease would fall, in fact the demand far exceeded
the supply of services. In the first year o'f the NHS, the cost
was £53 million more than had been predicted and with successive
years the cost rose without there appearing any glimmer of an
interruption in the upward spiral. The lofty ideal of shifting
the financial burden from those \oIhouse the service to all members
of society in employment has developed less prominence as the user
has become more and more accustomed to paying his prescription
charge for his medicine. It was not long before pressures were
applied to reduce the burden. No aspect of the service received·
more attention than the drug bill because it was an obvious expense.
By 1981 it was consuming more than ten per cent of the NHS financial
allocation of £13 billion. Over the years much thought has been
given to the prices being charged by the pharmaceutical manufacturers,
because any attempt to restrict the clinical freedom of the doctor
to prescribe the drug cif his choice would be considered taboo.
Additionally, the general practice sector of the NHS, unlike the
hospital sector, enjoys a theoretically limitless budget so any
attempt to control general practice prescribing costs is beset with
prohlems at the very outset. Likewise in the hospital sector, despite
the existence of a limited budget, no great successes in controlling
•prescription costs have been achieved. vfuat has been seen is the
imposition by successive governments since the late 1950's of
restrictions on profit-making by pharmaceutical manufacturers which
supply both the hospital and general practice sectors of the health
service. These restrictive arran~ements have taken the name of
Voluntary (subsequently changed to Pharmaceutical) Price Regulation
Schemes. In addition to these, hospitals have been given strong
encouragement by government to make contractual purchasing
arrangements with suppliers so as to lower the prices being paid
for the drugs purchased, the assumption being that a contractual
purchase was cheaper than one not contracted. Scope for such
buying agreements with suppliers has been magnified by the
discretion afforded hospital pharmacists to purchase and supply
one brand only of each drug by local inter-professional consent.
The "contract" is the legally binding agreement between the Health
Authority and the supplier, under the provisions of which the
Authority agrees to buy under stated conditions that particular
drug referred to in the agreement from that supplier at the price
offered by the supplier and accepted when the agreement came into
force. Contract drug schemes first emerged in the late 1940's,
with hospital pharmacists taking the initiative and assuming a
dominant·role in their organisation. With the emergence of
speCialist supplies officers as a distinct discipline within the
health service, a situation arose in some places in which the
roles of the two employees clashed. Disputes arose as to which of
them should have the pre-eminent role in hozpitaI drug purchase,
whereas elsewhere, with goodwill shown by both parties, their tasks
were perceived as being complementary.
The investigation described here concerns itself with contract drug
purchasing by hospitals in England. The main objective is to
determine how efficient the present contracts are and to suggest
possible improvements to increase efficiency. Encouragement in
this task has been provided in the views of a Supply Council Report
(1) published in· late 1982. It remarked:
"we are convinced there are ways of improving the efficiency
of hospital purchasing and management of drug costs without
unduly affecting the total market •••
Considerable improvements could be achieved in the current
methods and practices in contracting and buying of
pharmaceuticals in the hospital service, and would result
in administrative savings and reduced costs for some items."
As well as an understanding of the legal and economic backgrounds,
there is a need to investigate the historical development without
which the present system cannot fully be understood. Remarkably,
considering the amount of public money involved, the subject is
little researched and poorly documented, a failing it shares with
health service supplies generally (2).
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It is a possibility that any books on the NHS or pharmaceutical
industry might be politically biased since both are subjects on
which politically-minded individuals tend to have fixed opinions
and the· holders utilise the opportunities presented to put forward
those views and so influence others. So whereas due note has been
taken of the printed word, it has been viewed with scepticism and
treated with caution. The publications of the government, health
authorities and professional bodies give an insight into the
contribution made by the contract system to health service
development.
The contract system as it exists now reflects the constraints which
both central government and its agencies have placed upon it. There
is still latitude allowed, which the Regional Health Authorities
have taken 'advantage of •. What emerges therefore are differences in
approach, variation in the number of drugs under a contractual scheme,
as well as the quantity and respective proportions of input of the
supplies officers and pharmacists. A comparison of the Regional
schemes shows considerable variations and an attempt has been made
to relate the efficiency of the contracts in the Regions to those
prevailing factors. Clearly the working relationship between the
supplies officer and the pharmacist is bound to influence the
efficiency of the contract and what becomes clear is that the
historical problems have yet to be resolved. The pharmacist as
the expert on drugs and supplies officer as the expert on buying must
both playa part, but where one seeks to usurp the role of the
other or where one imagines that the other is attempting to usurp
his role, problems are bound to arise. The countrywide diversity
with which the scheme is applied and enacted is examined and evaluated,
so allowing guidance for future contracts.
In 1980, of the estimated £180 million spent on drugs by English
hospitals, about £100 million was under a contractual arrangement.
The administrative cost of the system is unknown. Likewise the
savings, if any, resulting from it are unclear. What is a certainty
is the level of criticism of the contracts as they exist at the
moment, this criticism coming from health service staff involved
as well as suppliers who 'are finding that the contract is becoming
less and less attractive to them.
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There is the feeling among many suppliers that the balance of
rights and oblip,ations is uneven with the rights granted to the
buyer and the obligations resting upon the supplier and this
contention is discussed.
As an academic topic for investigation it is multidisciplinary,
composed of aspects of law, economics, politics, purchasing,
marketing, pharmacy, management and social science, and possibly
as a result of its diverse nature has received little attention
from any discipline. Following the consideration of the published
findings, the m~thodology is given and the primary findings in
relation to the derived hypotheses are presented. It is hoped that
this research will help to create a bet.ter·understanding of drug
purchasing under contract, resulting in an improved service which
utilises to the utmost the scarce resources available to it,
serving the best interests of all parties concerned.
References
Report of the Pharmaceutical Procurement Commodity
Advisory Group, (Chairman Greenleaf, J.C.) Supply
Council. 1982. paras. 2 and 12.
2 Report of the Supply Board Working Group, (Chairman
Salmon, B.L.) DHSS. 1978. para.95.
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SECTION ONE
SECONDARY DATA
·5
CHAPTER
PURCHASING
1.1 General Nature
"Purchasing" denotes the act of and the functional responsibility
for ~rocuring materials, supplies and services. It encompasses
physicai storekeeping and inventory control, whereas "buying" is a
more limited concept, being restricted to the act of procurement alone.
A "market" is defined as the closely interrelated group of sellers and
buyers. It includes all the sellers in that industry and all the
buyers to whom they sell. The t~rm "market structure" refers to the
organisational characteristics of a market which seem to exercise a
strategic influence on the nature of competition and pricing within
the market. Those characteristi.cs determine the relations of sellers
in the market to each other, of buyers in the market to each other,
of the sellers to the buyers, and of established sellers to potential
new entrants to the selling field.
Bain(l.l) refers to the most salient aspects or dimensions of market
structure as being:
n(a) The degree of seller concentration - described by the
number and the size distribution of sellers in the marke t ,
(b) The degree of buyer concentration - defined in parallel
fashion.
(c) The degree of product differentiation as among the outputs·
of the various sellers in the market - that is, the extent
to which their outputs (though similar). are viewed as
nonidentical by buyers.
(d) The condition of entry to the market - referring to the
relative ease or difficult·y with which new sellers may
enter the market, as determined generally by the advantages
which established sellers have over potential entrants.
The potential importance of each of these characteristics is fairly
obvious. Seller concentration refers, for example,
to whether the number of sellers is one, fet-lor many
(monopoly, oligopoly, atomism) and to the relative sizes
of sellers t-lithany eiven number , Theory and observation
su~£est that the character, intensity, and effectiveness
of competiticn·a~ons sellers will be si~nificantly
influenced by the deeree of seller concentration.
Buyer concentration has a similar sienificance in determinine·
the character of cOMpetition among buyers and the character
of the relationships between buyers and sellers that
condition ultiMate market performance.
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Product differentiation refers, for example, to whether
on one hand the products of competing sellers in a market
are viewed as identical (homoeeneous) by buyers, or, on
the other hand, differences in quality, design, packaeing
or reputation amon~ the competing products lead various
buyers t~ have various deerees of preference for certain
of these products as compared to others. The extent
to vhich competine products in a market are differentiated
may clearly be expected to influence the competitive inter-
relationships of sellers in the market, their conduct and
their market performance.
The condition of entry, or height of barrier~ to new
entry to a market, characterizes the extent to which
established sellers have advantages over potential
entrant sellers. It thus deternines the relative
force of potential competition as an influence or
regulator on the conduct and perfomance of sellers
already established in a market."
The market structure for drugs shows a relatively small number of
sellers, less than two hundred, with wide size distribution, sales
ranging from £78 million to £ several thousand. There is a s~~ll
number of buyers, the NHS taking almost 50 per cent ·of the industry's
output, exports about 30 per cent, direct consumer purchases of
over the counter preparations about 10 per cent and others, mainly
non-NHS hospitals about 10 per cent. Product differentiation is ·wide
covering medicinals for the prevention or treatment of every known
disorder. The number of suppliers within each product group. is
relatively small, and that number is obviously dependent upon the
degree of focus concentrated upon therapeutiC groups. For example,
whereas there is one supptrer-for tobramycin there are about ten for
aminoglycoside antibiotic.s, of which group tobramycin is a member, and
there are about fifty suppliers of antibiotics generally. Entry to
the market is restricted by manufacturing equipment costs, and the
legal and ethical emphasis on quality,. resulting in high h~~n resource
. .and capital outlay needs. Additionally patent protection and the
concern for quality of product in the mind of the prescriber militates
against speedy acceptability and easy access to the market.
The market conduct is the behaviour. pattern followed by businesses in
adapting or adjusting to the markets in which they operate. It concerns
•itself with the price poliCies of firms, that is their aims, their
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methods of price establishment, their production outputs, product
choice, marketing expenditure, as well as the interactions between
competing companies.
The end results arrived at in the market as a result of the market
conduct of the companies is the market performance which encompasses
the price, output, production and selling cost and product design.
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1.2 Ob,iectives and Maximisation of Utility
Organisational buying behaviour is defined (1.2) as the decision-
making process by which formal organizations establish the need for
purchased products and services, and identify, evaluate.and choose
among alternative brands and suppliers. The term decision-making
includes acquisition of information, its processing, choice processes,
objectives and other criteria to be used in choosing among alternatives.
Contract drug purchasing forms a small but significant portion of
government buying activities. The government obviously gives
consideration to social, economic and political factors in formulating
its policies. Although the profit motive is lacking, the budget in
the NHS is a constraint preventing the realisation of all its
objectives. Within the limited health care budget there is at present
theoretically no limit on the amount of money to be spent on prescrip-
tion medicines but there is a general awareness that excessive
expenditure on that sector of the service reduces the allocation for
other needs. The government effectively controls the legal environment
of buying and so it possesses both the power to regulate as well as the
power to purchase.
The objectives of government purchasing were defined in a Government
paper (1.3) published in 1967. It stated:
"the primary objective of Government purchasing is to obtain'
what, is needed, at the right time and in such a way as to
secure the best value for rnoney:spent~~ ,
That purchasing function has groHn considerably since the advent
of the NHS and central government is now heavily involved in the
distribution of health goods.
that centralisation provided:
"advantages arising from buying in bulk, including economy,
variety control and standardisation ••••Purchasing in bulk
,will not always be advantageous. As with the reduction in
the variety, of products purchased, there is an optimum level
dependent on industrial capacity, on the economies to both
supplier and user of short haul deliveries and on the need
to maintain competition and the stimulus to innovation in
the supplying industry. None the less, the Government believe
that there is considerable scope for the development of its
purchasing ••• to the benefit of the economy as a whole."
The view of the Government was (1.4)
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On the subject of consultation with industry, the Government stated
(1.5) that:
"Fruitful co-operation between purchaser and supplier depends
upon mutual regard for the interests of the other."
If the generalised views of the Government are focussed upon the
pharmaceutical industry, the impression gained is of a high risk industry
in which the research effort of many years and the investment of many
millions of pounds could result in worthless products. The risk is
further compounded by the possibility of a successful product being
superceded by a competitive innovation without warning. The industry
as part of the private sector of the economy, is required to make a
profit to survive, but its principal market is the government whose
paying agency, the Treasury, has no direct control over it. So the
industry has increasingly taken on the role of scapegoat for a major
share of the blame arising from the apparently uncontrollable rise
in costs of the NHSrand a significant thought exercising governments
over many years is the achievement of value for money in drug
purchasing. In the contract arena, the manufacturer faces the risk
of not being awarded a contract tq supply the hospitals of a
Regional Health Authority for one or two years. On its part the
government wishes to see a thriving pharmaceutical industry, as
described by the Sainsbury Report (1.6}' and the Supply Council Report
(1), which is recognised as having been, over the years, a major
exporter. Stahl and von Grebmer suggest (1.7) that the trend toward
state intervention in the distribution of health goOds will increase
over the coming years.
In seeking to achieve its objectives in purchasing, the government has
regard to the social, economic and political consequences of its
actions (or lack of them). Thus the aim is to promote high employment,
efficiency, progress and stability for the whole economy and efficiency
for the various industries. In order to maximise the attainments of
the economy as a whole as well as those of specific industries the
government pursues several lines of approach to ensure a competitive
market. These are described by Bain as follows (1.8):
" (a) Control of market structures, involving in a constructive
vein securing and maintaining market structures which are
conducive to good performance, and in a remedial vein
alteration of market structures which are linked with
and apparently a factor causing poor market performance.
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(b) Control of market conduct, both constructively and
remedially, largely through prohibitions on conduct
which tends to lead to poor market performance.
(c) Direct remedial measures to reallocate resources
among industries in order to hurry the attainment of
competitive adjustments that the market should
eventually accomplish but is unduly slow in bringing about.
(d) Possible "relief" measures to redress inequitable income
positions during prolonged processes of market
adjustments."
The government therefore has the obligation
(a) to prevent, or if it already exists, to remedy monopolistic
tendencies in industry by, for example, adopting legal measures
to prevent the emergence of a company with too large a share
of the market,
(b) to prevent collusion among competitors,
(c) to provide subsidies as necessary to ensure the viability of
the industry. This would encompass its control of prices to
ensure a viable pharmaceutical industry,
(d) to provide patent protection to act as an incentive to the
invention and innovation of new products, and
(e) to influence the innovation of new drugs by its spending on
research and development.,
The objective of purchasing staff is to buy in the most efficient
way and so contribute to the profitability of their organisation.
That there is no profit making in the NHS does not preclude the buyer
from seeking to ensure that the allocated resources are spent
judiciously.
The buyer aims to obtain supplies in such a fashion as to satisfy
reasonable demands consistent with low stockholding and economic
order quantities. Those pur.chases must be at the lowest price,
provided the goods meet the predetermined quality standard, and the
service offered satisfies the user.
In addition to acquisition of goods the purchaser retains a library
of information on supplies and makes the contents of that information
store available to users to facilitate their choices.
England, possessor of an uncommon blend of skill~, being an authority
on both purchasing and marketing, describes (1.9) the good purchaser
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as one who considers proper qualit~ service and delivery as of basic
importance, but regards a price that is fair both to his own company
and to the supplier as an integral part of every transaction. England
continues his description of a good purchaser as follows:
"Is reasonable in his demands on a supplier, but never forgets
that his primary responsibility is his own company. .
Is courteous and businesslike 1n his treatment of vendors'representatives.
Has·technical purchasing competency, including "Tools" of
purchasing (procedures, records, filing and so forth).
Has knowledge of commodities, the processes by which they
are produced, the manner in which they are marketed, and
the uses (processes) to which they are to be put •••
So controls the inventory of eaah of his materials, in view
of the probable rate of production, that he has the most
economical quantity on hand and on order that current and
prospective price and market conditions warrant ••'.
Has knowledge of available suppliers, materials, substitutes,
price trends, and general business conditions, as well as
trends regarding specific commodities in which his company
is interested, and
Possesses an appreciation of the essential interrelation of
sales, engineering and design, production, and finance, so
that he
Is expected to contribute, and is capable of contributing,
to sound decisions regarding broad company policy formulation
and administration, particularly where procurement matters
are involved •••
He sincerely believes in his job, is loyal to his company,
and practices the highest possible standard of ethics at
all times."
Suppliers' goals include the provision of goods of required quality
and quantity at a reasonable price delivered at the time and place
arranged. By such means the provider will maximise his profitability.
Suppliers often view the market globally and permit or encourage low
or no profit sales in one sector, be it geographically or admin-
istratively defined, with the intention of recouping elsewhere.
England characterises the good supplier as one who is progressive
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as to policies, procedures, organiz.ation and research, possesses
financial strength and is honest and fair with its customers, employees
and itself, believes that it shares with its customers the same
interests, has adequate productive capacity and technical competence,
possesses satisfactory labour conditions, pursues a sound procurement
policy itself and is in reasonable proximity.
The goals of suppliers and purchasers converge with particular clarity
in NHS buying, with potential for conflict or concord being heavily
dependent upon the approach adopted by each party. An RHA report of
July 1979 suggested (1.10) that a direct approach or discussion between
the NHS staff and suppliers would help improve contracting.
Ideally good supplier - good purchaser systems ensure a continual
source of suggestions regarding processes, materials,:and markets.
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1.3 Conflicts and Satisfaction of Corporate and Personal Goals
The government's aim is to promote high employment, efficiency, progress
and stability for the whole economy and efficiency for the pharmaceutical
industry. For the latter it indirectly encourages export potential by
differentially controlling profitability and by encouraging research, and
it discourages monopoly tendencies in industry.
The encouragement of research - based industry brings the government
into covert conflict with its agencies, Regional Health Authorities,
which have no interest in the modus operandi of pharmaceutical companies
and their export potential or achievements.
The goal of the District Health Authority is to purchase drugs at the
19we~t..possible price consistent with adequate quality,.to ensure
continuity of supply and to purchase in the most cost efficient way.
In order to achieve this the Authority might desire that its own staff
control the function so that it would be more responsive to the local
needs of its staff, and by implication, its patients.
Operational results do not always co.incide with organisational goals.
Government efforts to control company profits make individual drug
price negotiation a fruitless exercise. Furthermore the philosophy
of government support to research - based concerns is negated
by Health Authorities buying from:generic "copiers", albeit at lower
prices.
A Health Authority may unwittingly not be purchasing at the lowest
price, a contributory factor being the poor communications in the NHS.
That the quality of drugs bought is adequate is undisputed, but it
is possible that medicines from some manufacturers may be viewed as
unacceptable on the basis of outdated technical information which
prevents some otherwise suitable material being bought.
The need for continuity of supply in the aims of RHA purchasing is
not necessarily satisfied by contract award. Despite its legalistic
terminology NHS contract purchase does not guarantee business to a
supplier or supplies to the Health Authority.
The purchasing by a Health Authority in the most cost efficient way
is a topic analysed in depth later. Since the cost of the operation
is unknown and since other methods of goods acquisition have not been
examined, a question mark must hang over that aspect ofNHS buying.
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Those performing the buying are the remote employees of a Regional
Health Authority, suspected of attaching less importance to the
individual specific needs of a dozen or so district authorities than
their own overall requirements. The conflict is not entirely divorced
from the overall dimension of the perceived but nevertheless misplaced
view by Districts of Regions as being cast in the Orwellian role of
"big brother" as a result of the monitoring function held by the RHA.
Superimposed upon the structure and its real or perceived conflicts
are those of the individuals who are actively concerned with the
pursuit of their personal interests and career goals, and who regard
them as of primary interest. Furthermore, the members of the two
disciplines primarily involved, namely pharmacists and supplies
officers, pursue, subliminally or consciously, the restrictive
sectional interests of their professional organisations as well as
those personal ones of status, prestige, recognition and self-
fulfilment. There is also functional conflict with inadequate
boundaries of jurisdiction, and that conflict is reinforced by poor
communications within the NHS as well as between the DHSS and the NHS,
and poor co-ordination and understanding resulting from the enormous
scale of the service as exemplified by its status as the largest
employer in Europe.
Health Service purchasing is characterised by the large number of
people involved as well as the wide range of their roles. The presence
of a contract superimposes a committee structure in the decision
making process and centralisation in the purchase function. One can
identify users, influencers, deciders and buyers, with the possibility
of a professional group playing different roles in neighbouring Health
Authorities. It is essential, therefore, in analysing the modus
operandi of contract purchasing to consider all the groups who partici-
pate in the decision-making process. Prescription drugs are perhaps
unique in having such a large number of parties involved in the
production to use chain, as illustrated in Figure 1.1. They are
manufactured by the pharmaceutical company, sold to a wholesaler or
pharmacist in hospital or community practice, prescribed by a doctor
under the influence of industrial advertising and promotion, dispensed
by the pharmacist, consumed by the patient and are paid for in the
main by the taxpayer. The purchase of drugs, along with other goods by
15
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hospitals is "one of the few predominantly commercial operations in
·what is primarily a service organisation." (1.11).
The organisation of a contract arrangement for the purchase of drugs
brings about the intervention of a further link in the chain in the
person of the supplies officer, a non pharmaceutically qualified
administrator who specialises in procurement and supplies activities.
Webster and Wind (1.12) note the len.~thof time reqt.:iredfor buying
decisions in organisations to be made because of the evaluations
required and the complexity of the organisation. Thus the relationships
in the buying process do not follow the chain of command but are
horizontal between suppliers officer, pharmacist, doctor, etc •• No
single discipline has the final say in the decision-making process.
The major determinants of organizational buying behaviour are defined
by Webster and Wind (1.13) as the environmental factors, the organisa-
tional characteristics, the interpersonal relationships among the
members involved and the individual characteristics of these members.
In an attempt to understand more clearly the buying behaviour, models
have been established for organising and 'interpreting the information
available (1.14). Webster ann Wind have categorised those models as
"task" or "nontask", "task" models emphasis~ng task-related variables
such as price whereas the "nontask" models include those which attempt
to explain buying behaviour based on a set of variables, such as the
buyer's motives, which do not have a direct bearing on the specific
problem to be solved by the buying task, although they may be important
determinants of the final purchasing decision. They are shown in
Table 1.1 (1.15).
TABLE 1.1: A CLASSIFICATION OF DETERMINANTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL
BUYING BEHAVIOUR
Source of influence
Individual Factors
Task Variables
Desire to obtain
lowest price
Meetings to set product Off-the-job
specifications interactions among
company employees
Nontask Variables
Personal values
Interpersonal (Social)
Factors
Organizational
(Formal) Factors
Company policies with
respect to product
quality
Expected trends in
business conditions
Company policies
regarding community
relations
Political factors in
an election year
Environmental Factors
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Webster and Wind describe those factors which have an effect on the
decision to buy (1.16). The enviror~ent exerts an influence on the
organization, its members and the patterns of interaction among them.
The task-related environmental forces are primarily derived from inter-
organizational relations. Of utmost importance are the marketing
stimuli presented by prospective suppliers, but in addition there
are the technical, political and economic characteristics of society.
The nontask factors include the influence of other org2nizations and
the social-cultural-political environment.
The formal organization is defined by its objectives, policies,
procedures, structure and systems of rewards, authority, status and
communication.,: and these influence the buying process. The task
influences include policies defining the criteria as to the quality
to be purcha~~d, delivery requirements and stockholding. The non-
task factors are the systems for rewarding performance, assigning
status and power to individuals, and for communication. The status
and power enjoyed by the supplies officer, the purchasing pharmacist
the quality control pharmacist and the prescriber are examples of this
category. The transfer of information among members of the
organization can influence the purchasing decision. The establishment
of a committee to discuss buying, and the specific composition of such
a committee may significantly influence the decision.
The interpersonal factors are the social ones. Those who playa
role in the buying process are the influencers, users, deciders, buyers
and gatekeepers. The buying group has a pattern of communication and
a set of shared values (norms) which direct and constrain the behaviour
of the individual within it. Deciders have formal authority and
responsibility for deciding among alternative brands and vendors.
Influencers do not necessarily have buying authority but can influence
the outcome of the decision through the application of constraints.
Buyers have formal authority for selecting vendors and consummating the
buying decision. This authority may be constrained by other members.
Users may have little or no authority or influence. Gatekeepers
control the information flowing into the buying group and include
secretaries, drug information pharmacists, quality controllers, supplies
officers or pharmacists who can control the activities of represent~
atives who call on others. They can prevent a representative detailing
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a drug to an influencer or user. One individual may occupy several of
the roles listed and several individuals ~ay occupy Lhe same role. All
individuals are influencers, but not all influencers occupy other roles.
The individual behaviour of the person involved in the buying process
defines the system. Each person applies his set of needs, goals,
habits, past experiences, information and attitudes to the purchase
decision. The individual also accepts and strives for the accomplish-
ment of the goals of their groups and organisation. Of importance are
the individual's self confidence, reaction to risk, tolerance to
uncertainty, age, income, education, professional identification and
personality, his awareness, attitudes and preferences towards suppliers
and brands, and his methods of obtaining and processing information
regarding alternative sources of supply.
The roles of the individuals involved in the buying process have been
defined by Webster and Wind (1.17) as outlined in Table 1.2.
TABLE 1.2: DECISION STAGES AND ROLES IN THE BUYING CENTRE
User Influ- Buyer De- Gate-
encer cider keeper
Identification of Need x x
Establishing specifications
and scheduling the Purchase x x x x
Identifying Buying Alternatives x x x x
Evaluating Alternative
Buying Actions x x x
Selecting the Suppliers x x x x
Webster and ~Jinddefine the roles as follows:
"Users may exert their influence either individually or
collectively. In many cases the potential users are those
who initiate the buying process or even formulate the specific
purchase requirements," or use their influence "by refusing
to work with the materials of certain suppliers for any of
several reasons."
Although prescribers are demanders of drugs rather than users, they
should be classified as users in terms of their role in the buying
centre.
Webster and Wind continue:
"Influencers are organizational members who directly or indirectly
influence buying or usage decisions ••• by defining criteria which
constrain the choices ••• or providing information with which to
evaluate alternative buying actions ••• technical personnel are
known to be significant influencers."
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Buyers have "formal authority for selecting the supplier and
arranging the terms of the purchase ••• Although the buyer may
have formal authority for negotiating with suppliers for
committing the organization to supply contracts, the choices
available to him may be significantly limited by the formal
and informal influence of others. For example, technical
personnel may have authority for establishing specifications
and may do so in a manner which forces the buyer to deal
with a particular supplier."
The buyer's influence is "especially apparent in determining
the set of feasible suppliers and in selecting the suppliers
••• and (the influence) depends ••• on the nature of the buying
task. It can be relatively routine ••• applying previously
established criteria to a limited range of acceptable
alternative~a function that is essentially clerical in nature;
or it may be somewhat more complex if there is the need to
negotiate prices and other conditions of sale as part of the
process of arranging the purchase contract."
Deciders have "power to determine the final selection of
suppliers. The buyer may be the decider, but it is also
possible that the buying decision actually will be made
by somebody else and left to the buyer for implementation.
In actual practice it is not always easy to determine when
the decision is actually made and who actually makes it.
A de ·facto buying decision may be made by ••• a specification
that can be met by only one supplier •••
Gatekeepers control the flow of infor;nation into.the group
~•. the buyer may have formal authority for allowing salesmen
to call upon the engineering department or may be responsible
for maintaining a library of catalogues ••• General management
also may be exposed to important sources of information, and
technical personnel especially are likely to be exposed to
information about new products and new technology of interest
to the firm."
Webster and Wind (1.18) note the activities of the purchasing agent:
"the purchasing agent typically feels that he must be involved
in the decision process at the earliest stages - that is, at
the stage of defining the need for purchased products or
services ••• He wants to ••• assure that the best value is
received from available alternatives in the marketplace.
Especially if the buyer is ambitious, he will want to achieve
management recognition and enhanced status within the organization
and, identifying with the profession of purchasing, he will
actively seek to enlarge the scope of his authority and
responsibility. He will actively fight any tendency to keep the
purchasing function from being involved before the final stages
of placing orders and he will resist specifications that limit
the alternatives that he can consider. The purchasing agent's
ambitions and desires for increased status cause disequilibrium
and upset the stability of his relationships with other members
of the buying center. Instead of being on the "receiving" end
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•of the purchasing decision process, whbre requisitions are given
to him for routine clerical attention, he tries to make the
interactions flow both ways by encouraging people to accept his
advice, information, and guidance as they define specifications,
set schedules, evaluate vendors, and so on. He wants involvement
at all stages of the buying decision."
Those views on the role of the buyer are examined in the primary research.
At this stage it is timely to note the expanded role of the hospital
pharmacist over the last ten years and his development of an active role
in providing advice to prescribers in addition to his traditional role
of dispensing the requirements of the prescriber. His education and
skills are being used more and he is deriving greater job satisfaction
as a result. By contrast the skills of the Supplies Officer are, in
the opinion of many, not utilised sufficiently. A move to negotiation
in the award of a contract might remedy this and is discussed later.
In view of the absence of negotiation on price in contract awards, a
statement of the Supply Board Working Group seems surprising.
It stated (1.19) that supplies work 1s "concerned essentially with
getting the best value for money in the purchase of goods, and having
to match the commercial expertise of suppliers." It might be considered
unfair to suggest that in a negotiation, the negotiating expertise of
the industrial manager would outclass that of the health service
Supplies Officer and therefore that is a good reason for the absence of
negotiation in NHS contract awards. Those negotiating skills which the
Supplies Officer has acquired are excluded from the competitive tender
system of contract purchasing.
Turpin (1.20) states that "Procurement is a specialized function which
can only be carried out efficiently by people with specialized skills"
and this reflected the 1911 Rayner report on Government Defence
Procurement. Turpin suggested (1.21) that "substantial economies can be
realized (in government procurement) if the work is efficiently done by
properly trained officers." Hyman has remarked (1.22) upon the in-
efficiency of supplies management in many health authorities. He
advocated (1.23) some or more training in supplies matters for, inter
alia, all pharmacists, and supported "continuous career training for all
supplies officers, including some periods in industry and other public
services."
The contracts award committee is composed of personnel representing
diverse interests and professions. Webster and Wind relate (1.24)·
that:
21
"Buying committees are used Hhere the judgments of several
organizational members are felt necessary to evaluate
alternative buying actions ••• Buying committees are often
found in organizations wher-e several distinct viewpotnt s
are represented in the buying situation and need to be
taken into consideration in evaluating buying alternatives."
The committee faces four problems described as probleMs of objectives,
personnel, navigation and leadership, and decision making. The
problems of objectives encompass the:
"(a) defining and agreeing on the objectives of the
committee ••• (b) explicating and solving the conflicting
objectives of the various departments represented, and the
conflict between the departmental objectives and the
committee's objectives ••• (c) determining the individual
objectives and their congruency with the departments' and
the committee's objectives."
The problems of personnel relate to the personalities of the
partiCipants:
'''theirtalkativeness, shyness, defenSiveness, friendliness,
argumentativeness, and especially the leader's personality,
his dominance or subnissiveness, his leadership pattern,
his desire to be liked, and so on."
The navigation and leadership problems arise because:
"Committees can get "so involved in their activities and content
matters that they may lose direction." It is one of the
functions of the committee's leadership to provide the
required direction. In addition, the leadership should
open and maintain communication among the co~~ittee members
and help resolve the various problems confronting the
operation of the committee."
The problems of decision making are those of the possibly greater
difficulty of a group than an individual to make an efficient"
decision:
"the need for unanimity versus the majority rule,
specificity versus general decisions, and so forth."
A further aspect of contract awards is the centralization implicit.
Centralization is the process of concentration of effort. In the
context of purchasing it implies a management policy that channels
all procurement through a purchasing department.
Hebster and Hind (1.25) report a conceptual frametvorkwithin which the
effects of centralization versus decentralization on buyer behaviour
is examined. Centralization influences the buyer's job in five ways:
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"(1) the geographical location of the buyer;
(2) the a~thority relationships between buyers and users;
(3) the authority relationships between the buyer and the
top purchasing executive;
(4) informal relationships between buyers and users;
(5) the formal nature of communication between buyers and users."
It was hypothesized that in centraliz~d purchasing the buyer's loyalty
domain would be mainly in the purchasing group, where formal rewards
were given by the purchasing manager and social rewards by other buyers.
In decentralized buying, the buyer feels more loyal to users than to
the purchasing department because he is closer to and has more frequent
contact with the users and because the users are in a better position
to offer him important social rewards and formally evaluate and reward
his performance. The award of a contract and its consequent central-
ization of purchasing imparts a lower responsiveness to users' needs.
Webster and Wind (1.25) state that the model seems consistent with
actual practice.
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1.4 Monopoly, Monopsony, Oligopoly and Oligopsony
The market form of an industry can show perfect competition or
imperfect competition. Pharmaceuticals are an example of imperfect
competition. Teeling-Smith says the obvious (1.26) in expressing the
view that drugs resemble all manufactured goods in that they all no
longer show classical price competition, since that only exists in
theory, that of wheat farming. Normal supply-demand considerations
imply that an increase in price causes a decrease in demand and an
increase in supply. By contrast a decrease in price increases demand
and decreases supply.
Egan et al pOint out that for industrial products there is greater
flexibility given the shorter and more highly controlled production
processes and rates (1.27).
They further state that an additional characteristic of industrial
products is a high rate of product innovation and change. Competition
is effected by dynamic product changes rather than price.
For drugs the price elasticity is Virtually nil, "that is supply (and
demand) are unresponsive to change in price. Price elasticity, if
less than 1, is inelastic; if more than 1 is highly elastic; if it
is T, it is perfectly elastic. The latter implies that a decrease in
unit price produces such an increase in supply that the value of sales
remains constant, or an increase in price produces a decrease in demand
with value of sales remaining as before. Although there is little price
awareness by prescribers and so little price competition, there is
product competition between similar treatments or different brands of
the same drug. Instead the price charged is determined by the patent
status of the drug as well as the operation of the PPRS.
Perfect competition is defined as a market where the product is homo-
geneous,entry into the market is free and the behaviour of anyone
producer has no real effect on the market price. Imperfect competition
can be represented by monopoly, a situation in which there is one
supplier of a product, oligopoly, where there are few suppliers,
monopsony, where there is one buyer and oligopsony where there are few
buyers. In the case of the first two, the supplier has influence over
price, can control supply but cannot dictate demand, whereas in the last
tW9 the purchaser holds the influence over price, can dictate demand but
has no control over supply.
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The supplier or purchaser can therefore exert an effect on the market
price where imperfect competition exists in all instances other than a
market structure showing an oligopolistic supplier and an oligopsonistic
buyer (bilateral oligopoly) or bilateral monopoly which is unknown to
exist in practice.
The United Kingdom human medicine market consists of three sectors.
These are
(a) NHS prescriptions,
(b) Private prescriptions,
(c) Over the counter sales.
Private prescriptions form a very small part of that market with
estimates ranging up to 10 per cent by value of the home market. Of
the remainder' about 75 to 80 per cent consists of NHS sales and 20 to
25 per cent consists of over-the-counter or household sales (1.28).
In addition, export sales from 1969 to 1981 have been running at the
rate of £4.0 million to £5.5 million for every £10 million of home sales
(1.28). In other words sales to markets abroad are not quite as
valuable as those to the NHS.
The Government, as purchaser of NHS medicines, holds a near
monopsonistic position. It should therefore be expected to be capable
of influencing the market price. The Government's power over price
determination is reinforced when Health Authorities award contracts as
this effectively reduces the number of buyers acting on behalf of the
DHSS, increases the value of the indiVidual.orders placed and so
strengthens the control which the buyer may exert over the supplier.
A complicating factor, however, is that the DHSS buys on behalf of the
NHS but the demander is the prescriber who neither pays nor is acutely
aware of the price of the drug, but is influenced in his demand choice
by the efforts of the DHSS and the manufacturers. The oligopsonistic
power is therefore in several respects more theoretical than real,
unless, as in hospitals, contract purchasing brings in its wake low
brand loyalty, reducing the influence of the demander and increasing
that of the buyer.
The sellers of a drug are few, in which case the market structure is
described as having oligopolistic sellers (1.29) or if the drug is
patented there is one seller only and so has a monopoly.
A monopoly assumes the absence of a close substitute product and so
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the monopolist faces no imminent threat of competition. The absence
of a close substitute product is rare in pharmaceuticals. The trend
in pharmaceutical manufacturing is for companies to become fewer but
larger (1.30, 1.31) and this trend is bound to shift the equilibrium
from atomism toward oligopoly and oligopoly to monopoly.
The pharmaceutical manufacturers therefore become more vulnerable to
investigation under monopolies and mergers legislation, a prerogative
of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. In addition the
Government uses the PPRS negotiations and, if necessary, statutory
provisions to influence prices.
The price charged by the retail seller of medicines is maintained as
a result of a judgment of the Restrictive Practices Court in 1970
(1.32). It was considered that for proprietary, that is over-the-
counter, medicines Resale Price Maintenance abolition would result in
a substantial reduction in the number of establishments selling the
goods, and in the case of ethical products, that is prescription drugs,
there would in addition be a substantial reduction in the quality or
variety of goods available. It could be suggested that since the
Government effectively controls resale prices of medicines through the
PPRS and the Patents Act, abolition of Resale Price Maintenance would
not in the long term lower prices, although, in the short term, whole-
salers would reduce stock and deliveries, and prescription demand would
be met less quickly.
·In 1973, the Monopolie~ Commission reported (1.33) on the supply of
chlordiazepoxide and diazepam. They found that a monopoly existed and
that it was "undesirable that Roche Products should supply these drugs
to NHS hospitals and the armed forces free of charge, or at low prices
which are unrelated to cost savings, for the purpose of keeping
competitors as far as possible out of that part of the market." (1.34)
In addition they recommended that the manufacturer "should not
differentiate in its selling prices between customers or classes of
customers (including DHSS as purchaser for NHS hospitals and the
armed forces) except to the extent that such differentiation is
justified by normal commercial considerations such as savings in cost
arising from bulk supply." (1.35)
The Commission recommended that the selling prices of the drugs under
discussion should be reduced and this was achieved by the Government
by way of a Statutory Lt.. trument. There followed protracted legal
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proceedings which eventually led to a settlement announced in
November 1915 in which price arrangements satisfactory to both sides
were negotiated.
Initially when it was established in 1948 the t10nopolies and Restrictive
Practices Commission was constituted as an investigatory body to see if
monopoly situations existed and whether they operated a6ainst the
public interest. Since then its successor bodies, the Monopolies
Commission and More recently the f'lonopoliesand Hereers Commission
have tended to aSSUMe that monopolies autoMatically operate against
the public interest. Thus the l'11er~erbetween the tHO pharMaceutical
nanuracturer-e Glaxo and Beecham vas opposed on the ,,:;rollndsof reduced
competition in research and developMent (1.36).
Health Service Regional Supplies Officers applied their thoughts to the
economic purchasing criteria in 1969.. Those ideas vlere endorsed by
the DHSS and were reported (1.31) by the Supply Board Workine Group in
1918 as follows:
"Uhen considering the economic unit of purchase it is obvious
that the competitiveness in the relative industry must also
be examined. For example in an industry which has comparatively
fe\l manufacturers of a particular product purchas i ng or
contracting by greater number of authorities will tend to
increase prices as each contractin~ authority will, through
their individual demands, be in competition with each other
and may tend to force prices up; and of e~ual consideration,
in an industry that has many Manufacturers of a particular
product, large unit purchasing by an authorHy \-/ith enough
purchasing power to influence the trade may tend to diminish
the competitiveness. As cost effec~iveness in purchasing
depends to a great extent on competition among suppliers,
this is a most important consideration. It f'ollows that very
accurate assessments must be l'11adewhen looking at this question
aridparticularly when investieating "monopoly" or "ring" prices.
The temptation to achieve quick savines at the expense of a
lone term policy to sustain competition should be avoided."
~fuen those thoughts are focused upon drue purchasing the conclusion to
be drawn is that sonetimes health authorities COMpete with each other
for drugs in short supply resultine in possibly raised prices. If
those authorities' purchasin3 arrangements are consolidated the
possibility of the trade beine markedly affected MUSt be considered.
Loss of bUsiness from an oligopsonistic buyer could force businesses
out of the market resulting in higher rather than the anticipated
lower prices. The message of the Regional Supplies Officers seems
to be that some degree of co-operation among buying authorities
would be benefiCial, provided it is 'kept within bounds, but the
number of companies must not be allowed to diminish excessively.
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Appendix 3 to the Supply Board Horking Group Report is an analysis
of the shortcomings of NHS supplies arrangements written by one of
the members of that Group. It stated, (1.38), inter alia:
"t1anufacturers must be competitive and the supply position
must not be allowed to deteriorate into a monopoly or near
monopoly situation."
Turpin completes the picture of the relationship between government
and industry as follows:
"The way in which government procurement is carried out
can have a significant effect upon the growth, competitiveness
and efficiency of British industry ••• If the government
exercises a considerable power as a purchaser, industry
possesses a countervailing power, greatly fortified where
conditions of monopoly or oligopoly obtain ••• For each
side to act in this situation with exclusive regard to its
own immediate interest is unacceptable." (1.39).
The market for drugs bought by Health Authorities can best be described
as bilaterial oligopoly which is oligopoly plus oligopsony. There is
a significant degree of buyer concentration and a significant degree of
seller concentration. The characteristics predicted for the conduct
and performance of such a market are described by Bain (1.40):
"full control over price in the hands of neither buy~rs
alone nor sellers alone, express or tacit bargaining on
price between buyer-seller pairs or between groups of
buyers and of sellers, and some general tendency for
the power of large sellers and that of large buyers to
offset each other, so that price deviates from the atomistic
level less than it would with olieopoly alone or oligopsony
alone. That is, the "countervailing pOHer" of lare:e buyers
and of larce sellers may tend to blunt both monopolistiC and
monopsonistic tendencies, thouSh arrival exactly at an
atomistic outcome is not generally to be expected.
Comparative degrees of seller and buyer concentration
should have some influence on the outcome."
The policies of the seller and the buyer are in opposition in
bilateral oligopoly. The bargaining or negotiation between the two
parties results in a general price for all sales or a variety of
prices. Bain (1.41) describes the different prices emerging as a sort
of "chaotic discrimination" among different buyers and different
transactions. He feels that solid-front bargaining is uncommon with
group negotiations.generally not appearing, but rather large buyers
attempt to secure more favourable prices, in response to wh.ich sellers
attempt to hold the prices firm. On the question of the effect of
bilateral oligopoly negotiations on resulting price compared with that
prevailing under different market conditions Bain is uncertain.
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CHAPTER 2
N.H.S. PURCHASING PROCEDURES
2.1 General Nature
The National Health Service Act 1946 (2.1) which came into operation
on 5 July 1948 conferred on the Minister of Health the duty to promote
the establishment of a comprehensive health service. When the
Department of Health and Social Security was created on November 1 1968,
the Secretary of State for Social Services took over this responsibility.
The Secretary of State is responsible by law to Parliament for the
provision and administration of a national health service in England.
Whereas he is required to establish Regional and District (formerly
Area) Health Authorities and is given power to decide what -,
functions to delegate them, he has no legal power to control the
activities of hospitals or personnel in the NHS (2.2). These functions
are carried out by the 14 Regional and 193 District Health Authorities
~n England. Each of these is legally independent (2.3).
The Permanent Secretary to the DHSS is Accounting Officer and is
personally responsible for the proper expenditure of the funds
Parliament has voted for the NHS (2.4). The Secretary of State can
refuse to supply health authorities with finance but he can only do so
to the extent that enables the NHS to continue: He is responsible for
seeing that there is a health service but he is not responsible for
each particular unit of it. Despite this, he is answerable to the
House of Commons for the NHS and any detail of day-ta-day activity
can form the basis of a question from a M.P. that he is obliged to
answer (2.5).
The NHS Act 1946 authorized the Regional Hospital Boards to exercise
various functions, including the acquisition of hospital supplies, on
behalf of the Minister (2.6). Nevertheless the Board carried any
liabilities incurred as if it were acting as a principal (2.3). The
Minister was empowered, either by agreement or compulsorily, to acquire
any equipment used in or in connection with the hospital premises.
This was a provision of Clause 10 of the NHS Act 1946 (2.1).
However, the acquisition of supplies was normally the function of
the local health authority, as empowered by Clause 64 of that Act.
The :National Health Service Regulations, 1948,conferred upon hospitals
the powers necessary for acquiring supplies, subject to any arrangements
made by a Regional Hospital Board with the consent of the Minister (2.8).
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The 1968 Health Services and Public Health Act authorizes the use
of that power exercisable under section 46 of the Patents Act 1949,
to procure medicines for the hospital service at lower prices than
charged by patentees for the procurement of medicines for the general
medical, pharmaceutical and dental services of the NHS (2.9).
The NHS Reorganisation Act 1973, which brought about the changes in
the NHS on 1 April 1974, did not alter the ambivalence shown by the
NHS Act 1946 toward the role of the Minister of Health. It states
(2.10) that the Secretary of State shall have power (a) to provide
such services as he considers appropriate for the purpose of dis-
charging any duties imposed on him by the Health Service Acts; and
(b) to do any other thing whatsoever which is calculated to facilitate,
or is conducive or incidental to, the discharge of such a duty. He
must ensure that the NHS operates satisfactorily, ensuring that goods
are bought in the most efficient and economic way but his power to bring
this about is limited to advice to area and regional health authorities
in varying degrees of persistence on how they might purchase supplies
(2.11).
The National Health Service Act 1977 (2.12) consolidated certain
provisions relating to the health service and repealed certain
enactments. Section 17 of the Act empowered the Secretary of State
to give directions with respect to the exercise of any functions.
Section 57 of that Act notes that the:
"Secretary of State may by order provide for controlling
maximum prices to be charged for any medical supplies
required for the purposes of this Act. The Secretary of
State may by direction, ••• concerned with medical supplies,
require persons ••• or under~akings ••• to keep such books,
accounts and records ••• as may be prescribed by the
direction, ••• order •••, or notice, to furnish at such times,
in such manner and in such form as may be so prescribed such
estimates, returns or information relating to the undertaking
as may be so prescribed."
Schedule 11 to that Act deals among other matters with the orders and
directions under section 57 of the Act and the restriction on dis-
closing information. Paragraph 5 of the Schedule states:
"No person who obtains any information by nature of section
57 above and this Schedule shall, otherwise than in connection
with the execution of that section and this Schedule or of an
order made under that section, disclose that information except
for the purposes of any criminal proceedings, or of a report of
any criminal proceedings, or with permission granted by or on
behalf of a Minister of the Crown."
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Clearly Section 57 of the NHS Act 1977 provides the legal basis to the
PPRS detailed later. It is possible that those who refuse to supply
information on the operation of the Scheme do so under the assumption
that to provide such information would run counter to Schedule 11 to
that Act!
The market for pharmaceuticals in the United Kingdom in 1979 was £1351
million with a predicted value for 1980 of £1594 million (2.13) this
including items bought by patients. Hospital and community drugs
dispensed in England in 1978-79 were worth £673 million and £781
million in 1979-80 (2.14). In 1980-81 approximately £185 million
were spent on pharmaceuticals by English hospitals and £775 million
by the Family Practitioner Services (2.15). An estimate of the Office
of Health Economics, a body sponsored by the Association of the British
Pharmaceutical Industry showed the U.K. general practice prescription
market to be £735 million in 1979 (2.16) and hospital market to be
£165 million (2.17). That hospital figure is 2.8% of the total
hospital revenue budget (purchases and salaries) (2.18) and if
salaries are excluded, it forms 10.7% of hospital purchasing costs
(2.19), the most expensive commodity.
The information on total expenditure on contract purchases of drugs
in the health service is incomplete (2.20). From the information
available, it was estimated that in 1975176 total capital and revenue
expenditure of Regional Health Authorities was £593.1 million, of which
22.7% consisted of purchasing under central arrangements, 33.8% under
co-ordinated regional and area arrangements and 43.4% under unco-
ordinated arrangements. Drugs expenditure during that financial year
amounted to £67.9 million of which 4.9% was under central purchasing
arrangements (2.21). Expenditure figures for co-ordinated regional
and area arrangements, as well as unco-ordinated arrangements are
available for two regions only (2.22).
ForQneregion co-ordinated arrangements accounted for 47.6% of drug
expenditure (compared with 40.1% for all commodities) and unco-
ordinated arrangements consumed 47.2% of drug expenditure (compared
with 36.6% for all commodities). The other region showed co-
ordinated arrangements for drugs of 58.4% of all drug expenditure
(compared with 39.4% for all ~ommodities) and 36.0% for unco-
ordinated purchases of drugs (compared with 49.6% for all commodities).
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It can be deduced that the value of co-ordinated purchasing of drugs
varies but generally accounts for a greater proportion of expenditure
than goods generally. Nevertheless, this was considerably less than
the 80% that might be obtained (2.23).
The relationship between the buyer, an agent of the government, and
the seller, private industry, is one in which a balance between the
control over the supplier and the freedom required by it is stuck
and regulated by contract. Turpin (2.24) describes it as a kind of
treaty, by which the conditions of a relationship of interdependence
are established. Hyman (2.25) feels that to be meaningful at law and
useful in practice, a contract must define quantities to be purchased
over stated times, at different prices, to given delivery points. In
practice, this is not the case. As in other public services, contract
purchasing occurs by competitive tendering. Since most tenders are
based on estimated quantities to be supplied as and when demanded, this
constitutes a standing offer which may be revoked at any time. The
contract therefore exists only in respect of orders placed while the
offer stands. Only specific quantities for tender would allow a
definite offer and thus the contract is not binding.
Beynon, a NHS supplies officer, refers (2.261 to ·"cbnfusion" about the
precise nature of a contract and suggests it results from the use of
"supplies jargon." He further declares that the term "contract" is
often used for convenience and not in a strictly legal sense. Salmon
(2.27) stated that in present circumstances,· it is often not possible to
be sufficiently specific about future quantities to permit a binding
contract to.be made, and he felt that the standing offer will always have
a place in the purchasing arrangements of the NHS, as it does in many
other organisations.
Health Authority drug purchasing is manifestly different from community
arrangements in respect of the professional discretion accorded to the
hospital pharmacist to supply an equivalent brand to that prescribed.
In effect this allows the hospital to stock only one brand of each drug.
Since several manufacturers compete against each other for the supply
of unpatented drugs, that aspect of drug purchase lends itself
particularly well to a competitive framework in which each unpatented
drug is obtained.
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Tendering has traditionally been the means of purchase of many
patented as well as unpatented drugs, but recent moves suggest that
tendering is highly inappropriate for patented drugs and some analysts
feel that negotiation would provide cheaper prices for patented drugs.
The aim of the tendering procedure is to provide competition in public
authority purchasing. The independent preparation of tenders by
prospective suppliers is an essential feature of the system. Collusion
among suppliers therefore strikes at its roots on economic and ethical
grounds. The economic ones are the loss of economic efficiency and
the financial burden on the purchaser and the ethical grounds are those
of deception for financial gain.
Collusive tendering falls within the scope of the Restr.ictive Trade
Practices Act 1976. It is, however, difficult to detect. An obvious
precaution is to avoid undue regularity and predictability in the
choice of firms invited to tender. An approved list of firms should be
sufficiently large and regularly updated to allow competent new suppliers
to b~ placed on it (2.28).
The operation of contracting is governed by the National Health Service
Regulations 1973 which require Health Authorities to make Standing
Orders for the regulation of their proceedings and business (2.29).
Standing Orders govern the award of contracts and apart from ensuring
that public money is subjected to public accountability they afford
protection to the officers who purchase. Rix suggests (2.3q) that
there is nothing in Standing Orders to encourage officers to undertake
further action to promote purchasing efficiency. Rix continues:
"Standing Orders alone cannot guarantee efficiency in
purchasing and they may sometimes even hinder efficient
purchasing."
Rix identifies the motivation of the purchaser as being concerned
primarily with safeguarding his reputation which depends on his obeying
the rules rather than on his "value for money" performance.
35
2.2 Tendering
Since the 19th Century, .one of the leading principles of government
contracting has been that they should be let by competitive tender
(2.31). The tender is the offer made by the potential supplier which
is accepted or declined. It is a practice approved by the Public
Accounts Committee for a record to be made in departmental files of
the reasons for departing from competition in particular cases, so
as to facilitate inquiry by the Comptroller and Auditor General.
Within each government department, the Accounting Officer is
responsible, under the Minister, for all financial matters in his
department. Since the late 1920's the Permanent Head of each
department holds this office. He is appointed by the Treasury but he
is not the Treasury's servant or representative in the department.
He is responsible to his Minister for economical administration and
has responsibility to Parliament and is required to sign the
Appropriation Account of his department .which is laid before the
House of Commons. He has to answer to the Public Accounts Committee
for the correctness of the account and is held responsible for the
efficient and economical administration of the business of his
department (2.32). The Public Accounts Committee is a committee
of Members of Parliament appointed each session to examine the
Appropriation Accounts and the Reports on them of the Comptroller
and Auditor General and it calls for explanations from the Accounting
Officers of the departments (2.33). The Comptroller and Auditor
General must discover and report upon any neglect or violation by
departments of the established contracting principles. His report of
1946 stated that the examination of contract methods was one of the
leading functions of his officers (2.34). This includes the·working
of the system for placing contracts and accepting tenders and is an
integral part of his statutory duty to satisfy himself that the
expenditure conforms to the authority which governs it and he must
check the formal regularity of expenditure by government departments
(2.3~). The Public Accounts Committee must ensure that departments
observe the recognised principles of contracting and where its report
draws attention to any defect of contracting procedure, the Treasury
assumes responsibility for seeing that the matter is rectified by the
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department concerned (2.36).
It is evident that buying by government agencies is considerably
circumscribed.
·Turpin holds the view that competitive tender is an effective means
of getting the needed goods at lowest cost and is easy to administer
(2.37).
Turpin described (2.38) competitive tender as "almost an article of
faith. " h1ebster and Hind describe (2.39) the low-bid or competi tive
tender system as "a form of investment-reducing strategy" designed to
reduce perceived risk. That risk, .in their view, is a function of the
uncertainty which an individual has about the outcome of a given course
of action and the consequences associated with alternative outcomes.
They continue:
"The'individual may be uncertain either about the goals
that are relevant in the buying situation or about the
extent to which a particular course of buying action will
meet those goals •••
Two types of consequences will be of importance as determinants
of the amount of risk per-ceived by the organisational buyer in
a given buying situation. First, uncertainty about the
·performance of certain products and vendors will be significant
determinants of perceived risk. Second, the individual may be
concerned about the reactions of other people to·his decisions,
the psychosocial consequences of his actions.
The importance of the consequences resulting from a given
buying action Hill increase as a function of the importance
of the goals being pursued and as a function of the amount of
time, money, effort, and "psychosocial" investment involved
in the buying decision."
\-1ebsterand Hind suegest that high perceived psychosocial risk can be
reduced by decreasing the amount of personal involvement in the buying
situation:
"The individual can adopt a "count-me-out" posture and
refuse to accept responsibility for the outcome of the
buying decision."
Another element of risk is that of bias. Competitive tender is
designed to diminish the risk of bias or favouritism in contract awar-ds
and tendering firms will feel that they have an equal chance of
getting the contract. The tenderer is free, in law, to withdrat-lhis
tender at any time before it is accepted by the department. No binding
._ -.........
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contract arises if tenders are invited for the supply of goods only as.
and when ordered by the department (2.40). In this case 'the tender
takes effect as a standing offer' to supply goods as'ordered and unless
it has been agreed for consideration that the tender shall not be
withdrawn, the tenderer may withdraw his offer at any time, though
orders already given will be binding ~2.41). In the United States,
a bid is irrevocable by the tenderer once opened by the authorised
government officer, and the contracting officer is bound by law to
accept the most favourable bid among those opened, unless he rejects
, .
all tenders made. In the United Kingdom, no equivalent obligation on
departmental contracts officers exists (2.37).
Competitive tender can be of two varieties. These are (i) open or full
in which the purchaser invites potential suppliers to submit a complete
tender containing the relevant figures, and (li) limited, restricted,
selective or closed in which the purchaser invites interested under-
.takings to make themselves known and then it selects from the
candidates those from which it will request a tender (2.42). Fully
competitive tender is seldo~ invited for Government work since
Departments prefer to limit competition to a list of approved firms
of known capabilities and financial standing which have had experience
of departmental work (2.43). When joint contracting schemes were
established by hospital authorities in 1949, open competition was at
first used but was progressively abandoned in favour of selective
tendering except as an occasional means of testing the market and of
~
seeking new sources of supply. Selective tender is nearly always
the sounder procedure if the quality of workmanship, such as applies
in ,medicines, is important. It avoids waste of resources when many
firms spend time and effort in the preparation of tenders with little
or no prospect of winning the contract. Turpin (2.4J) states that the
general adoption of selective tender results in a closer relationship
between the government department and the firms regularly invited to
tender and results in the reorganisation or rationalization of an
industry. The principles of admission to and exclusion from depart-
\
ments' approved lists must safeguard the public interest and be fair
•to contractors (2.44). The lists should not be so short as to
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discourage competition and invite collusion (2.45), in which the firms
combine toe;ether in a 'ring' uith the object of eliminating competition
aMon~ themselves in tendering (2.46).
Baily (2.47) is highly critical of the procedures applying to
government purchasing. He states:
"But in the case of government departments, procedures evolved
in the nineteenth century to ensure and display public
accountability sometimes continue to be applied rigorously
in the second half of the twentieth century when the whole
role and scale of government has altered radically. Like
Caesar's wife, government buyers should be above suspicion.
But they should also seek ••• ' the best value for money
spent'. The civil service has tended to regard purchasing
as a job whi.cn anyone could do, without special sldlls or
training, simply by sticking rigidly to a set of rules
designed to show for all to see that purchase decisions are
made with complete impartiality, Hithout fear, favour or
improper influence, and indeed without personal responsibility
attaching to any individual. 'Commercial common-sense is
what is missins,' accordine; to one government contractor;
'the civil servants are not to blame - they bend the system
to make it work. The system Has designed solely to prevent
fraud, so no one has any real executive power ,"
The doctrine of ministerial responsibility, the doctrine of
public accountability, the tradition of anon~~ity, the strong
internal pressures to standardized, rulebook procedures and
a highly formalized bureaucracy, have all combined to produce
the sort of situation one supplier described thus:
'It isn't unusual for the paperwork for najor contracts
be kicked around for a year and a quarter •••' to ensure
best value for money spent one must take positive steps;
best buy \Oli11not result from the negative aim of the
avoidance of grounds for criticism ••• The Banwell Report
(2.48) criticized local authorities for sticking too rigidly to
'outmoded procedures' ••• 'On the question of public account-
abili ty ••• much emphasis has always been laid on the need for
local authorities so to deal with contractors as to avoid any
suspicion of favouritism.' The traditional ritual of open
competitive tenders, sealed tenders opened before a committee
as the clock strikes the hour, no negotiation, etc., indeed
rules out suspicion of corruption or favouritism. 'But
experience shows that it is fallacious to suggest that the
lowest tender obtained in open competition will necessarily
result in the lowest final cost.' "
to
the
the
Baily concludes his discussion of this topic by quoting from the
National Economic Development Office paper 'Action on .the Banwell
Report' published by HMSO in 1967 (2.49).
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"Competition still has an important part to play, particularly
in the field of public expenditure, but we consider that
other methods including negotiation can be used with advantage.
Our emphasis is on the need for flexibility and freedom of
choice; not "is it orthodox?" but "is it the best solution?"
should be the test. Concern to demonstrate that money from
the public purse has been spent wisely will continue to be
an inevitable and healthy necessity amongst all public
authorities: but it must be more widely recognized, by
elected representatives and officials alike, that rieid
adherence to procedures sanctified by long tradition is
not necessarily the best Hay to take full advantage of
modern techniques, industrialization and Modernization;
and that the Best Buy is more likely to result from the
Hise use of available modern methods."
Baily (2.49) notes that the NEDO urged the Ministry of Housing and
Local Government to-press local authorities to improve their buying
'methods, while noting some improvements since the Banwell Report
of 1964. The NEDO repeated the recommendations several times,
strongly endorsin~ the Banwell conclusion. Baily's views had been
revised by 1978 when the fourth edition of his book had Modified
his previous stronely held vieHs and replaced them by milder comments
such as "there has been a tendency for all purchasing decisions to
be taken by committees so that no individual could be held accountable
for success or failure."
Another chink in the competitive tender system arose in 1967 with the
governmental interdepartmental inquiry into Marks and Spencer procure-
Ment methods. The Report of the inquiry was not published but the
Minister of State, Treasury, Mr. D. Taverne, in a written answer
(2.50), stated that:
"Experiments based on the company's practice, modified as
necessary to meet the Government's different circumstances,
are being undertaken in suitable fields of supply by the
Hinistry of Defence, the Ministry of Public Building and Horks,
and Her ~~jesty's Stationery Office. The experiments involve
departures from the conventions of competition and formal
contracting and considerable delegation to purchasing officers."
Mr Taverne, had prefaced his answer with the statement that:
"The Report outlined aspects of the company's practice of
establishing long-terM close relationships with selected
suppliers, and recommended their adoption in Government
purchasing."
Turpin is somewhat cynical regarding the benefits of competitive
tender. He proffers the vt.ew (2.38):
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"The interest of the administration in the satisfactory
performance of contracts took second place to the
financial interest of the Treasury. In more recent
times the virtues of competitive tender have seemed
less self-evident. Opinion in industry is far from
unanimous in its favour"
Turpin continues (2.38):
"Government departments place too rigid a reliance on
competitive tender through fear of the Parliamentary
Question. Competitive tender often means costly delay
and can be wasteful of resources in that tenderers
may have to hold capacity in reserve in prospect of
getting the contract, while other work is declined
or postponed. From the government's view, continuity
of association between user and supplier is sacrificed
and with it the economies to be gained from an uninter-
rupted flow of work, as well as the benefits that can
accrue to a procuring agency from the exercise of
continuous quality control and from the joint planning
of projects and long term programmes."
Turpin states (2.38) that:
"It is therefore not surprising that government officers
with responsibility for contracts have on occasion
expressed scepticism about the value of competitive
tendering as traditionally applied in government procurement."
Housle~a United States hospital administrator, expressed (2.51)
the view that "Good purchasing is the art of negotiation and the
better the negotiation, the better the prices." He stated that
volume of sales does not necessarily achieve a better price. Although
"bidding (competitive tendering) is an age-old technique", Housley
felt that it "often creates confusion, bad will and mediocre prices."
He felt that suppliers may be responsive to competitive tendering
if the value of the order is sufficiently large and he suggested that
individual item bidding was "out-moded" and should be updated by a
contract for a whole category of items, for which suppliers "are
very responsive and accommodating." This could be applied to drugs
in Britain by the award of a contract for a wide range to a whole-
saler. Housley describes such a system as offering:
"the hospitals this opportunity. It provides clout and
leverage for price, quality and performance ••• encompasses
all supplies of a certain category - the small as well as
the large volume items, the less expensive items as well as
the most expensive, etc. As a result, the hospital
consistently gets best overall price, quality and service
with a fraction of the time and effort expended with
traditional methods."
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An anonymous correspondent wrote (2.52) in Contract Journal in 1970
concerning competitive tendering for building work. He referred to the
1944 Simon Report comment that:
"the operation of the competitive system of tendering
gives no encouragement for honest dealing and presents
difficul ties whi.ch do not exist in other industries."
The article continued with the comment by its author that:
"the least that can be required of a good tendering
policy is for contractors to be told in retrospect
of the state of competition on jobs for uhdch they
have submitted bids."
The author continued by advocating the holding of "post-mortems over
tenders" and referred to unduly low tenders and the difficulties they
cause:
"In Holland and Italy, the practice is to accept the second
lowest tender. Why should not this be tried in Britain.
It would put a completely new face on the competitive
situation ••• Tendering must be made even more selective.
Contractors should be told more of the state of the
competition. The cut-throat edge of the competitive
tendering situation should be tempered in the interests
of both client and contractor. Subeconomic bids should
.be rigorously passed over."
t~tthews (2.53), the chairman of a leading firm of building contractors
has described the tender system as !lagross misuse of our national
resources." He stated (2.53):
"Government departments and local authorities in particular
have traditionally regarded competitive tendering as the
means of securing the best job at the lowest price, but
this view is surely mistaken. Contractors incur considerable
costs in tendering and the price of every contract awarded
cannot help but include the cost of all previous unsuccessful
tenders. It is the tendering stage, so often abortive, which
also wastes the valuable time of some of the most able
executives in the building industry. Yet for every contract
secured, perhaps a dozen are tendered for without success •••
Tendering is an out-dated system in a modern world, and it is
in the interests of contractors, their clients, and the
country's economy to hasten its final demise."
Rix emphasises (2.54) the need for a more far-sighted view of the
value of sound purchasing and deplores the concentration on tendering
to the exclusion of negotiation. He suggests:
"in some circumstances negotiation may be the best method of
awar-dtng a contract.
An offer cannot be invited from a company after the tenders
are opened, even if no offer has been received from the
best ~nown source of supply. It is necessary to re-invite
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tenders which means going through the whole process again, and
in many cases time does not allow this course of action.
Discussions cannot be entered into for the purpose of amending
a tender after it has been received ••• This can cause con-
siderable difficulties when an offer is ambiguous •••
There is an undoubted pressure on purchasing officers to use
the tender system and this certainly reduces the flexibility
of approach to the market •••
It takes a professional purchasing officer to recognise where
beneficial results can be achieved by circumventing the rules
in a manner acceptable to ratepayers and auditors."
The Audit Commission, the independent watchdog of local government
spending decried (2.55) the range of prices paid by the various
authorities for standard .items in a report published in July 1984.
Unfortunately it appeared to afford little recognition of the dilemma
facing all public concerns in their need to purchase by tender. Such
price variations are unremediable.
Van Dyke, Roering and Paul (2.56) pOinted out that bidding (competitive
tender) realises the lowest possible price only under certain
conditions.
1. Where the value of the purchase is sufficient to justify
the expense to buyer and seller;
2. The specifications are clear to both;
3. The market consists of an adequate number of sellers;
4. Sellers want to bid and are therefore willing to price
competitively;
5. There is sufficient time for this process.
They continue:
"When anyone of these conditions does not exist the buyer
is more likely to obtain the best price through negotiation."
Using these criteria it can be suggested that Health Authorities could
arguably obtain the best price for the drugs they require through
negotiation rather than competitive tender.
Scott, a contracts officer with the Central Electricity Generating
Board, asserts (2.57) that negotiations usually arise for reasons of
urgency, proprietary or monopoly supply and occasionally technical
excellence.
Farrington explored the relevance of various factors to effective
purchase price management in a survey completed by industrial buyers.
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He showed (2.58) that negotiation skills were identified by
.respondents as the most appropriate to effective purchase price
management. He suggested that was an indication of the wide use of
negotiation in resisting price increase requests and in achieving cost
reduction objectives. Contractual aspects were considered of minor
importance by the respondents. Farrington further showed (2.59) by
a simulation exercise that there was a totally absent desire on the
part of buyers to negotiate on contractual aspects of purchases, and
an unquestioning attitude adopted toward the price and terms suggested
by the supplier. Even when obvious cost savings were available from
other sources, 33% of respondents remained loyal to the existing
supplier. This suggests that development of negotiating skills could
produce significant savings on purchase price in 'all areas of commerce,
including drug buying.
As yet it has been assumed that competitive tender and negotiation are
mutually exclusive. Such is not the case, as described (2.60) by Van
Dyke, Roering and Paul. In descr~bing the studies of seller behaviour
that buyers may perform those authors suggest:
"When they see who the lowest bidders are, and evaluate
the current financial situation faced by each, they may
use the information to negotiate with the low bidders
for an even lower price than originally submitted."
The tendering procedure can be divided into four stages (2.61)
1. Preparation for tender
2. Invitation:to tender
3. Opening and assessment of tenders
4. Award of the contract
The first stage begins with the department defining specifications.
To ensure an equal and effective competition, the specifications should
be as simple, clear and unambiguous as possible. Several departments
make use of a pre-bid conference in which potential tenderers are
invited, the department's requirements are explained, the proposed
contract is described, and suggestions from the firms invited. This
secures the co-operation of prospective contractors. A department
will often during this stage, arrive at its own estimate of the·
contract price, which is a useful item of comparison of tendered
prices (2.62).
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The next stage is that of invitation to tender. At one time it was
regarded as good practice to invite all the firms on the approved
l~st to tender on every occasion. Before tenders are invited, listed
firms are sometimes informed of the proposed contract and are invited
to express willingness to tender. Firms that do not wish to tender can
then be excluded and invitations are sent to the firms likely to be
genuine competitors. The Public Accounts Committee during the 1961-62
session stressed that invitations to tender should not be issued to
firms whose tenders are likely to be rejected on grounds extraneous
to the competition, such as lack of technical capacity to undertake
the contract (2.63). Tendering and evaluation of tenders can be very
expensive and the cost of wasted tenders may in the long run have to
be borne by the government in higher prices. It can be assumed that
if a firm tenders for six contracts and is awarded one, then the
successful one must pay for the cost of preparing the other five
(2.63). The Public Accounts Committee of the 1961-62 session stipulated
that the invitation to tender must define as clearly as possible the
requirements of the department and the factors to be considered in
the assessment of tenders~
The third stage of the tendering procedure is the opening and
assessment of tenders. As described above, this has little practical
legal significance and the offer can still be withdrawn. Even a
stipulation to the contrary in an invitation to tender is illegal.
This stage can be complex if, as in the case of drugs, tenders are
invited for a range of different items and if tenders grade prices
according to quantities. The tenders are subjected to detailed analysis
by the department's technical officers. During assessment there must be
close co-operation between those (supplies officers) who organise the
contractual arrangements and those (pharmacists) who buy using the
contracts. The pharmacist knows what he wants and he may know the
technical capacity of the firms. The supplies officer probably knows
more about the management of the firm and is responsible for observing
the principles of government contracting and sound purchasing practice
(2.64).-
The harnessing of the expertise of both the supplies o,fficer and the
pharmaCist would help prov~de a more efficient system. Such a view
was given encouragement by a statement of two experienced pharmacists
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Calder and Parker (2.65) in a report submitted to the NHS Supply
Council in 1982. They felt that "The effectiveness of the (drug
contract) system varies considerably depending on how closely Supplies
and Pharmacy work together." Such an opinion was endorsed by the
Supply Council Report (2.66) which stated:
"We feel that there is room for improvement in collaboration
between pharmacists and supplies officers to make better use
of supplies officers' commercial and negotiating skills
and thus form effective purchasing teams able to negotiate
more positively with commercial suppliers in relation
to both co-ordinated purchasing and other buying arrange-
ments ••• some Regions have apPointed full-time technical
pharmacists ••• We recommend the appointment of technical
pharmacists ••• In many Regions supplies officers are
involved only with the purely administrative arrangements
for drug contracts. We feel better.use could be made of
their expertise in assessing the need for contracts,
negotiating with suppliers and in other aspects of
pharmaceutical purchasing and supply in Regions. The setting
up of Regional Pharmaceutical Supplies Committees and Regional
Pharmaceutical negotiating teams ••• would ensure that such
expertise is used to adv~ntage ••• "
Regional Pharmaceutical Supplies Committees were recommended to
establish policy and oversee the.work of the negotiating teams,
to maintain liaison with the field and to link with the envisaged
National Standing Pharmaceutical Supplies Committee and ensure
co-operation with other Regions. The negotiating teams would
negotiate with industry and purchase drugs above a given threshold,
investigate and review packaging and its specifications and establish
and maintain approved suppliers'lists. The negotiating teams would
refer problems to the National Standing Pharmaceutical Supply
Committee.
The involvement of pharmacists in purchasing has been researched by
several workers. Muller and Krasner, of the Center for Social Research,
New York City University, analysed (2.67) the prices paid for six
drugs by 51 hospitals in New York, United States, and discovered a
significant negative correlation with pharmacy salaries per bed.
This suggested that "the more the hospital invested in professional
pharmacy staff, the lower the drug price paid."
Bachynsky, a research officer with the Department of National Health
and Welfare, Canada, sounds a note of caution when he warns (2.68)
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against the cost incurred by too muc~ involvement of pharmaCists in
group purchasing, suggesting that "every effort should b.~Q1ade to
delegate a portion of the purchasing to nonprofession~l persons."..
The Supply Board Working Group noted (2.69) the statutory· responsi~
bilities of pharmacists in ordering and evaluating medicines and those
of supplies officers in the "preparation and maintenance of contracts."
The Report continued:"Advantageous prices are achieved by the Regional
co-ordination of the purchase of medicines." No clear delineation
of roles in contract award was suggested by the Working Group. An
attempt was made to clarify the subject by an RHA report of March 1979
which recommended (2.70) that someone with a good knowledge of the
drugs market should be employed to administer the drug contracting
procedures. That person would be able to "get out 'into the field"
and meet and discuss terms on a face to face basis with suppliers.
A Regional Pharmaceutical Officer in 1983 asserted (2.71) that each
drug contract must be under the control of a specialist pharmacist
to ensure, inter alia, correct evaluation of suppliers and monitoring
of standards. He continued;
"Pharmacists were the key to value for money in terms of
the procurement of pharmaceuticals."
An opposing view was promulgated at about the same time in a report
published by a market research group which indicated (2.72) that
the role of the pharmacist in purchasing may be diminishing or at
least be under challenge. It suggested that cost reduction was
"only possible using the supply officer facility and expertise."
Farrington hypothesized (2.73) that departments which possess purchase
price analysts and purchase researchers will be more sensitive to cost
structure and be more effective in consequent price control.
The purchase of generics and proprietary drugs, that is unpatented and
branded ones respectively, requires a different approach. Generic
drugs are part of a competitive market and Calder and Parker suggest
(2.74) that for those "an open tender system 1s required to give
manufacturers an equal chance. With proprietaries, where there is
generally no direct competition, some form of negotiation is likely
to produce the best results." Calder and Parker continue by referr;ing
to the low profit margins in the generic market and the little money
.spared for quality control by companies and the resulting minimum
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standards adopted. The Health Authorities require, therefore, a
considerable input to check sources of supply and product quality.
"The contract then becomes not just a price list, but a positive
indication of acceptable quality for pharmacists at hospita~ level."
(2.74). There appears to be a clearly defined role for pharmacists
in contract awards.
Tenders were discussed in a publication of December 1965 of the
Ministry of Health (2.75). That document informed hospitals of the
rev.iewof procedures for dealing with late, incomplete or amended
tenders:
"General Considerations
The essence of an efficient tendering system is the
preservation of strict equity between all tenders in a
way which can, if necessary, be defended publicly. This
means that, as a general rule, late, incomplete or
amended tenders should not be accepted."
It went on to specify procedures and laid down rules on
confidentiality:
"Confidentiality
While decisions as to the acceptance of late, incomplete
or amended tenders are under consideration, and while
requotations or retenders are being sought, the tender
documents, price-schedules etc. should be kept strictly
confidential and held in safe custody."
The award of the contract is the last stage. A department is under
no legal obligation to award the contract to the lowest or any other
tenderer. It may invite fresh tenders. The important principle
in government contracting is that the lowest satisfactory tender
should be accepted. The Comptroller and Auditor General may bring
to the attention of the Public Accounts Committee cases in which a
tender has been accepted that was greatly in excess of others
submitted. There may be a good reason for not accepting the lowest
tender even if price is the primary consideration. The lowest price
may not be the best price. Uneconomic prices may be a cause of loss
to the government later, by low quality or the firm may go into
liquidation. The Public Accounts Committee 1943-44 stated that a
fixed price should be a good price, that is one which is likely to
produce for the contractor a reasonable profit, but not more than a
reasonable profit, if he executes the contract with due care and
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diligence. Tenderers expect that tenders will be fairly considered
on an equal basis (2.76). Justice must be seen to be done and the
suggestion of any fraud in the conduct of the proceedings might well
give rise to court action on the tort of deceit. (2.77). Turpin
ey.presses (2.78) the view that there should be redress for an ,
unsuccessful tenderer who has been the victim of capricious, biased
or fraudulent action. There is no uniform or regulated procedure
for the adjudication of such appeals, by which a fair determination
of the matter is assured.
Breach of contract has a remedy in an action for damages which
reimburses the injured party for the loss caused by the breach,
including the value of the benefit that he would have obtained if the
contract had been fully and exactly performed. The measure of
damages is the differen~e between the contract price and the market
price of similar goods at the time fixed for delivery. In practice
it would be almost impossible for such a breach to be proved and the
author cannot identify any instance of such a case coming to court.
Unfortunately forms used in.the contracting process bear no relation
to those in the private sector. Furthermore each region has its own
forms. Turpin (2.79), in describing the lack of standardisation in
government forms, expressed the view that it would be in the interest
of efficiency if suppliers would not have to adapt their judgement and
procedures to a novel set of conditions when doing business with the
government.
This argument has as much validity for the variation in forms for
regional drug contracts as it does for government business generally.
In Mersey Region, tenders for the drug contract are addressed and
opened in accordance with Standing Orders. Up to 1984 the recommend-
ations by the designated Supplies Officer were submitted to the
Regional Supplies Officer for approval by the Regional Health Authority
or Regional Team of Officers and he issued the letters of acceptance.
It is now dealt with by the Regional Supplies Officer and is not
delegated to a district's Officer. The conditions of contract are
recommended by the DHSS. Even within Regions progress on standard-
isation of forms has been slow and though a Regional Working Party
on standardisation of forms supported the use of a six part order
form and recommended that Areas adopt that type of form to achieve
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standardisation, this is not being used throughout the Region (2.80).
The Supply Board Working Group reported on the need for rationalisation
of specifications as a prerequisite to co-ordinated purchasing (2.81).
For drug contracting considerable progress has been made in this sphere
to ensure that drugs of an appropriate high quality are bought.
The timetable for award of a contract in the various regions would be
similar to that of the Mersey Region which is as follows:
Estimates of full schedule and approved additions sent out 30 April
Estimates of full schedule and approved additions
returned by
Tenders issued to firms by
Tenders returned from firms by
Extract from tenders to schedules by
Request to firm for samples early
Quality control meeting to discuss samples week beginning
Meeting of pharmacists and supplies officers to examine
tender schedules week beginning
Acceptances and rejections issued to firms by
Synopsis to RHA for approval by
Contract book distributed to hospital pharmacies mid
Contract effective from
June
22 June
20 July
6 August
August
6 August
October
16 October'
23 October
November
December
Another RHA allows about six weeks from issue of tender to return,
about six weeks to compile the information received and decide upon
acceptances, and about six weeks before the contract awards are
notified to companies (2.82). The latter RHA, while allowing companies
longer to deliberate than Mersey RHA does, compiles the information and
deliberates more quickly but keeps the companies waiting longer before
informing them of the outcome. Whereas the three components of the
process require 15 weeks in Mersey RHA they occupy 18 weeks in another
RHA. There is obviously variation in the timescales adopted by the
RHA's.
The time between tender being submitted by SU?9lier and acceptance by
the Health Authority r2.nges from 4 to 19 weeks (2.83) ~,itha mean of
13 weeks; That time has been criticised as being too Long and the
time between acceptance of tender and first-delivery too short (2.84).
Criticisr:lhas also been expressed that suppliers do not have sufficient
tine to consider the tender document before it nust be returned (1.10).
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Those timescales,which may be considered as typical U.K. examples, may
be contrasted with information from the United States. Suggested time
requirements for the various components of the tender process were·
promulgated by McAllister who suggested (2.85) that 3 - 4 weeks are
required by vendors for analysis and quotation of price, 2 - 6 weeks
are required by buyers to evaluate the offers and award contracts.
1 to 2 weeks are needed for preparations of contracts, and a tinespan
of 4 weeks prior to contract cbn~encement is needed by con~anies to
update their databases and arrange supplies.
The first task is the collation of estimated requirements. If there
is sufficient demand additional items are added to the schedule. The
co~plete schedule ~s issued With tender docl~ents to those firms on the
frequently revised list of possible suppliers. Any firm may apply to
supply goods to the NHS. They must first apply for registration as
an approved supplier and that usually involves a check on their
financial and legal status and the Scientific and Technical branch of
Supplies Division vet suppliers in terms of technical competence (2.86).
Firms wishing to tender for items on the sche.dule may be asked to send
samples which are tested. The standing orders on the procedure for
receipt of tenders must be observed and the offers made by the firms
are tabulated. These offers together with reports on the samples
tested are provided to the adjudicating committee which consists of
pharmacists and supplies officers with representation by medical staff
and auditors of the RHA. The lowest tender is accepted unless one of
the following conditions prevails:
(a) samples are not received,
(b) samples are not of appropriate quality,
(c ). pack is inadequate,
(d) :item is not to specification,
(e) pack is inconvenient,
(f) item is tendered at list price or DHSS contract price, or
(g) item for which alternatives are recommended.
The decisions are translated into the contract documents issued to the
firms and the information sheets for participating departments. The
information sheets contain the list of items, prices and contractors
and copies are issued to the RHA and the DHSS. Firms not awarded a
contract receive the appropriate non-acceptance letter.
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·The estimates provided by the user departments are inaccurate
(1.10, 2.87,2.88) and suppliers take little notice of them, and in
many cases use their own records on drug uptake to assess likely
purchasing quantities. Yet the NHS staff involved waste a great
deal of time and effort collating the information (1.10) which is
of little use. One region halved the workload for the supplies staff
as a result of no estimates collation and the suppliers were delighted
to help in the exercise (2.89). A few Regions have now discontinued
collecting estimates of drug usage (1.10).
The result of a lack of commitment to buy a fixed quantity of goods is
a standing offer which is not the most economic and efficient method
of purchasing but it does save the negotiation of many individual
contracts each year (2.90).
A firm purchasing commitment is more difficult to achieve in the case
of drugs than other commodities because of changes in prescribing
habits, but the use of many drugs could be predicted quite accurately.
The United States General Accounting Office (equivalent to the U.K.
National Auditing Office) wrote of the significant reduction in costs
on the basis of committed volume (2.91). Hyman (2.92) described a
system in French hospitals in which the uptake is guaranteed within
10-15% and the price is fixed for the year. Hyman felt that there
should be firm commitments to suppliers so they can work economically
throughout the year (2.93). The Supply Board Working Group deprecated
the inaccuracy of estimates and the absence of firm purchasing
commitments (2.94).
The frequency of renewal of the contract has been traditionally once
a year, but seven of the fourteen English Regions have decreased this
to once every two years. It has been suggested that the contract
should hold for three or even five years. This would lead to better
discounts and lower administrative costs (1.10, 2.70).
Past satisfaction or at least complacency with regard to NHS purchasing
has been superseded of late by a questioning, and, in some cases, a
critical attitude. An illustration of this is seen in the 1982 report
of the Supply Council (2.95):
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"We have examined the present arrangements for contracting
and purchasing medicines for the hospital service and
are convinced that there is room for considerable
improvement, especially in the provision of reliable,
compatible and interchangeable management information.
The method and system of contracting also needs to be
improved, ordering and the associated clerical activities
need to be rationalised, better use made of available
purchasing skills and unnecessary duplication of effort
avoided. We confirm that ordering.of pharmaceuticals
should be under the control of a pharmacist."
,
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CHAPTER 3
N.H.S. DRUG CONTRACT SYSTEM
3.1 Historical Development and Political Effects
The NHS gets its money from the state and the needs to be satisfied
include those perceived by the government as being of greatest impor-
tance. Turpin (3.1) su~~ests that in government purchasing as in
other fields the decisions can be expected to be political decisions,
which take account of the ulterior social and economic consequences
of alternative courses of action. In addition to this general
political influence which applies wherever public money is spent there
are specific political implications in NHS drug purchasing. The
activities of the pharmaceutical industry have for many years attracted
the close attention of those with political interests. Many Socialists
favour a nationalised drug industry and regard the present independent
manufacturers as profiteers at the expense of an impoverished NHS.
The Conservative viewpoint is that the present free enterprise system
stimulates competition, provides high export earnings and serves the NHS
well. Furthermore Socialists see the NHS as fulfilling a monopoly role
in the provision of health care whereas Conservatives see an important
role for private health care alongside the traditional state provided
scheme.
Health Authority drug purchasing might be considered to be fertile
ground for political influences to make themselves felt, yet no
published work which examines this topic has been found. Even the
political pressures on purchasing of goods generally have not been
previously analysed.
Since drugs account for more than ten per cent of hospital purchasing
costs and are the most expensive of all the categories of goods bought,
it might be thought that any political influences on purchasing would
be reflected most clearly in the recommendations for the purchasing
of drugs.
The historical background is depicted in Table 3.1.
The Minister of Health and his successor, the Secretary of State for
Social Services, may issue statutory directions to the Health
Authorities on their mode of operation but it has been policy since
1948 to allow Health Authorities to determine their own policies
within very broad guidelines. No Secretary of State has issued a
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direction to the NHS in connection with supplies (3.45). The
statutory authorities of the NHS receive cautiously worded advice and
guidance from the Department of Health. This advice need not be, and
often is not, followed (3.45).
The Public Accounts Committee has taken an interest in contract
purchasing, has influenced DHSS guidance, and is referred to below.
An examination of the advice issued to Health Authorities shows that
since. the inception of the NHS, about sixty circulars, reports or
letters referring to purchasing in general or drug purchasing in
particular have been issued. Some of these have been of major conse-
quence, others are little known. The guidance which is given is
considerable and it creates the quasi-legal framework within which the
contract system has evolved. Included in the list is a report, the
Bradbeer Report, which, while not strictly speaking constituting
advice from the Ministry of Health, nevertheless had an influence
on Ministry guidance.
It should be noted that in the first years of the NHS, identical
circulars were issued to Regional Hospital Boards (RHB), Hospital
Management Committees (HMC) and Boards of Governors (BG). HM refers
to hospital memorandum. DS refers to "Dear Secretary" letters. HC
is Health Circular. HRC is NHS Reorganisation Circular.. HSC(IS) is
Health Service Circular (Interim Series). SCC refers to Supply Council
Circular.
The 'year of issue appears in parentheses or following an oblique
stroke. No significance should be attached to the differentiation
of the guidance into categories of circular, memorandum, letters or
reports.
GUIDANCE 1948 to OCTOBER 1951
The guidance issued, under a Labour government was as follows:-
RHB(48)8: HMC(48) 1, BG(48)8
RHB(48)13, HMC(48)2, BG(48)5
RHB(48)13b, HMC(48)2a,
RHB(48)49, HMC(48)35, BG(48)39
RHB(49)89 HMC(49)72, BG(49)74
RHB(50)7, HMC(50)7, BG(50)6
The first guidance, in paragraph 29 of RHB(48)8, HMC(48)1, BG(48)8 of
March 1948 stated that it will be for Management Committees (and boards
of governors of teaching hospitals) to decide the future methods and
sources of supply, subject to any arrangements for central purchase of
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particular items which may from time to time be made by the Minister
or by the Regional Boards with his consent.
This was followed by circular HMC(48l2,paragraph 4 of which envisaged
that hospital management committees would normally appoint a supplies
officer whose duties would be to arrange for the acquisition, mainten-
ance and distribution of equipment and supplies.
This was followed in September 1948 by HMC(48)2a. This referred to
some misunderstandings which had arisen with regard to the responsib-
ilities of these officers and those of hospital pharmacists, with
regard to pharmaceutical supplies. It drew the attention of committees
to the considerations that the Supplies Officer should be generally
responsible for all supplies but that this general responsibility does
,not imply - particularly in the case of special supplies such as drugs
- that individual orders should be made or approved by the Supplies
Officer:
"He must clearly rely on the advice of the pharmacist in
relation to pharmaceutical supplies ••• and must delegate
adequate independent responsibility to the pharmacist •••
Management Committees should ensure that the measure of
inderendent action is effective, particularly having regard
to:~ The ordering, receiving and supply of certain poisons
and dangerous drugs must legally be carried out by pharmacists."
The issue of HMC(48)2a of 1948 drew the comment from hospital
pharmacists ( 3.3) that ordering of pharmaceutical supplies should
always be in the hands of the pharmacists themselves. They wished
to avoid over-centralisation in buying and viewed with concern the
role of some supplies officers. The circular HMC(48l2a was regarded
as ambiguous, but the editorial suggested that tactful consultation
between the two disciplines before changes were made would prevent
unfortunate developments.
The scene was set, at the very inception of the National Health
Service, for pharmacists and supplies officers to challenge each
other's roles rather than for co-operation between the two disciplines.
HMC(48l35 of July 1948 indicated the respects in which arrangements
had been made centrally by the Department for purchase and supply.
It stated that consideration was being given to the extension of
central supply arrangements to other categories of hospital equipment
and supplies. It said that suggestions for further central provision
would be welcomed and should be addressed to the Controller of
supplies.
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HMC(49)72 of 18 June 1949 stated that the Minister had under
consideration the need for extension of central purchasing and
contracting by the Department, in the interests of economy and better
efficiency, to other major equipment and common user stores:
"He has decided that this shall be undertaken wherever it
appears to be economically or otherwise advantageous or
necessary ..• Hospital Management Committees ••• are
invited to suggest particular classes of goods to be
considered for early action."
The circular referred to central contracts placed by or on behalf
of the Department for streptomycin, with subsequent purchasing
programmes probably including drugs. The Minister did not think it
desirable that Regional Hospital Boards should themselves undertake
any purchasing or contracting on behalf of hospitals. He hoped,
however, that they would encourage HMC's to consider the economic
advantages of joint contracting by groups of HMC's for items which
could not be covered centrally by the Department, and that HMC's
would press on with such arrangements.
On 23 January 1950, the Ministry issued HMC(50)7 entitled "Hospital
Supplies Officers and Pharmacists" in order to set out in more detail
the Minister's views on the proper division of responsibility between
the pharmacist and the supplies officer. The Minister had been advised
to define more clearly the considerations to be taken into account in
the provision of pharmaceutical supplies. The procedure in obtaining
those should be that the pharmacist should estimate the needs, a
pharmacist should scrutinise these and pass them on to the-supplies
department for collation. The supplies department should take
pharmaceutical advice on specification, preparation of tender schedules,
special conditions of contract, etc. Pharmaceutical advice should also
be taken on proposals for contract awards after tenders are received
before recommendations are made to the Management Committee.
Individual orders, which need not be countersigned by any other officer,
should be placed by the pharmacist.
The Labour government during those years clearly emphasized the
central role of purchasing and gave little encouragement to delegation
of authority from the Ministry to local level.
65
GUIDANCE NOVEMBER 1951 TO DECEMBER 1958
During the years from October 1951 to DeceMber 1958, a Conservative
government was in office. The Ministry during .those years issued
the guidance listed below:-
RHB(53)13, HMC(53)12, BG(53)13
Central Health Services Council, Report of the Committee on
the Internal Administration of Hospitals (Chairman
A.F. Bradbeer) HMSO 1954
HM(55)22
Central Health Services Council, Report of the Sub-Committee
of the Standing Pharmaceutical Advisory Committee on the
Hospital Pharmaceutical Service (Chairman Sir Hugh Linstead)
HMSO 1955
HM(56·)7
Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the cost of the NHS
(Chairman C.W. Guillebaudl Cmd 9663 HMSO 1956
HM(57l25
Central Health Services Council, Interim Report of the Committee
on Hospital Supplies (Chairman Sir F.Messer) HMSO 1957
HM(58) 17
Central Health Services Council, Report of Sub-Committee of
the'Standing Pharmaceutical Advisory Committee on organisation
of Hospital Pharmaceutical departments (Chairman Sir Hugh Linsteadl
HMSO 1958
Report of the Joint Sub-Committee on the Control of Dangerous
Drugs and Poisons in Hospitals (Aitken) HMSO 1958
HM(58)94
Central Health Services Council, Final Report of the Committee
on Hospital Supplies '(Chairman Sir F.Messer) HMSO 1958
HMC(53)12 entitled "Supplies" was issued on 20 February 1953 and it
set out the scope of central contracting for supplies. It encouraged
jOint contracting by groups of Management Committees and emphasized
the need for competitive tendering and the drawing up of contracts in
proper form., It referred among other items to special drugs being
supplied mainly direct by contractors to hospitals. The Minister
felt that the arrangements (for central contracts) should be continued
but stated that it was not proposed at that time to develop central
supply arrangements on so wide a scale as envisaged in HMC(49)72.
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He felt that before the end of 1954 extensions of existin~ schemes
may become effective, including drugs (possibly on a pilot basis
in one RHB area). He invited RHB's to encourage HMC's to
consider the advantage of joint contracting and referred to
schemes already started or contempla;ed. He hoped that joint
contracting would be extended wherever economies seemed likely and
that RHB's and BOG's would report periodically on the progress made.
The circular continued: "It is not the intention to centralise
contracting or supply in the Department if equally good results can
be obtained by jOint contracting." In referring to the need for
invitations for competitive tenders, the circular stated that the
invitations should be as widely spread as possible, .if necessary by
public advertisement, and all tenders should be treated confidentially.
Contracts should be in writing and the prices at which they were
awarded should be confidential. The standardisation of certain
general conditions of contract was under consideration but meanwhile
all contracts should include a "fair wages", a "corrupt gifts" and a
"default" clause. Special conditions appropriate to the goods should
be included in tender schedules. In the case of contracts providing
for delivery of an unspecified or estimated quantity of goods as and
when required during a stated period, provision should be made for
termination by either party at the end of three months or at any time
thereafter, provided one month's notice for that purpose was previously
given by either party in writing.
The internal administration of N.H.S. hospitals was examined by a
committee which produced the Bradbeer Report, published in 1954, and
it reviewed supplies problems which centred on defining the optimum
unit for purchasing and contracting. It concluded that a more detailed
examination was needed, and this took the form of the Messer Committee,
referred to below.
The C and AG reported for the year ended 31 March 1954 that as a
result of his comments, the Ministry were preparing model standing
orders for hospital authorities (3.46).
In 1955, HM(55)22 was issued and it brought to the attention of
hospital authorities the Linstead Report. The Report stated that the
choice of and decisions upon materials and sources of supply was a
normal and important function of the pharmacy.
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It stated that so long as selection of the material and source of
supply and control of receipt and storage were in the hands of the
pharmacist and may place his orders without delay, there may be '
advantage in using the services of the Supplies Department for other
stages of the purchasing process. Differences of opinion between
the two departments would be resolved by the two presenting their
views to any Committees. The document HM(55)22 referred to the
responsibility of the pharmacy for the provision of drugs and
medicinal preparations and the promotion of economy in the use of
medical supplies.
On 31 January 1956, HM(56)1 was issued and it was entitled "Standing
Orders." It detailed model standing orders which would help ensure
that hospital authorities complied'with the requirements of the NHS
(Regional Hospital Boards, etc) Regulations 1947. It stipulated
that tenders were to be invited for contracts and detailed the
procedure to be adopted for obtaining, submission, opening and
acceptance of tenders and the form of contract.
The Committee of Enquiry into the Cost of the National Health Service
(Guillebaud) reported in January 1956. While welcoming the appointment
in 1955 of a special committee (Messer Committee) of the Central
Health Services Council to investigate supplies, the Guillebaud
Committee stated that it did not propose to offer any recommendations
on the subject. It nevertheless went on to state that hospital
authorities generally had not ye~ taken full advantage of the
enormous volume of knowledge and well tried practices in supplies
purchasing which were common to all large undertakings in this
country. Progress in applying those practices appeared to have been
slower than might have been expected.
HM(51)25 of 14 March 1951 brought to the notice of hospital authorities
the Interim Report of the Committee on Hospital Supplies 1957
(Chairman, Sir Frederick Messer, M.P. (Labour) ), and recommended them
to follow the Report's advice. This Report was completed in June 1956
but was not published until 1951. It referred to the comparatively
little progress since 1953 in developing inter-group arrangements and
contracts were largely at group or hospital level.
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It referred to lack of detailed evidence of the overall financial
savings achieved by joint contracts but felt that savings were
being made. It stated that joint contracting should reduce
administrative costs and strongly advised the adoption of joint
contracting schemes, devised to meet the individual circumstances
of hospital authorities. It compared prices under Ministry contracts
for hospitals in Wales and Scotland with those under two joint schemes
and found no price advantage one way or the other.
As far as central supply was concerned the Report noted:
"It is right that central supply arrangements should remain
on the present limited scale, i.e. that they should be
substantially confined so far as value is concerned to
those categories of drugs ••• which necessitate central
supply arrangements owing to the inadequacy of available
supplies or to the limited sources of supply which are
available."
HM(58)17 was issued on 18 February 1958 and it stated that the
Minister of Health accepted the Report to which it referred, that of
the Joint Sub-Committee on the Control of Dangerous Drugs and Poisons
in Hospitals under the chairmanship of Janet Aitken, which was
published in 1958. Paragraph 18 of the Report referred to the
pharmacist ordering drugs. It made note of the evidence given to
the Committee that in some hospitals the Supplies Officer orders
receives and stores medicines. The report stated "This latter is
a contravention of the Poisons Rules; the Supplies Officer may not
store poisons nor order or store Dangerous.Drugs." The Committee
felt that the 'purchasing of medicines should always be the
responsibility of the pharmac~st. ,This did not rule out the recording
of transactions in the Supplies Officer's department, nor, of course,
the Supplies Officer advising on the wording of contracts; but the
pharmacist should be responsible for the ordering and also the storage.
The second Linstead Report, of 1958, was not published but was
referred to in HM(59)43 which is dealt with below.
On 2 December 1958, HM(58)94 was issued. It brought to the attention
of hospital authorities the Final Report of the Committee on Hospital
Supplies, under the chairmanship of Messer, which was not Pvblished.
The memorandum asked that careful consideration be given to the
recommendations of the Report. The Committee suggested that jOint
contracting should be used for common user drugs which were not
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bought under Ministry contracts. The Minister would continue to
arrange for central contracting in any cases where this appeared
suitable: for the rest, he hoped that joint contracting would be
used as extensively as practicable. The Committee noted that central
purchasing or contracting only applied if a clear cost saving would
result or if sources or supplies were inadequate. The Committee
took the view, with which the Minister agreed, that with few
exceptions, group buying or jOint contracting should be the general
practice. On the question of responsibility of supplies officer and
pharmacist in purchasing, the Committee felt that choice of materials
and sources of supply was not solely a matter for the pharmacist; he
must carry his administrative colleagues with him on all matters of
importance. The Committee did not consider that the Supplies Officer
should have the last word or be authorised to overrule the wishes
of the departmental head without reference to the chief admini-
strative officer or the appropriate Sub-Committee of the hospital
authority. 'The Minister shared the view that both the Supplies
Officer and the specialist head of department had a part to play in
procurement. There should be no question of one officer seeking
to overrule another. The Minister felt that special considerations
arose in pharmacy owing to the pharmacist's statutory responsibilities.
The Minister's view was that no precise delimitation of responsi-
bilities was possible, both having an important part to play and the
main need being an amicable working relationship and (as the Committee
stated) the suppression of any individual desire to seek personal
prestige.
All the documents referred to reflected the prevailing political
influence with little sympathy being shown toward greater involvement
of the Ministry in procurement.
GUIDANCE JANUARY 1959 to OCTOBER 1964
From 1959 to 1964 few advisory documents appeared. They were:-
HM(59)43
HM(61)78
HM(59)43 was issued on 28 April 1959 and it referred to the unpublished
Report on the Hospital Pharmaceutical Service 1958.
It listed among the duties of the group pharmacist "co-ordination of
pharmaceutical supplies, in consultation with the Supplies Officer."
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The circular drew attention again to the lack of amicable working
relationship between the supplies and pharmaceutical disciplines and
expressed the view that the delimitation of responsibilities between
the two was clear. The Central Health Services Council in accepting
the Report decided that further study was needed and this resulted in
HM(66)33.
HM(61)78 of 14 August 1961 on the subject of "Hospital Drug Costs"
reminded hospital authorities of the importance of controlling their
costs and stated that "a reasonable, and indeed, a desirable,
practice" was the substitution of "less expensive drugs of
equivalent therapeutic effect." Paragraph 5 stated that joint
purchasing had "been found to produce substantial economies when
applied to drugs and dressings. Boards and Committees are asked
to satisfy themselves that no item to which this method could with
advantage b~ applied has been overlooked."
During the years 1959 to 1964, under a continuing Conservative
administration, no changes in emphasis on the more local procurement
of s~pplies took place.
GUIDANCE NOVEMBER 1964 to JUNE 1970
The guidance during the years November 1964 to June 1970 consisted
of the following:
HM(65)22
HM(65)67
HM(65)90
Hospital Equipment Information No. 15 1965
Report of the Committee on Hospital Supplies Organisation
(Chairman J.F. Hunt) MOH 1966
HM(66)33
Hospital C and M Service Reports No. 9 H.M.S.C. 1966
HM(66)69
HM(67)95
HM(70)21
Report of the Working Party on the Hospital Pharmaceutical
Service {Chairman Sir Noel HalD DHSS 1970
HM(65)22 was issued on 10 March 1965 and was entitled "Quality
Control of Hospital Supplies of Drugs and Dressings." The memorandum
commended to Hospital Authorities an appended report of the Hospital
Pharmacists' Consultative Committee. The aim was to initiate a
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·procedure to enable hospital authorities to be safeguarded against
supplies of doubtful merit. The Ministry would provide in confidence
on request information on fitness of firms to supply medicines.
The Department would carry out inspections of firms to ensure that a
standard procedure applied. Contracting authorities were advised
to issue invitations to tender rather than advertise their
requirements.
HM(65l67 of 25 August 1965 supplemented the reference in the Model
Standing Orders circulated with HM(56l7 to the definition of
"pecuniary interest."
HM(65l90 issued on 30 September 1965 dealt with Hospital Costing and
envisaged changes as from 1 April 1966 to improve the arrangements
and to make greater use of the results. Though it did not speci-
fically refer to supplies, the memorandum suggested that the new
costing system would provide a framework for further detailed
studies.
Hospital Equipment Information No. 15 was issued in December 1965
and referred to tendering procedures. It is discussed elsewhere.
The Hunt Report of 17 January 1966 had a major impact on procurement
in the health service. Hunt was appointed on 26 November 1964 to
review the organisation for the purchase and distribution of goods.
His Group reported that joint contracting represented 23% of total
supply expenditure (range less than 10% to more than 75%), central
contracting accounted for 10.6% of total expenditure, leaving almost
two thirds at hospital level. The Report's paragraph 49 referred
to the proposition that the hospital pharmacist should himself make
contracts for pharmaceutical supplies and it rejected the propo-
sition stating that the head of the specialist department (pharmacist)
should provide for the supplies officer expert advice about suitable
specifications, sources of supply, quality control etc.. It
recommended "area" supply units, 60-70 in number.
The Report, in paragraph 68, bemoaned the fact that the hospital
service had for long operated independently of government policy
in purchasing. The author of this thesis regards this as unrealistic.
In paragraph 81, it recommended a hospital service supply board
separate from the Ministry. It decided against an extension of the
Ministry's participation in the supply field.
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On 20 May 1966 memorandum HM(66)33 was issued. This announced
publication of a report by the National Health Service Central
Organisation and Methods Unit on the ordering and receipt of
pharmaceutical supplies ~nd the Minister asked hospital authorities
to study the conclusions of the report. The study showed (paragraph
11) that in the hospitals visited working relationships were generally
good with a high degree of co-operation amongst officers concerned
with the various duties regardless of how these happened to be
allocated locally. It remarked that good will achieved amicable
working relationships. The report noted the growth of regional and
area joint arrangements, under which both pharmacists and supplies
officers were members of contracting committees and recommended
their extension (Pages 11 and 12). It referred to the estimated
savings in one Region of £50,000 in one year as a result of jOint
contracting (Page 12). The report recommended that the pharmacist
should choose the manufacturers but the supplies officer could give
valuable assistance in tendering and preparation of contracts (Page
13). It recommended that the pharmacist should place the order which
should not be countersigned by other officers (Pages 15 and 16).
On 14 September 1966, memorandum HM(66)69 was issued and it brought
to the notice of hospital authorities the Hunt Report previously
issued. It commented on it and invited discussion. The examination
of the comments led to issue of HM(67)95 on 29 December 1967. The
Minister agreed to recommend establishment of "area" supply units,
greater in size than the groups at that time, and the setting up of a
hospital service supply branch in the Supply Division. Ultimate
responsibility for supplies would rest with Regional Hospital Boards,
which should appoint a Regional Supplies Officer. The Minister
stated that changes in the list of products being bought on an area
or regional basis would not need approval, but the Ministry would keep
in touch with Regional Hospital Boards by asking for periodical
reports.
The Minister agreed that the Supply Division would influence
purchasing, would offer guidance to hospital authorities on "best
buys" (Page 17 of Report) and quality control,'would determine the
levels at which supplies should be purchased, the methods of purchase
and would make central contracts where these were financially or
otherwise advantageous (Page 19 of the Report). The Minister agreed
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·that the decisions of supply branch as to the level at which goods
should be purchased would be mandatory (Page 25 of Report).
HM(70)21 of April 1970 covered the issue of the Report of the Working
Party on the Hospital Pharmaceutical Service. The Report was
published in February 1970 by the Working Party set up by the Minister
of Health in April 1967 under the chairmanship of Noel Hall. It
commented in section 4.24 on the development of Hospital Supplies as
outlined in HM(67)95, suggesting that it should be entirely
beneficial to the hospital pharmaceutical service and that the
Pharmaceutical Areas proposed and the supply areas might share common
boundaries. Section 4.30 stated that the Regional Pharmacist would
be a member of regional supply contracting committees.
The principles of.the Labour party were not compromised by procurement
policies during the years 1964 to 1970, with a strong emphasis on the
role of central government with a strengthened supply division in
the Ministry with mandatory powers.
GUIDANCE JULY 1970 to SEPTEMBER 1974
The guidance issued during these years was as follows:
OS (Supply) 12/71
HM(71)70
OS (Supply) 34/71
OS (Supply) 11/72
DS (Supply) 18/72
DS (Supply) 56/72
DS 19/73
HRC(73)5
DS 120/73
DS (Supply) 26173
DS (Supply) 31/73
DS (Supply) 57/73
DS (Supply) 4174
DS (Supplyi 11/74
HSC(IS) 73
Letter DS (Supply) 12/71 invited Regional Hospital Boards to comment
on draft standard supplementary conditions of contract for stores
purchases.
According to HM(71)70 the Secretary of State in September 1971 accepted
the recommendations of the Noel Hall Report, referred to previously,
and asked that they be implemented.
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In November 1971 DS (Supply) 34/71 set out the agreed supplementary
conditions of contract suggested in DS (Supply) 12/71. It referred,
inter alia, to the estimated quantities indicating "only the probable
requirements for the period referred 'to and the Authority shall not
be bound to order such quantities."
DS (Supply) 11/72 asked that appropriate wording regarding safety,
quality and efficacy of medicinal products be incorporated in the
conditions of contract purchases.
DS (Supply) 18/72 of May 1972 recommended draft specific wording on
duration of contract and price changes to be added to the standard
supplementary conditions. It referred to contracts being "not
legally binding," details of agreement to changes in contract prices
following notice by suppliers, and details of duration of contract
following notice by either party.
On 11 September 1972, DS (Supply) 56/72 was issued. It dealt with
protection of commercially valuable information and requested that
Authorities followed the guidance. It referred to information on
contract prices which necessitated a high degree of discretion in
its use and disclosure only to those needing to know in the hospital
service. Such information was not, in the Department's view,normally
in the category that justified the formal classifications (of
confidentiality) referred to.
DS 19/73 of 1 January 1973 drew the attention of Hospital Boards to
Directives on public contracts adopted by the European Economic
Community to which Hospital Authorities became subject following the
entry of the United Kingdom into the EEC on 1 January 1973.
HRC(73)5 of February 1973 offered guidance to Joint Liaison Committees
on supply matters in preparation for health service reorganisation to
take place in the following year. It stated that it was intended that
the majority of supply activities should be carried out at regional
and area level. "The Department will establish policies and procedures
appropriate to supplies matters, but other than this, responsibility
for supply policy and procedure will rest with RHA's."
The foregoing quotation from paragraph 8 could not be understood by the
present author.
DS 120/73 was issued on 1 June 1973 and referred to Public Sector
Construction Contracts of the EEC and noted minimum periods for the
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receipt of tenders (21 days) and for request to participate in
tendering (21 days). These are generally applied in hospital drug
contracting, tho,ugh the letter refers to building works.
DS (Supply) 26/73 of 29 June 1973 stated that RHA's and AHA's must
plan their supply organisations to accord with national policies
for which the Department's Supply Division had ultimate responsibility.
Among the activities of Supply Division were the determination of
levels and methods of contracting, evaluation of supplies, preparation
of national specifications, arrangement of central contracts where
appropriate, rationalisation of supplies procedures, the providing of
guidance and information to the Health Service and continuation of
arrangement and financing such research projects as may be needed.
No changes in emphasis between central purchasing and area or
regional purchasing were recommended.
DS (Supply) 31/73 issued in July 1973 referred to slight amendments
to the wording of DS (Supply) 18/72.
DS (Supply) 57/73 of 12 December 1973 dealt with the integration of
community health and local education services with the other supply
activities of health authorities in the reorganisation of the health
service of April 1974.
DS (Supply) 4/74 was on the same subject as DS (Supply) 56/72,
protection of commercially valuable information, and was cancelled
by the issue of HC(76)28 two years later.
DS (Supply) 11/74 of 20 February 1974 amended and ratified DS (Supply)
26/73 previously mentioned. The DS (Supply) 11/74 letter provided
standard general and supplementary conditions of contract for stores
purchases with notes for health authorities' use. The conditions
specify that "the contract shall be considered as a contract made in
England and subject to English Law" but the notes state that "the
condition (price changes) must not be used in contracts which are
legally binding (e.g. fixed quantity contracts)." Clearly a
contradiction in terms is used with the author of the letter
apparently undecided as to whether a non-fixed quantity contract is
or is not a contract. This was followed later that year by HSC(IS)
73 issued in August. It offered guidance to the reorganised health
service on supply services. The Region would negot~ate contracts
for goods to be bought regionally. The circular noted that the
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ordering of some medicinal products and storage of drugs were
the responsibility of qualified pharmacists. The Central Department
would monitor the supply arrangements of Regions and would concern
itself with assessing progress in extension of Regional and Area
contracts. Staff at Area would order supplies under national,
regional or area contracts.
No decrease in emphasis on regional contracting occurred during this
time of tenure of office of a Conservative government.
GUIDANCE OCTOBER 1974 to APRIL 1979
The guidance for 1974 to 1979 consisted of the following:-
DS(Supply)26175
HC(76)20
HC(76)28
HC(76)33
Buying for the National Health Service (Collier Report)DHSS 1976
HC(78)6
Report of the Supply Board Working Group (Salmon)
.DHSS 1978
HC(78)21
HC(79)2
DS(Supply)26/75 of 19 June 1975 was cancelled by HC(78)6. The DS
letter dealt with contracts for the purchasing of textiles and asked
that "countryof origin" be included in tender documents.
In May of 1976 HC(76)20 was issued. It reminded Authorities of the
legal requirement to make Standing Orders for the regulation of their
proceedings and business, and commended for their consideration and
adoption a set of Model Standing Orders. Part V of the Model·Standing
Orders dealt with tendering and contract procedure. The procedure
was clearly delineated in the circular and forms the basis for the
present arrangements.
HC(76)28 of June 1976 dealt with Protection of Commercially valuable
information in Health Services Manasement. It reinforced the earlier
advice in DS{Supply)56/72 and DS(Supply)4/74 which were cancelled by
it. It stated that information in tenders and all matters relating to
contracts should be made known only to staff who "need to know" and
kept in strict confidence; prices and similar details necessarily
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circulated to ordering officers were not usually marked with privacy
markings, but it was essential to treat them on a "need to know" basis.
Staff with access to commercially valuable information were required
to be particularly careful not to reveal prices paid to competitors
under contracts.
The Collier Report published in July 1976 by a jOint DHSS/NHS
committee recommended co-ordinated purchasing of medical equipment.
The Collier Report, though not dealing specifically with drugs had
implications on a more general scale. It noted in paragraph 37 that:
"the most economic unit for purchasing will often be larger
than the individual Area. It is largely the responsibility
of RSOs (Regional Supplies Officers) to define ••• what the
most advantageous size of contract should be and to arrange
inter-Area, Regional and inter-Regional purchasing as
appropriate ••• inter-Regional purchasing should increasingly
take over much of the Department's central contracting role,
thereby leaving the Department's officers to concentrate on
those matters, such as standards for evaluation, which they
are best placed to do."
The Report did not stimulate any guidance from the Secretary of
State on the topics dealt with under its terms of reference but Health
Authorities in England were asked in the covering circular HC(76)33
to note the Report's proposals.
HC(78)6 of February 1978 entitled "European Economic Community"
contained guidance on the provisions of an EEC directive concerning
public supply contracts. NHS Authorities' contracts were subject to
the directive, which enforced the principle of non-discrimination on
grounds of nationality in the award of contracts and it required that
contracts be placed on the basis of obtaining the best value for
money. An appendix to the circular referred to the absence of .
consideration (being standing offers or non-fixed quantity call-off
contracts) in many NHS contracts and so they are not legally binding.
Nevertheless an Article of the Directive covered these contracts.
The appendix to HC(78)6 noted that the time limits for receipt of
tenders and for requests to participate in restricted tendering were
minimum periods.
The Report of the Supply Board Working Group, which met under the
chairmanship of Salmon, has been referred to previously. It was
dated May 1978 and was issued under cover of HC(78)21 in which
comments were invited. The Report examined the arrangements for
procuring NHS supplies (excluding drugs and other items prescribed
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under the Family Practitioner Services) and made recommendations on
how to make better use of resources.
It recommended that the best level of purchasing should be
determined for each supplies item (Page 6.8), that firm commitments
should be given to suppliers to obtain the most competitive terms
(Paragraph 5.9), and that ordering practices should be reviewed
having regard to efficiency for the NHS and its suppliers (Paragraph
6.11). It recommended against the devolution of current central
responsibilities to regions (Paragraph 1) but suggested four possible
models for a new supplies body (Paragraph 14), recommending a
Supply Council with no executive responsibility but having a
secretariat (Paragraph 15). The Council would be.a policy-making
body, the implementation of the policies remaining with the Department
and Health Authorities (Paragraph 200). The Council would determine
the most effective level of purchasing, whether it be national,
Regional or Area (Paragraph 179.2), and would negotiate a larger
number of central contracts (Paragraph 187). This latter point was
referred to in appendix 1 to HC(18)21, which was the letter from
Mr Salmon to the Secretary of State covering the Report. Appendix 2
to HC(78)21 stated that the Council should determine the best form
of contract.
The General Election of 1979 prevented the Secretary of State
announcing his decision about implementation of the Report.
HC(79)2 of January 1979 accepted a recommendation in paragraph 76.1
of the Salmon Report that there should be no independent District
supplies organisation.
The advice in the documents of those years was in line with the
Labour party philosophy of a strong centralised influence in
purchasing.
GUIDANCE MAY 1919 to PRESENT DAY
The advice took the form of the following
Consultative Paper on the structure and management of the
National Health Service in England and Wales "Patients
First" HMSO 1919
HC (80)1
HC(80)8
HC(80)12
SCC(81)1
79 .
SCC(B1 )2
HC (B1)6
SCC(B1)3
SCC(B2)1
SCC(B3)3
SCC(B4)1
"Patients First" was published in December 1979 and it stated that
the new district authorities should consider, with the regional
health authorities, what should be done (in supplies services) and
decide where it would be appropriate for one authority to provide
a service for others (Paragraph 22), with maximum delegation to
hospital level (Paragraph 12).
In January 19BO, HC(BO)1 announced the decision to appoint a Supply
Council, with functions detailed in the appendix. The Council
would develop policies and introduce arrangements which would enable
authorities to make the best use of their supplies resources. It
would provide a comprehensive NHS supplies information system, and
advise the Secretary of State and Health Authorities on the
organisation of supplies work, having regard to the basic
organisation of the NHS and the need for purchasing decisions to be
taken at the lowest level with due regard to the need for efficiency
and economy. When this circular is contrasted with appendix 2 to
HC(7B)21, it is seen that the proposed seven listed functions of the
Supply Council of HC(7B)21 were telescoped into four of the later
circular, yet the later one added the reference to "the need for
purchasing decisions at the lowest level", a phrase absent from the
original recommendations.
The most profound impact on NHS buying has come about through the
NHS Supply Council.
The Secretary of State in June 1980 listed the objectives of the
Supply Council among which was the determination of the organisation
of supplies with the need for purchasing decisions at the lowest
level, as well as the optimum level of purchasing within the NHS
and the best form of contract (3.44). The latter mentioned aspects
were originally debated at almost the inception of the health service.
Despite a multiplicity of reports, working parties, circulars and
memoranda, thirty years of effort had not clarified those fundamental
issues.
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In July 1980, HC(80)8 provided the necessary guidance to RHA's and
to the new district authorities to implement the changes in structure
and management organisation which were needed in the health service
reorganisation. Paragraph 14 stated that the Supply Council would
be giving guidance on the organisation of supplies.
HC(80)12 of December 1980 gave guidance on the application to NHS
supply contracts of the GATT Agreement on Government Procurement.
It dealt with the advertising of certain contracts and the country
of origin of goods bought.
The Supply Council issued its first circular, SCC(81)1, in February
1981 and this informed Health Authorities that guidance would be
issued on the organisation of supplies within three or four months
and Authorities should avoid processing plans for change in supplies
until that guidance was issued.
That guidance was published in May 1981 in SCC(81)2. It referred
to the emphasis placed by the Public Accounts Committee on the
considerable scope for finan~ial savings in NHS supplies. It said
that the DHSS interprets Government policy on contracts and the
PPRS scheme and it would be inappropriate for these to be taken
over by the Supply Councilor other Health Authorities.
However, the arranging by the DHSS of central contracts was a
candidate for transfer to the Councilor other Health Authorities,
and the Council would review this activity (along with other DHSS
activities) as soon as possible with a view to transferring it to
the NHS (Paragraph 8.2). The ~egional Health Authorities were
recommended to negotiate and manage contracts within national
policies (Paragraph 11.2). District Health Authorities, within
national and regional policies, would make arrangements to obtain
goods not so far covered by contracts and arrangements negotiated
above the District level (paragraph 11.1ii).
May 1981 saw the publication of HC(S1)6 which provided, inter alia,
guidance on the making of Standing Orders. It stipulated that
Authorities "shall ensure that competitive tenders are invited for
the supply of goods." However, under specified conditions, such
as for low value orders if the agreement of the Management Team is
obtained, competitive tender need not apply.
SCC(S1)3 of June 1981 covered supplies information systems which the
Supply Council recommended to Health Authorities.
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In August 1982 the Supply Council issued SCC(82)1 which informed
Health Authorities that duties associated with negotiating and placing
national contracts for drugs were to be transferred during 1982/83
to S.W. Thames RHA. Thus the suggestion previously promulgated in
SCC(81)2'was given firm support in SCC(82)1.
Supply Council Circular SCC(83)3 of November 1983 announced the
provision of revised and updated conditions of contract for the
purchase of goods.
Supply Council Circular SCC(84)1 issued in December 1983 demonstrated
the futuristic view of purchasing symbolised not only by its title
(84)1 despite its issue in 1983 but also by its content. It
announced the publication of a paper entitled "Future Objectives for
the Supply Function in the NHS in England" which, inter alia, C~'
bemoaned the existence of too few fixed quantity contracts. Paragraph
4.6 referred to the norm being the ""call-of" type of "contract""
in which "this so-called "contract" is a purchasing arrangement with
no legal commitment by either party to it." It continued:
"As supplier~ are aware of the position and cannot be
sure of the volume of business they might get, their
prices reflect this and NHS Authorities do not, therefore,
get full value for the total expenditure made on the product.
In order to redress this situation a primary objective must
be for Health Authorities to negotiate fixed prices for fixed
quantity or exclusive contracts that are legally binding.
Substantial cost benefits will accrue if this is done but
it will require commitment from all parties to the contract
National policies emanating from the Council will invariably
require this commitment. Regional Supplies Committees will
also need to consider this on all their existing and future
contracts.
The targets to achieve this objective will be:-
(a) Within one year:
Where possible, re-negotiate existing "arrangements"
on a firm price for quantity or exclusivity and
ensure commitment by users; and
(b) Within two years:
All future contracts to be firm in price in return for
commitments on quantities and or exclusivity."
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In referring to the need to encourage a strongly competitive and
innovative U.K Health Care Industry, the document noted the need for
RHA's "to forge "partnerships" with contractors to ensure effective
performance of the contracts."
The Supply Council showed a determination to do more than pay lip-
service to efficient contract purchasing by demanding the institution
of fixed prices in return for fixed quantity purchases. The first
major change in emphasis after thirty five years and numerous working
parties and reports was to be seen in U.K. hospital purchasing.
However, the document made no reference to the administrative level
of purchasing though it did refer to "too many small value orders"
and "too much duplicated stock held in too many stores." Perhaps
the document's "National co-ordination of Procurement" and,
"fragmented use ..of total National supplies resources" hint at further
major changes in emphasis on the "where?" of buying in addition to
the "when?" and "how?"
It is seen that the documents issued since May 1979 comply with the
devolutionary philosophy of Conservative party thinking.
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3.2 Present Knowledge and its Limitations
The Department of Health receives details of prices paid on contracts
from each Regional Health Authority. That the DHSS has this inform-
ation is confirmed in a letter to Hyman from the Department dated
22 November 1977 which read:
"RHA's have been asked to send us some basic inforMation
about each regional or inter-regional contract they make,
viz. period of contract, co~odity, estimated value, and
subjective analysis sub-code (i.e. relating co~~odity
to the Finance Division subhead). He also expect ther.l
to monitor area contracts in their own region Similarly
and at the end of each financial year to send us a summary.
By comparison of what we receive against Lnf'ormat i.cn
received in our Finance Division from Authority Treasurers,
we hope over a period to build up a picture of how
contracting procedures are developing under certain broad
subheads. In vie\-l of present staffing difficulties in the
NHS and in this Branch, we cannot say yet if all Regions
will be able to meet our request or how much time we shall
be able to devote to sorting out discrepancies and I am
therefore unable to say what information He may be able to
release outside the NHS in ti~e." (3.47).
Hyman expressed the view that nobody knew even the total number of
contracts, other than national ones, in existence, the amount sp~nt
on them and whether or not the prices paid were the best available
(3.47).
The pharmaceutical industry has bemoaned the lack of information
available. The Office of Health Economics, an organisation founded
by the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry stated
that optimal solutions to the level and means of purchasing could not
be derived with reasonable confidence from quantitative data.
, '
Information on costs and quantity of purchases, parameters easily
measurable, seldom existed. In practice, very little was measured
as a matter of course in a way that Hould provide management with
useful empirical data for decision rnakin~ and this meant that
practical opportunities for rational purchasing could be missed
(3.48)•
The Working Group appointed by the Secretary of State in 1977 to
examine procurement of NHS supplies was critical of the lack of
information available.
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Reference is made elsewhere to the comments in the Group's Report
(Salmon Report) paragraphs 95 and 101. The Report stated that
the NHS does not have, and never has had, an adequate supplies
information system in general use. The primary information exists,
but it is in such diverse forms and maintained in such different
ways that collection is impossible. The Working Group had con-
siderable difficulty in obtaining, even in respect of Regional
contracts, information which could be collated to give a national
picture, "and we know that this kind of difficulty permeates all
levels of the Service." (3.49).
The Public Accounts Committee session 1979-80 reported (3.50) that
60 per cent of expenditure on supplies was under co-ordinated
arrangements and it was hoped that it would reach 80 per cent
within four or five years.
Additional criticism, including that of lack of information on
central contracts, was voiced in paragraphs 81 and 148 of the
Salmon Report. Any details given on the subject of contract
purchasing must be viewed with caution.
Central purchasing arrangements are the responsibility of Supply
Division of the DHSS. (3.51). These include the drugs dextran,
chloramphenicol and heparin which are mandatory arrangements, which
mean that the DHSS expects Health Authorities to use the particular
brands exclusively when buying these (3.52) (3.53). The reasons
for the central purchasing are that it may be essential to have
central control of production, to prevent shortages of supply or
to encourage a supplier to produce it in the small quantities
needed when a multiplicity of separate small contracts with individual
Health Authorities would not be commercially acceptable to suppliers
(3.53). Further benefits of central contracts are the savings that
can be made, the imposition of standardisation, the saving of
administrative time in that individual Health Authorities do not
need to seek quotations, the obtaining of professional advice, for
example from the British Standards Institution, and the preparation
of a detailed specification ensuring a high quality product.
Disadvantages of central contracts are the possibility of high.
administrative costs which may not be apparent, the fear, on the part
of Health Authorities, that they will lose their individuality, the
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long delay in receiving deliveries following orders being placed,
the lack of appreciation of the needs of the individual hospital,
and the low degree of satisfaction engendered following complaints
being made.
The Supply Board Working Group felt that there might be scope for
more central purchasing of medicines after consultation with doctors
and pharmacists (3.54). The Group was not in favour of delegation
of the central contract to the Regions (3.55). The Group referred
to criticism expressed by Health Authorities of aspects of the
central arrangements (-3.56),and one member of the Group referred
to better prices than those on central contract being paid and he
indicated that central purchase techniques needed overhaul (3.57).
The value of the central contracts in England for drugs dropped from
£3.4 million in 1975/76 to £2.4 million in 1976/77. This represented
a drop from 4.9% to 2.8% in the spending on central contracts as a
proportion of total drug spending. During those years the total
revenue expenditur~ on all goods rose from £534 million to £619
million and the proportion of all revenue.goods bought on central
contract fell from 22.~% to 21.4% (3.58). Clearly central contracting
does not playa big role in drug purchasing by hospitals, but is
estimated for all goods to save 7.9% of expenditure (3.59).
The value of regional and area contracts is estimated to be about half
the drug expenditure incurred by the hospitals. These contracts for
all goods are estimated to save about 6% of expenditure (3.60).
In 1963, the Public Accounts Committee minuted a saving of £850,000
from £11 million spent on contract drugs in the year up to the end of
November 1962 (3.61).
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3.3 CountrYVlide Variation
The present state of contracts' operation is a function of the
political, legal and economic pressures and the historical perspective
of a body of guidelines and experience within the constraints of which
the system has evolved. Any drug purchasing under contract consists
of standing offers of the supplier with no obligation to buy a given
quantity but the NHS accepts the offers when it suits the health
authority. The contracts are organised at national level by the DHSS
as well as at regional, area or local level. Non contract purchasing
from manufacturers or wholesalers also takes place and in an emergency
from other hospitals or nearby retail pharmacies.
Negotiations of contracts for goods on a regional basis were.being
carried out in 1978 by the fourteen Regions as follows; in three
cases by Region, in eight cases by Area, in tuo by Region and Area
jOintly, and in one by the joint efforts of Region, Area and District.
Of .56 multi-district area health authorities, ordering under contract
occurred at area level in 13, at area and district level combined for
33, and at district level for 10. Of 34 single district AHA's, all
ordered under contract (3.62·). There is variation, therefore, in the
organization of the contracts in the regions of the country though all
share the same basic fraMe\-/ork.
A contract seeks to regularise a purchase but in so doing it
centralizes to some degree the buying operation. The primary motive
for centr~lization is to produce econoMies likely to be achieved in
buying larger quantities, to provide consistency and control in various
purchasing sites and to provide specialised skills in the purchase.
The consequences of these aims are the resultant changes in the system
once centralization is achieved. There is a need to question the
financial benefits accruing, the efficiency of the buy-to-use chain
and the impact the change has on the job satisfaction of those affected.
No study of these in the setting of health service drugs purchased
has apparently been performed. Nor is there any definitive wort< to
describe the degree of centralization, in other words, the
geographical authority, likely to attain the best results. Various
workers have pondered on the subject and their thoughts are provided
in an attempt to shed a little light on this obscure subject.
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The Supply Council Report (3.63) noted the large number of
hospitals' pharmaceuticals' ordering points and recommended they
should be reduced, where possible, to not more than one per district
so as to reduce unnecessary ad~inistration and increase control.
The number of ordering points is analysed in the prinary research
of this thesis.
The Supply Board Working Group Report stated that there was
insufficient application of economic criteria in determining the
best level at which to contract for supplies, but felt that more
contract purchasing could be achieved (3.64). Whereas large
scale purchasing may produce economies of scale, many people in
the health service fear that an increase in central contracting
would not be in the interests of the Service and industry (3.65).
At all levels in the health service, vested interests militate
against economic criteria being used in purchasing arrangements.
Regional Supplies Officers in 1969 produced a statement which
established criteria for determining the best contracting level
and this statement was endorsed by the Department of Health
(3.66).
The Mersey Regional Supplie., Officer's Report on supplies organisation
for the Mersey RHA of 12 June 1974 noted that market research would
continue to play an important part in further determining levels and
methods of contracting, activated by himself (3.67). Unfortunately,
there is no evidence that it was already a feature of contracting.
On 1 June 1975, Regional Supplies Officers again recommended the
application of appropriate economic criteria and saw a need to
increase co-ordinated purchasing (3.66). The Supply Board Working
Group of 1978 expressed the benefit of co-ordinated purchasing, did
not doubt that significant savings had been achieved and felt that
there ~las further scope for co-ordinated buying. The Group was of
the opinion that the NHS should fo110\1 the example of organisations
outside the NHS and purchase at the level which would bring most
advantaces to all.
The Group, in referring back to the Hunt Report 1966, suggested
that to obtain best value for money, a central body should often.
,.
place contracts and users would be required tQ buy only through
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these contracts (3.68). This was a thought which had been
expressed in the organ of hospital pharmacy in 1962, which stated
that a strone case could be made for bulk of drug contracting to be
carried out by the Ministry which would avoid duplication ef
effort (3.69).
Despite the passage of time, little progress on the question of the
optimal level of contract organisation appears to have been made and
in 1980, an area supplies officer bemoaned the paucity of detailed
studies on the effects of the size of supply units as far as savings
on period contracting and on the purchase of non stock items - some
60% of the budget - were concerned (3.70). The suppliers, according
to Williamson, when calculating the price, have regard to the total
value of business being offered, the size of the individual deliveries,
whether quantities are specific and whether manufacturing runs can be
maintained. He expressed the hope that the full benefits from the
huge purchasing power of the service could be obtained while avoiding
a monolithic supplies organisation. Thus there would be flexibility
to provide that special service for patient care together with a high
regard for economy (3.70). Experience in the United States shows that
group purchasing can lead to considerable savings and is recommended
by the U.S. General Accounting Office (2.91). In the United States
the number of hospitals purchasing pharmaceuticals throueh groups
increased from 41% in 1975 to 72% in 1978 (3.71). In Britain, the
emphasiS appeared to be directed toward inter-regional groupings.
This was recommended to the DHSS by Regional Supplies Officers in
June 1975. By the end of 1977, five consortia of regions had
been created (3.72). They were:
(1) the 4 Thames and East Anglia Regions,
(2) Northern and Yorkshire Regions,
(3) North Western and Mersey Regions,
(4) Oxford, Trent and West Midlands Regions,
(5) South \'1estern,Vlessex and \~ales.
Despite discussions taking place within these groupings, no
apparent progress appears to have occurred.
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This conclusion is borne out by a study undertaken by the Supplies
Officer of Warwick AHA and referred to by Calder and Parker. It
showed (3.73) that Oxford, Trent and West Midlands RHA's looked at
the possibilities of a joint contract to increase their purchasing
power, were disappointed with the results of their study and felt
that no significant financial advantages would be gained by inter-
regional contracting.
The administrative level of contracting is a topic which has been
considered by one RHA. The result of its deliberations takes the
form of an operational manual which states (3.74):
"The decision to purchase goodS at National, Inter-Regional,
Regional, Inter-District or District level is dependent
on various economic and commercial factors.
Generally, it may be said that the correct level for
purchase negotiations is that at which standardisation
can reasonably be agreed, and where the commitment to
purchase such items will attract the most favourable
competition amongst suppliers."
Such an attitude is indisputable. That agreement on standardisation
and commitment is possible at Regional level alone is indefensible.
No evidence has been found to substantiate that view point.
The administrative level at which optimum prices are achieved
remains a subject which has not been adequately investigated in
the United Kingdom. Any possibility of such examination has been
thwarted by changes in emphasis by the DHSS over the years, so
one must look to the United States for inspiration. Three
pharmacists, May, Daniels and Herrick evaluated the relationship
of drug price and purchasing group size and showed (3.75) that drug
prices were negatively correlated to group size in a linear
relationship and prices were significantly lower in groups
representing greater than 10,000 beds. It would be unwise to
extrapolate those findings directly to the U.K since the United
States analysis deliberately excluded public sector based hospitals,
the context in which the hospitals of the two countries function
within the total health sector bear little relationship to each
other, and the industry proftles and behaviour in the two countries
are likely. to differ.
The authors suggested that there was a point where the additional
growth of the group may result in minimal or zero reduction in
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prices. If the industry and hospital variables in the two countries
were identical thatoptimal bed group size would equate to that of
a typical RHA. The U.S. study provides concepts Hhich could use-
fully be tested in Britain because the authors succeeded in
empirically testing the relationship between price and buying group
size. Regretfully a facet common to both countries vias the
difficulty, reported by the authors, in determining the prices
charged.
A factor which must be considered in any thinking about the level at
VThich contracts are organised is the Lower level of service given by
suppliers as a result of more co-ordinated buying. If contracting
results in Lower-profit Margins for the supplier, he \.,ri1llower the
level of service to reduce his costs (3.76). The OHE felt that large
scale contracts might prove counter-productive if lines of
communica tion or flow of information between purchasers, suppliers
and users were interfered with (3.77).
The Supply Council Report of 1982 stated (3.78):
"The present system of drug contracting is unwieldy and needs
revision. We concluded however that Regional Contracts
for pharmaceuticals are serving a useful purpose overall
altnough their operation could be improved.
Regional Drug Contracts vary from Region to Region and
involve a good deal of largely independent administrative
activity and duplication of effort. A co-operative effort
between Regions is needed to improve the efficiency of the
arrangements. We reconmend that there should be more
co-ordination of activities between Regions, exchange of
information about suppliers and quality of products and on
the timing of contracts to help suppliers spread the worl<load
and 'plan more effective production ••••• He recommend that
most contracting for pharmaceuticals should be at Regional
level, co-ordinated Nationally by the Standing Pharmaceutical
Supply Co~~ittee of the Supply Council. To achieve more
effective purchasing we recommend that, in each Region, a
small team be formed to negotiate, evaluate and monitor drug
contracts and other purchasing arrangements. The team
should consist of a supplies officer with expertise in drug
contracting, a technical pharmacist, and the Regional quality
controller ••• this team should report to a Regional
Pbarmaceut.Lca.lSupplies Committee composed of pharmacists
and supplies officers and chaired by the Regional Pharmaceutical
Officer or Regional Supplies Officer •••"
Despite absence of empirical evidence on the administrative level of
buying firm decisions appear to have been taken.
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!he considerable variation in contract organisation in the regions
of the country, within the national constraints, results in part
from considerable opposition amo~g HMC's and AHA's to transfer of
authority over supplies personnel to RHB's and RHA's. Compromises
and adaptation of local conditions and pressure~ led to variation
in the degree of control of the regional supplies officer, and
development of co-operation schemes depended on the attitudes of
individuals and authorities involved. The Office of Health
Economics in 1972 described (3.79) some regions as having poor
communications, high prices and small scale inefficient purchasing.
Where the size of the region or area justifies it, each supplies
officer tends to specialise in one or more product: groups (3.80), and
so within a region the organisation of drug contracts may be delegated
to one or more areas or even districts (3.81). So, for example, in
Mersey Region, the organisation of the drug contract for the Region
and in the name of the RHA took place in St Helens and Knowsley
Health Authority until 1984, when the RHA took it over.
Complaints arise that too many (or too few) items are on contract.
An article in Public Pharmacist (3.69) referred to the Linstead Report
suggestion of no more than 150 items being bought by bulk procurement,
yet 300.or more items were not uncommon. Ammer showed (3.82) that a
small number of items account for a large cost and a large number of
items account for a small cost. High cost items account for 70-80%
of costs, but consist of only 10-15% of the number of items stocked
(A items). Similarly B items account for 20-25% of items and 15-20%
of cost. C items are 60-70% of items but represent only 10-15% of cost.
The A items therefore require close attention. The Supply Council
Report of 1982 emphasised this pOint (3.83) in relation to "deciding
which items should be included in drug contracts". It questioned the
purpose of inclusion in Regional contracts of "items where there is no
.real competition" and concluded that such inclusion wasted considerable
effort and those items should be moved from contract arrangements to
some other form of buying guide.
Given that the average number of drugs stocked is 2,500 (3.84) or
3,500 items (3.83, 3.85), about 525 items account for 70-80% of costs.
A Regional Health Authority was given a report in July 1979 by a firm
of management consultants called in to investigate its drug purchasing
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procedures which recommended (1.10) a reduction in size of its
contract, that is the number of items included in it. That report
analysed the contracting procedures of other regions and found a
range from 200 to 1000 items on contract. Clearly, this variation
could not be attributed to any sound economic reasoning. A Committee
of Health Authority pharmacists set up in July 1979 reported (3.86)
on the variation in contracting arrangements in English Regions.
It noted:
"Threshold value. There was no common method for deciding
the point at which an item should be included in a contract.
Some regions used an estimated total value for the item,
others the estimated saving arising from including the item
in the contract."
Bachynsky (2.68) warns against'continually looking for new drugs to
add to the list, stating "costs tend to increase faster than benefits
and ultimately reach a pOint where there are no further gains. to be
made."
In considering the range of drugs on contract, one is left with the
impression that there are forces at play to lengthen the list. The
supplier of the successful brand gains prestige and possible community
practice spin-off benefits when his drug is on contract. Assuming an
increased contract value produces an increased saving over trade
prices, a tenuous argument but one which is nevertheless prevalent,
both supplies officers and pharmacists would acquire or assume a
raised status as a result of an extension to the contract range.
If the prescriber believes or is led to believe that he is prescribing
contract drugs he would wish to see that range extended if in the
process resources are being saved.
The period of the contract shows inter-Regional variation. A recent
report stated (3.86) that the "majority of contracts were for one year.
In some regions the period was two years." Information from a supplier
shows (2.83) six of the Regions with one year contracts and seven
with two.
It also becomes clear that some experimentation has recently been
occurring, with one region reducing the duration from two to one
year, one region increasing it from one to two years and one region
changing to an on-going contract.
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A preliminary management report for a Regional Health Authority
suggested (2.70) a minimum duration of contract of three years and
an ideal period of five years. Their further report expressed (1.10)
a preference for two years.
Calder and Parker note (3.73) that "a number of regions are now moving
towards a two year contract period which seems to offer a reasonable
compromise." Despite all the experimentation and observations no
reference to any scientific basis for the views expressed can be
determined and it is suggested that it would be beneficial if such
work were performed.
The contract is divided into sections in some regions (3.86), but the
majority do not, and one region with a two year period divided the
contract into two parts, negotiated in alternate years.
The effective date for commencement of contracts shows (2.83) inter-
Regional variation. Over a 24 month period the starting dates occur
quite regularly. Twelve of the 24 months show an English contract
beginning, and the longest time span during which no contract becomes
effective is four months. As a consequence, firms are constantly
reviewing and revising their offfers, and are able to adjust their
prices in accordance with recent contract adjudications. Less
frequent contract renewals might be thought likely to reduce the work-
load of firms and the prices offered.
The Contracts Working Party Report referred to previously (3.86) noted
the variation in use of estimates:
"One region had ceased to provide estimated quantities. Other
regions expressed doubts concerning the value of submitted
estimates. The accuracy of estimates submitted was frequently
questioned."
The absence of reliable estimates of requirements was bemoaned by the
Supply Council Report (3.87).
This topic is analysed later in the light of surveys referred to in
the primary research of this thesis.
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CHAPTER 4
N.H.S. DRUG PRICES
4.1 General Aspects
In considering the price paid for the medicine thought must be given
to the behaviour and performance of the supplier and the buyer.
Both have power to modify the price of the article. As described
previously an examination of the Market type reveals a small number
of buyers facing a small number of sellers, that is, bilateral
oligopoly. The sellers' policies and the buyers' policies are
opposed to each other.
The price set by the firm.may reflect collusion, either overt or
.tacit. The latter could arise in price leadership, in which one
firm alters its price and the other follows suit. Defection from
collusion could produce secret price cutting. In anticipating
rival reaction prices of competitors may be interdependent but in
many instances the price set may be completely independent of
possible competitor action.
~lebster and ~lind (4.1) vie\Jthe setting of a price, initiating a price
change and responding to competitors's price changes as being among
the most important marketing decisions:
"In determining the firm's·price strategy, four sets of
factors have to be considered: (1) the effect of the
price on the other marketinB mix elements (the nature
of the product, and the type and amount of advertising
and distribution) and especially on the customer's
perceived product quality and value; (2) the cost of
producing and Marketing the produc t; (3) customer's
price elastfci ties; and (4) conpet i tor+s actions and
probable reactions."
In the case of contract drug sales to Health Authorities, there is
little effect of price on the customer's perceived product quality
and value. The second factor is of major importance. The third
does not apply. The fourth factor is a consideration of every
supplier.
tvebster and Hind make the apt comment (4.1) that competitive
bidding (contracting) is common, but because it is expensive
and time consuming to prepare bids (tenders), it is important
to have an assessment of the likelihood of winning the sale and
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the potential order value before decidine to bid. They sagely
note that an understanding of the buyer's sensitivity to prices
and the importance of price in determining the buying decisions
is a crucial input to the design of an "optimum" price strateeY.
Since the market approximates to a bilateral oligopoly, control
of price resides in the hands of neither buyers alone nor sellers
alone, as described by Bain previously.
It is axiomatic, therefore, that a reduction in drug price could
be achieved by actions on the part of the supplier or the purchaser.
The government has powers as legislator to enforce its prices policies.
Such powers are limited in that, as Turpin suggests (4.2), it would
not be in the best interests of the government to compel the
acceptance by suppliers of uneconomic prices. The resulting prices
offered to the community pharmacists tend to be higher than those
to Health Authorities (4.3, 4.4), an aspect examined in detail in
the primary research.
Sometimes, health authorities or hospitals ignore contracts and
negotiate directly with suppliers and undercut the agreed prices.
It reduces the sales on contract and so affects the price which
can be obtained next time, it weakens the relationship of
the NHS with suppliers and it may remove or modify competition.
That prices can be undercut is a comment on the weakness of the
arrangement and normally it should be difficult to undercut a
good co-ordinated purchasing arrangement on a wide scale (4.5).
The author has evidence of undercut tine on drUG contracts
which reflects adversely on the system.
Such undercutting is not restricted to the machinations of
unsuccessful tenderers. It applies to the victors as well. This is
demonstrated by the missive from the Mersey RHA contracting and
purchasing manager dated 6 April 1984 reminding District Supplies
Managers of the RHA's 'Notes for Tenderers' which incorporate a
paragraph as follows:
"Unless given express approval by this office, tenderers
must not enter into any agreements with individual District
Health Authorities for items included on any contract
negotiated by this of (ice. Failure to comply with this
directive may r-esu.ltTn r-enoval f'rom the Approved List of
Tenderers. This applies equally to successful and unsuccessful
Tenderers."
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Clearly post-contract award price negotiation occurs and must result
in lower than contract prices being offered.
The Minutes of the Mersey RHA Regional Hospital Pharmaceutical·
Committee of 1976 relate that:.
"some terms offered by firms not prepared to tender were
more advantageous than contract prices."
They furth.er stated that "some firms were unable to fulfill contract"
( 4.6).
In broad terms, it must be agreed that, as sugges~ed by Salmon et aI,
an RHA by arranging contracts achieves not only "financial savings,
in terms of the prices paid and of the cost of contracting, ordering,
storage and distribution" but also "better specifications and
standards," that is a drug of quality specified by quality control
pharmacists, "a.central pOint of communic.ation" and "flexibility in
response to changing market circumstances." ( 4.7 ).
The suppliers could reduce prices charged if health authorities were
to reduce the number of delivery pOints and frequency of deliveries
(4.8,4.9).
Bachynsky stated that "there should be minimum quantities for single
s'hipl!lentsand a stated period between orders, e.g. three months,
so that hospitals and firms both have knowledge as to what can be
expected to occur and when." ( 2.68).
Prices could also be reduced if individual firms were given °a greater
share of the business. Prime Vendor Pur~hasing or Volume Contracts
are the terms used in America whereby all items of a category, for
example all drugs, are bought from one source. This system has led
to considerable savings (02.51,4.10). Under this sytern if the
annual estiMated consumption has been bought, a rebate is issued
at the end of the year based on a percentaee of tne value of the
total purchase~: A benefit of th~s sy~tern is that the contract price
is protected from an increase yet any reduction in price is passed
on to the hospital (4.11). It is claimed that the system eives a.
better service with the need for fetver staff and a ninimum of paper- 0
work, but some opposition to the scheme exists, based on the handine
over of the total purchasing to outside control (4.12). There is •
the danger of the syste'm developing into a Monopoly and the system
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is opposed by those in favour of a "free market" system (4.13) and
those who feel that the continued existence of the best suppliers
must be ensured (4.14).
Lee et al provided documented savings resulting from the alternative
buying strategy. They reported (4.15) that primary wholesaler
contract purchases resulted in a 15.6% discount from average.
wholesale price. Their work, in the United States, led to further
investigations.
Rubin and Keller reported (4.16) "substantial group volume discount"
resul ting from prime vendor bidding and contract t..rithone Hholesaler,
vlhile Van Der Linde noted (4.17) prime vendor buying resulted in
reduction of opportunity costs and maxiMum return on inventory
investment.
Purchase from wholesalers is recommended by a correspondent to
Pharmaceutical Journal (4.18) who doubts whether manufacturers'
discounts produce such real savings for hospitals as is thought.
That correspondent suggests that greater use of Hholesalers Hould
result in savings from (i) reduced hospital administrative costs
of fewer accounts, (ii) reduction in manufacturers' distribution costs,
(i1i) increased wholesalers' viability with more thinly spread
administrative costs, and (iv) revised invoice payment methods
maximising the benefits from prompt discounts' payment.
A United States hospital pharmacist, Abramowitz, in noting the results
of U.S. surveys showing that 70.3% of hospitals used competitive
bidding successfully and dOCUMented savings of 19 to 30% in group
purchases, defined the relative benefits of purchasing methods
according to hospital size. He suggested (4.19) that for small
hospitals, that is those wit~ less than 200 beds, group purchasing
wasmo~ beneficial, that for medium size hospitals, that is 200 -
399 beds, prime wholesaler was the best purchase method, and that
for the hospitals with more than 400 beds competitive bidding was
the most beneficial system of drug buying. Unfortunately Abramowitz's
contribution to any discussion of the topic is limited by his failure
to provide documentary evidence to SUbstantiate his opinions. He
does nevertheless extend the body of knolvledge of the subject by
itemislne; the advantages and disadvantages of pr-Lnary whoIesarer
purchasing. Since no similar definitive British work has been
performed, no strict comparisons are possible. Nevertheless some
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general impressions are made and these lead to the conclusion that
British studies would prove worthwhile.
There is no evidence of the competitive tendering system adversely
affecting small firms, according to evidence provided to the Public
Accounts Committee in 1965 (4.20) but in the long term price
reduction may undermine the competitive environment by affecting the
economic viability of suppliers or discouraging development of new
goods (3.11).
This could result in a monopoly charging whatever price it wished
(4.21). Pharmacists have benefited from the wholesaler service.
which gives a round the clock delivery service and would be loath
to see this service curtailed (3.71, 4.21), particularly in view
of the smaller stockholding needed when goods are delivered from
local wholesalers and the lower administrative costs of one order
to be processed to a wholesaler as opposed to several to individual
manufacturers. Nevertheless the wholesaler is vulnerable where
prices and profit margins are reduced (3.16). But there is nothing
to prevent the utilisation of prime vendor benefits allied to the
wholesaler service where the wholesalers would compete for the total
drug business.
Roberts, a renowned hospital pharmacist, put forward the view (4.22)
that "Tying the purchasers to direct dealing in many cases is not
feasable (sic) and the convenience of dealing with the wholesaler
is worth the increased cost."
Farrington (4.23) showed how contractual aspects have a direct
relationship to price control, particularly at the price increase
request phase. yet a survey he carried out to test the role that
contractual aspects played in effective purchase price management
showed that only 22.8~ of respondents, in his view a low response,
identified contractual aspects as being vital to effective purchase
price management. He stated:"It provides another example of a general
failure to comprehend the opportunities for the buyer in priCing
management." He further suggests (4.24) that negotiation of prices
is perceived by buyers as a key phase in industrial purchase price
management, and (4.25 ) that the buyer perceives price to be a
significant measurement of t:tisjob performance. By survey Farrington
deduced (4.26:) that buyers used lang term contracts as a major method
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to achieve cost reduction objectives. As regards time spent by buyers
on pricing aspects of work 53.8% stated (4.27 ) that they used more
than 20% of,their available time on pricing aspests yet, as Farrington
notes, no attempt was made by purchasing management during his
research to define an appropriate work load to ensure a balance to
enable a~l aspects of the buyer's job to receive attention.
There is also scope for price reduction by actions on the part of the
suppliers. The supplier could keep prices firm for the duration of
the contract as opposed to the present system of frequent price
changes during the term of the contract. A suggestion has been made
12.70 ) that a "rolling contract" be designed. In this, each
supplier's part of the contract would be reviewed cyclically.
Unplanned price increa~es increas~ t~e administrative costs of the
system and should be discouraged (1.10). They also make the contract
into an academic exercise. This is compounded by a lack of knowledge
of pric~s which should be paid and so purchasers in the NHS are
working at a serious disadvantage. Hyman wrote (4.28 ) that in part
the quality of the supplies system can be measured by the price it
pays for good products delivered as and when required.
The administrative cost of NHS drug buying to be set against nominal
savings has been assessed by a few:observers.
The Supply ,Board Working Group estimated that supplies administration
was costing £20 million to service an annual supplies expenditure of
£700 million (4.29). The proportion of the £20 million devoted to
contracts is unknown. One of the members of the Working Group wrote
that supplies expenditure, consuming'12% of revenue, could be ultimately
reduced by about £30 million per year (4.30). The member of the
Group suggested that among other factors,the supplies service should
have a detailed period of consultation with suppliers and should
negotiate effective competitive purchasing arrangements.
An NHS administrator attempted to cost the contract system to test
the validity of the belief that large scale contracting saves the
health service money. Edwards (4.31 ) estimated the cost of
organising the contract and related this to the savings generated.,
The study was of a regional contract for the supply of dressings
•
which bear similarities to drugs in having a large proportion of
the output of the industry being bought by the government or one of
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its organisations. Edwards concluded that it costs the health
service a great deal of money, mainly in salaries, to raise large
scale contracts. He repeated the often spoken suggestions that large
orders enabled suppliers to regulate output, predict accurately
future production levels, operate economies of scale in production,
reduce paperwork to a minimum, ensure good cash-flow and economise
on delivery costs. This would allow reduced prices to be offered.
Edwards estimated that the cost of raising the contract was about 1%
of the savings over list prices, or 0.1% of the annual value and
felt that it was difficult to speculate on real savings. He felt
that it was difficult to reduce costs, particularly those of
salaries of experienced staff involved in all stages •
.The difficulty of estimating. the savings accruing from the negotiation
of Regional drug contracts was referred to in the Contracts Horking
Party ReP9rt (4.32). It concluded:
"there is no satisfactory \<layin which this figure can be
calculated, as it is not possible to estimate prices
that would be paid, in the absence of a contract, in any
meaningful. way.
We investigated the methods commonly used to calculate
'savings' accruing from contract arrangements, and
consider that simple calculation based on
i) the difference between contract price and 'list'
price, or
ii) the difference between the contract price and
the next lowest tender
do not indicate the true financial value of contracts to
the Health Service.
It must be recognised that a contract has functions
other than obtaining favourable prices.
i) Maintenance, at Regional level
of an approved list of firms
invited to tender, and hence
considered suitable to supply.
ii) Centralised evaluation of samples
and suppliers.
iii) Ensuring continuity of supply of
certain items.
In the absence of a contract, individual purchasine units would
be required to undertake appreciable additional work, including
quality assurance, to achieve similar standards of control,
before comparison of prices could be considered."
The Supply Council Report (4.33) noted lower prices for items in
These include:
. competition and considerable savings from contracts for theM. It
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referred to the functions of contracts as related by the Contracts
Working Party Report and added that contracts set out legal conditions
of supply, established minimum acceptable labelling and packaging
standards, allowed some uptake monitoring and eliminated unnecessary
local activity so reducing administration. On the subject of ensuring
continuity of supply, the Report stated that for "products such as
heparin, intravenous fluids and vaccines there are sometimes a very
limited nunber of suppliers·and agressive (sic) quotations against
regional contracts may result in one company securing Virtually all
the business ••• such an event may raise problems of security of
supply ••."
The 1982 Council Report (4.34) noted that contract prices for generic
products related apparently to the choice of "approved suppliers" for
tendering. The Report recommended that the DHSS be pressed to help
Regions prepare product - related lists of approved suppliers and that
Regions' lists of approved suppliers should be reviewed critically
and made as comprehensive as possible.
There is evidence (1.10, 4.21) of contracts being awarded to companies
which provide one or few drugs. This results in extra administrative
costs involved in instituting the order, receiving the item, entering
in the records and paying the bill. These may outweigh the benefits
of the lower prices achieved.
Hyman feels that the contract should become a much simpler process of
negotiation after the purpose, specification, and price have been
assessed (4.35).
The Report for a Regional Health Authority (2.70) in 1979 suggested
longer contracts, fewer suppliers, "rolling contracts", pharmacist
involvement, regular contact in the field with suppliers, a
reduction in paperwork and nore cons~deration of the suppliers'
needs. A further Report for a RHA (1.10) of July 1979 spoke of
the advantage to be gained by quoting prices as standard prices with
discount terms, the shortening of the contract, the maximum use of
wholesalers, and the discontinuine of the collection and submission of
estimates of usage.
The Public Accounts Committee in its 1979-80 Report (4.36)
expressed the view that its members were "seriously disturbed by
the admission that NHS money is being wasted" f'oll.owtng an examination
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of procurement of supplies in the NHS. It referred to the need for
health authorities to carry out the recommendations of the proposed
Supply Council and the paramount need to conserve NHS funds and
proper co-ordiration of buying taking precedence over the freedom of
authorities to proceed independently. The Report continued:
"we find it greatly disturbing that efforts to achieve
economy in this field have gone on for 25 years without
re.?chj_~.::;a fully satisfactory outcome ••••••• there
appears to be no proper excuse for this failure."
Criticism of the contract system has increased over the years. A
Regional Pharmaceutical Officer in 1983 described (4.37 ) the
drug contracts as a "sham" and a means of getting products into
hospitals in the belief that they would then continue to be
prescribed by G.P's. He suggested a percentage discount binding
system instea~ of the present non binding system.
Hostility toward the traditional contract system does not stem solely
from NHS staff. A marketing director of a large drug firm was quoted
(4.38 ) as describing critically the present arrangements, doubting
whether the labour involved in administering them was justified' by
tQe savings made for many products.
•
,I
107
4.2 Influence of Price Regulation Schemes
The social benefits accruing to society as a result of the inception
of the National Health Service in 1948 were, as predicted, numerous.
Less predictable was the cost of that service to the taxpayer. Alreost
from the very outset the.increasing financial burden received the close
attention of the Ministry of Health, the Treasury and the Committee of
Public Accounts of the House of Commons, with the drug bill attracting
a major share of that scrutiny (4.39)!
Clearly the total drug bill reflects the unit drug costs and the
volume consumed, and so for any restriction on the total resource
allocation to hold firm there is a requirement to control unit costs,
volume or both. At an early stage in the development of the NHS the
scene was set for such attempts.
The principle of a doctor's clinical freedom to prescribe as he feels
most appropriate for his patient was soon to be threatened when on
10 May 1954 the then Minister of Health, Iain Macleod, informed the
House of Commons:
"We have not been able to reach agreement with the manufacturers
on what we consider a reasonable level.of profit, and we propose
shortly to advise the doctors that satisfactory price arrange-
ments have not been made and to ask them not to prescribe
these preparations." (4.40 )
The Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI), as the
body representing pharmaceutical manufacturers, apPointed represent-
atives to negotiate with officials of the Minist~y of Health and
the Board of Trade and to determine whether prices were "fair and
reasonable .." (4.41 )
It was intended that agreement would be reached between the two
parties on "reasonable" profit levels and the threat of the Ministry
(to advise doctors not to prescribe specified drugs) would be removed.
The outcome of those negotiations was to become a major factor in
determining, under the Voluntary (subsequently restyled
Pharmaceutical} ,Price Regulation Schemes (VPRS and PPRS), the level
of profits made by pharmaceutical companies from 1957 to the present
day and it was in that context that the prices charged for drugs
were to be determined.
The sales of the pharmaceutical industry, unlike those of any other
non-nationalised industry, were to be subjected to government scrutiny,
this unique treatment being accorded because between ninety (4.42)
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and one hundred (4.43 ) per ~ent of the prescription drugs used were
and are administered to NHS patients, and, in the main, the drugs are
paid for bY.the taxpayer.
This subdivision sets out to examine the past and present organisation.of Price Regulation Schemes and to determine their impact on drug.
prices generally and those prevailing in United Kingdom hospitals
specifically. It is the author's opinion that the scheme exerts
less influence on prices than generally thought and has no affect
on hospital price specifically.
Method of operation of the schemes
In the past
The first intervention of the government' in examining the profit.
levels of pharmac~utical manufacturers occurred in June 1951 when
objective criteria were agreed for determining the prices to be
paid to the manufacturers for the drugs supplied on NHS prescriptions
(4.44). The agreement, the'Voluntary Price Regulation Scheme (VPRS),
related the price of p~escribed medicines in Britain to the price in
overseas markets, the price of a standard equivalent or'ingredient
c~st·plus ~llowances for processing and packaging. It assumed (4.39)
that prices in export markets were competitive and that "most home
prices were reasonable." Teeling Smith comments (4.45 ) that it was
assumed that since abroad it was the patient or the private insurance
scheme which paid, then the price was reasonable. This assumption
does not appear to recognise what are .suitable criteria for judging
a reasonable price.
Under pressure from the Public Accounts Committee the scheme was
revised in January 1961 and it gave the Ministry the option of
requiring prices of widely used drugs to be related to costs and
profits. Two years later the Public Accounts Committee viewed with
concern the rise in prescribing costs and, as a result, the Health
Department expressed the desire to seek ways of containing them and
the Ministry agreed to take the Committee's view fully into account
in the negotiations about to begin for the renewal of the VPRS.
The Ministry stated (4.46):
"whatever form or forms of voluntary price restraint
are agreed with the"Association of the British
Pharmaceutical Industry, they must be clearly
understood to be binding on all its members."
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Agreement was reached between the Health Departments and the
pharmaceutical industry on 1 July 1964 on a revised scheme which
was due to be binding for three years and then be subject to
termination at six months' notice by either side. This revised
scheme, which was detailed in the Sainsbury Report (4.47 ), recognised
the importance of research ( 4.48).
Under the terms of the VPRS agreement, for "research-based"
preparations, the period of freedom from price regulation was increased
from three to four years. The free period for other preparations
was reduced from three to two years. •
Prices to the NHS were established according to certain rules.
The price to the NHS was not to exceed the weighted average of the
price obtained in the six most important export markets (4.49 ).
During September 1967, the Sainsbury Report was published. It
resulted from the Committee of Enquiry appointed in May 1965 to
examine the relationship of the pharmaceutical industry with the
NHS having regard, inter alia, to pricing and to the effects of
patents (4.50). The Committee had examined:
"the competitive conditions. prevailing in the sale of
medicines and the working of the Voluntary Price
Regulation Schemes of the Ministry of Health. We
found .••••• that the price regulation schemes of the
Ministry had serious weaknesses. As a result, we have
concluded that the existing conditions under which
medicines are supplied to the National Health Service
are not such as always to secure that prices and profits
are reasonable." (4.51 )
On 17 November 1969 the Scheme was revised again (4.43, 4.52). Before
1969, the Ministry of Health had attempted to control prices of
individual medicines by price comparisons and attempted to establish
the production costs of individual medicines specially selected by
the Ministry (4.43). The 1969 Scheme required more detailed
financial information from the manufacturers with the company's
overall costs and profits being considered rather than individual
prices. (4.43,.4.52).
A further revision took place on 1 September 1972 (4.53). The DHSS
Annual Report for 1972 states:
"The new Scheme reduces the number of companies
required to provide full financial returns each
year: in future, only those companies with turnover
in excess of £750,000 a year will be asked to do so.
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Companies with turnover between £100,000 and
£750,000 will be asked to complete a simplified
return and smaller companies will be exempt,
though companies in both groups may be called
upon to supply full returns if circumstances
appear to warrant them. Profitability and sales
promotion will continue to be assessed in
relation to the facts of the individual company.
The arrangements for agreeing price increases are
simplified and apply to products with sales
exceeding £150,000 a year, or £50,000 a year where
this is more than 10% of the company's sales to the
National Health Service." (4. 53 )
The Monopolies Commission Report of 1973 (4.54 ) noted that the
agreement between the DHSS and the ABPI consolidated in the VPRS
ensured the availability of medicines "on reasonable terms to the
NHS" as well as ensuring a "strong, efficient and profitable
industry."
The Report continued:
"as sponsor for the industry, DHSS recognises the
industry's contribution to the economy of the
United Kingdom as a whole and wishes further to
encourage its competitive efficiency at home and
abroad. ABPI recognises the desirability of securing
in the public interest that the prices of pharmaceutical
products supplied to the NHS are fair and reasonable."
In 1973 the prices of ethical medicines supplied to the NHS were
exempted from the control of the Price Commission under stages
2 and 3 of the Counter-Inflation Programme and remained subject to
the control of the Voluntary Price Regulation Scheme ( 4.55).
In April 1973 the Monopolies Commission Report on Chlordiazepoxide
and Diazepam was submitted to Parliament, the Government accepted
the Report's recommendations and by an Order dated 12 April 1973
fixed the price of those two Roche drugs ( 4.55). In 'November
1975 the dispute with Roche was settled with the Government laying
an Order revoking the price fixing Order. Roche undertook to co-
operate again in the Voluntary Price Regulation Scheme (4.56).
The VPRS of 1972 was succeeded by the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation
Scheme (PPRS) of April 1978.
The Schemes gained increasing prominence. Research findings are that
the proportion of proprietary preparations' cost which came under
review by the Schemes gradually increased from 89% at the inception
in 1957 to 99% in the last quoted year 1968 (4.57 - 4.61).
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The PPRS at prEsent
The object of ~he PPRS which became operative on 1 April 1978 is,
by regulating companies' overall costs and profits in supplying
medicines to the NHS, to ensure that the prices of such medicines
are fair and reasonable (4.43). The DHSS recognises (4.43 )
that it would be a massive task to control individually the price
of every medicine prescribed under the NHS.
The DHSS states ( 4.43) that:
~the PPRS is operated on the basis that ••••• if a company's
overall costs and profits in supplying such medicines are
reasonable, the prices of individual medicines supplied by
the company are for practical purposes not in themselves
significant and may be accepted as reasonable."
The DHSS memorandum continues:
"Because it was considered an effective means of price
control, the prices of medicines subject to the scheme
were specifically exempted from control by the Price
Commission. Because the NHS buys virtually all the
medicines prescribed in the UK, and because of the
continuing need to control public expenditure, price
regulation of the industry has continued; but it is
now the only industry subject to overall price control •••••
Pharmaceutical companies are aware that, quite apart from
statutory powers which would enable the Secretary of State
to control prices by order, those products which are
monopolies could be referred to the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission. In practice, companies - after some initial
reluctance ••••• in 1969 - now co-operate to a high degree
in the operation of the scheme."
The 1978 Scheme requires companies to submit annually to the DHSS
forecast financial returns within the first three months of the
accounting year to which they relate (PPRS para 5.4). The previous
Schemes suffered from the retrospective identification of a high
level of profitability six months after the end of the financial
year, according to the notes on the operation of PPRS provided by
DHSS, as well as a letter written by a spokesman of DHSS (Personal
Communication of 12 February 1982). Those turnover figures related
in the 1972 Scheme were doubled in the 1978 Scheme, producing one
category for sales of under £200,000 a year, one for sales of
£200,000 to £1,500,000 a year, and one for sales over £1,500,000 a
year (PPRS para 4). There are also provisions under which rebates of
excessive profits may be a~reed.
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The 1978 Scheme was reviewed in 1983 and from 1 April 1984 new
provisions applied. The target rate of profit for each participating
company was reduced by four percentage paints and the allowable level
of sales promotion was reduced (4.62 ).
The aims of the Scheme as printed in the official version of PPRS,
para 1, are as described by the Monopolies Commission Report (4.54
in referring to the 1972 VPRS, and so have not altered.
Problems Encountered
Conflict in the role of the DHSS
Evidence given before the Committee of Public Accounts in 1980
(4.63 ) shows that the DHSS adopts a "sponsorship" as well as a
regulatory role over the pharmaceutical industry. Further evidence
(4.64 ) highlighted the information that fifty eight companies
submit annual financial returns to the DHSS under the PPRS. While
regulating the industry the DHSS must also ensure that the industry
continues to export at a high level. In other words the DHSS
"sponsors" the industry.
The Sainsbury Report of 1967 remarked (4.65 ) on the sponsorship
and procurem~nt functions of the Ministry:
"the sponsorship function ••••• may lead to a pulling
of the purchasing punches."
It went on:
"the Committee has received a clear impression from
the evidence that the sponsorship function of the
Ministry interferes to some extent with their
directness of purpose in regulating pric~s."
It continued:
"we were not unanimous in feeling that they (the
disadvantages of the Ministry having two functions)
justify our recommending the separation of these
functions, but we note the sponsorship function
discharged by the Ministry as a factor which we
believe reduces the effectiveness of the direct
negotiat~on system within the VPRS."
The Monopolies Commission Report of 1973 remarked (4.66 ):
"it (DHSS) cannot exert its bargaining power as an
independent buyer would exert it, since it must
have regard to the effects this might have upon
the general prosperity of the industry, including
its exports and its research programme ••••• we
do not think that DHSS can be said to be in a
position to bargain on equal terms with a monopolist
seller of a given drug."
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Evidence before the Public Accounts Committee of 1980 showed that
there is a strong possibility of conflict in these two roles and
it has been suggested that the two be divorced by making them the
responsibility of different Government Departments (4.67 ).
Discussions on this topic in 1983 between the DHSS and the Department
of Industry resulted in a collective decision that the DHSS would
continue with its dual responsibility (4.68 ).
An alternative strategy would be the establishment of a specialist
regulatory agency. Such a device has been envisaged by Hartley
and Tisdell (4.69 ) for the monitoring and policing of non-competitive
contracts. The views of those distinguished economists, while not
specifically referring to drug purchases by NHS authorities, never-
theless bear a message which may apply. In their opinion:
"Such bodies might have the powers to investigate
and re-negotiate contracts where profits are found
to be 'excessive'. However, some models of'regulation
suggest that this arrangement might benefit industry
rather than society!"
The fifty eight companies, referred to above (4.64 ) are chosen on
the basis of turnover. An expedient which would release a company
from the need to submit financial returns would be to create a
subsidiary company. In theory this expedient can be nullified, since.
under paragraph 4.2 of PPRS, in the case of small companies:
"The Department reserves the right to call for a full
annual financial return if circumstances appear to
warrant it."
Furthermore a spokesman for Supply Division of DHSS in a personal
communication of 12 February 1982 stated:
"Several major suppliers are formed of more than one
company, but for the purposes of the PPRS their sales,
costs, .profits and'capital are consolidated in the
financial returns required under the scheme and they
are assessed as one company."
When the topic of transfer prices was analysed by the Public Accounts
Committee in 1983 it reported (4.70) that:
"an external investigation into this problem'
was being undertaken, that the study would be
welcomed and trust that it will be completed
urgently. "
The increasp. in number of tradin~ comp3nies b~T the creation of
, .subsidiaries with separate names was referred to (4.71) by a
publication of the Consumers' Associa.tion which suggested that
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the formation of subsidiaries may lead to the allowance of greater
·promotional expenditure under PPRS, but it subsequently retracted
that charge.
There is nevertheless suspicion of this formation of subsidiaries
gathering momentum, but the reasons for It can only be speculated
upon.
Levin, an industrialist in the pharmaceutical industry, noting
( 4.72) that ever-ywher-eeconomic contraints are puttine; those in
charge of health budgets under heavy pressure, continues by statine;
that the UK scheme is:
"simple but a very effective method of controlling profits,
linkine; the level of those profits to the company's
contribution to the economy. Thus a company which has a
high UK capital investment in building and equipment,
which exports substantially f;oomthe UK and which engages
1n origi~al research in Britain is permitted a relatively
liberal deal on prices by the DHSS. Smaller companies,
which cannot afford high investment in research or plant
and which have little or no export business will find that
their permissable level 'of profitability is severely
restricted and their opportunities for increasing prices
seriously limited." ,.'_'..'
Levin's comments provide a little more insight into the'operation
of the scheme and show it as favouring the large against the small
and therefore morally questionable.
Levin's reflections were given support by the Public Account~
Committee in 1983 which reported ( 4.73):
"DHSS do not apply the average overall return to
individual drug manufacturers. Instead they set
each company a reasonable annual target rate of return
relating to its NHS business.' They base each target
rate on their view of the merit of the company, having
regard to its contribution to the economy by it~
investment, research and development expenditure
and value added in manufacture in the United Kingdom,
and by the value of its exports." '
The Report subsequently described (4.74 ) the DHSS practice of
setting individual target rates for firms as being a "cause for
concern ••••• the use of subjective judgment ••~•• a difficult
administrative task for the Department, and leaves them with very
wide discretion." •
,/
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·The "liberal" deal allowed to certain companies by the DHSS gives
the impression of patronage to the industry generally or even
favouritism to individual companies. Certainly sound economic
reasonings do not appear to play too big a role in it with subjective
reasoning taking the place of the expected objective criteria.
The title of the Schemes was prefaced by "Voluntary" from 1957 to
1978 and then the word was replaced by "Pharmaceutical". Though
not widely known, it must be stated that the government has had,
under the Emergency Laws (Re-enactments and Repeals) Act 1964, the
power to control the maximum prices of medical supplies to the NHS
( 4.75). Exercise of those powers would be at variance with the
spirit of the Scheme ( 4.76). Nevertheless, the DHSS issued a
direction under section 5 subsection 2 of that Act, which requires
suppliers to provide such information as may be prescribed, to two
companies which had refused to supply information in connection
with the VPRS ( 4.77). The power was consolidated under the Health
Services and Public Health Act 1968 which authorised the use of
that power of hospitals to procure medicines at lower prices than
charged by patentees for the procurement of medicines for the general
medical, pharmaceutical and dental services of the NHS {4.7@. The
author of this work suggests that replacement of the term "Voluntary"
was apposite.
The relationship, symbiotic or otherwise, between the industry and
the DHSS has been examined by Wade. He suggests (4.79 ) that the
Scheme appears successful if prices in Britain are cOMpared with those
in other countries. He continues:
"It wbrks because both parties cohcerned with prices wish
the scheme to work. The State cannot deMand prices so low
that it exposes itself to the accusation that it has driven
drugs off the market or has made the discovery of new drugs
more difficult: the pharmaceutical industry cannot .be
indifferent to allegations that it is profiteering at the
expense of the sick."
Wade's views coincide with those previously aired by Enoch Powell
as quoted by Teeling-Smith (4.80). The present author· suggests
that any alleged "profiteerine" of the industry is not at all
unexpected. It is the raison d' etre of any company or industry and
is a motive of which th~ ABPI need not feel ashamed. By participating
1n the Scheme the ABPI ascribes to its members the more altruistic
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qualities of humanitarianism while it is portrayed as sublimating
the less philanthropic desires of its member companies.
Price Control
The Office of Health Economics, a body established by the ABPI,
criticised the VPRS in 1975. It argued (4.81 1 that the scheme was
based on the assumption that normal competitive forces did not exist.
It suggested that the DHSS used that erroneous assumption to justify
bureaucratic price controls:
"price competition for pharmaceuticals is just as
vigorous and effective in that market as in any
other market for innovative goods •••.•• the market
success of a prescription medicine would, other
things being equal, be affected by its price relative
to alternative products on the market ••••• a free
market price mechanism can often achieve a better
allocation of resources than bureaucratic controls,
even within a centrally directed sector of the
economy, such as the NHS."
The Office of Health Economics director reinforced those opinions
in 1982 when he suggested (4.82) that the price of the drug was a
significant. factor in the prescriber's decision making.
The contrary viewpoint has been expounded in government repo~ts as
well as the writings of individuals. The Hinchcliffe Report of
1959 (4.83 ) suggested that the pharmaceutical market is product-
competitive. This view was endorsed in the Sainsbury Report of
1961 which suggested (4.84 ) that the market for branded ethical
products is product-competitive rather than price-competitive
(that is drugs compete in terms of efficacy rather than price
primarily); and that product competition alone provides little
incentive to reduce prices, although it does have the advantage
of providing incentives to develop new products. (4.85 ).
The Monopolies Commission Report on the Supply of Chlordiazepoxide
and Diazepam felt ( 4.54) that:
"price restraint ••••• does not come from the patient
but from DHSS as the ultimate paymaster for the NHS.
The main instrument, through which DHSS seeks to
negotiate reasonable price levels with individual
manufacturers is ••••• the VPRS."
Any lingering doubts concerning where efforts should be exerted
to restrain the total drug bill were dissipated in 1983 with the
publication of the Tenth Report from the Committee of Public Accounts
which noted ( 4.86) that:
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"the reasonableness of expenditure incurred by the NHS
on drugs depends fundamentally upon whether DHSS •••••
have established effective control over manufacturers'
prices."
Clearly the volume of prescriptions, mirroring the prescribing habits
of the medical practitioners, was to be relegated to an inconsequential
sideline.
In a similar fashion the influence which could be exerted upon the
prescriber to reduce unit drug,costs must be considered as minimal.
The Monopolies Commission Report, in referring to the measures taken
by the DHSS affecting the competitive situation, pointed (4.87) to
the visits made by Regional Medical Officers to doctors:
"DHSS told us that discussions between doctors and
RMO's about prescribing are naturally difficult to
conduct. Chof.ce of treatment is entirely within the
general practitioner's discretion and DHSS say that
it wo~ld be wrong for the RMO to question this in
any way. While the intention may be to bring considerations
of cost to the general practitioner's attention, this has
to be done in a completely fair way, without appealing to
force majeure or going beyond strictly factual material.
The RMO is, therefore, positively briefed not to instruct
a general practitioner to prescribe one product rather'
than another."
The authors of the Monopolies Commission Report of 1973 clearly did
not feel that the price of a drug weighed heavily among the various
considerations of the prescriber.
Wade ( 4.79) states that the practitioner is insulated from the cost
of the drug prescribed. Happold (4.88), in a book markedly supportive
of the pharmaceutical industry, states:
"demand is not responsive to price. Especially in a
country with a free-issue medical service, the doctor
when prescribing is almost wholly concerned with what
'medicament is best for his patient. Considerations
of cost are very secondary, even if doctors in Britain
may be asked to explain and justify an above-average
cost of prescribing .......................•.........
The physician's opinion of effectiveness is the predominant
factor in what is prescribed".
Happold does not believe that there is price competition between the
(products of the) manufacturers. Happold noted the absence of a
market mechanism to help determine the price of a new drug. Reekie,
in a publication of the Office of Health Economics pOinted (4.89
to the isolation of the prescriber from financial responsibilty
and noted that the doctor "is not employed to make a financial best
buy."
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Perversely patients may conspire to prevent financial savings in
seeking expensive medicines. The editor of Monthly Index of
Medical Specialities (MIMS) is quoted (4.90) as having s~id:
"patients with access to Mims were asking for the
more expensive (and therefore "better") drugs."
The Ministry (and later the Department) of Health, over the first
fourteen years reported large price reductions as a result of the
operation of the Scheme and these are reflected in Table 4.1. As
can be seen from an examination of the Table, the reported savings
increased, slowly at first, to a maximum of £3.1 million in 1966
and then dropped to a reported figure of £0.9 million in 1911.
Subsequent years showed gener-alLy decreasing savings attributable
to the Scheme, with increasing savings reported most recently. The
question must inevitably be asked:
"From what level is the calculation of money saved made?"
A cynical view would be that large savings could be reported as a
result of the manufacturers pre-setting their prices at a higher level
in anticipation of them dropping as a result of negotiation. It must
be stated that the sources of figures quoted in Table 4.1 vary but
nevertheless are thought to reflect the real position.
The large fall in savings attributed to the Scheme coincided with the
major change in its operation, resulting in the companies' overall
costs and profits being scrutinised rather than individual drug prices.
The DHSS admits that its methods prior to 1969 had disappointing
results which were criticised by the Committee of Public Accounts
(4.43). Yet the apparent savings after 1969 were generally smaller
than before that year. It may be thought that the published savings
should be viewed with caution.
Profitability of the Industry
The Sainsbury Report of 1961 noted the need for "clearly defined
guidance on the definition of a reasonable level of profit on
capi tal" (4.102 )• The Supply Board Working Group Report noted
(4.103) that the object of the PPRS"is tovensure that each pharma-
ceutical company's profits from the supply of medicines to the NHS,
measured by return on capital employed, are reasonable.
The Comptroller and Auditor General in his report (4.104) of 6.
January 1983 noted the acknowledgment by DHSS of the "difficulty in
administering the profit control aspect of the scheme" ••••• and:
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TABLE 4.1: SAVINGS ATTRIBUTABLE TO VPRS AND PPRS FOR VARIOUS YEARS
YEAR ESTIMATED
NET SAVING
£ MILLION
REFERENCE
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
ending September
1968
ending September'
1969
15 months ending December
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
0.037
0.376
1.073
1.768
1
1.2
1.1
1• 1
2.25
3.7
0.6
4.91
4.91
4.91
4.91
4.92
4.93
4.94
4.94
4.95
4.57
4.59
2.3 4.61
1.15 4.96
0.7
0.9
-1.0
-0.2
-20.0
-37.0
-45.0
NIA
NIA
, 15.3
7.6
11.4
4.97
4.98
4.53
4.55
4.99
4.56
4.100
4.101
4.101
4. 101
NIA = Not available
NOTE A negative value in the "saving" coluMn denotes net price
rises attributable to the scheme. The scheme can influence
price rises as well as price falls.
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"the uncertainties about the reasonableness of
transfer prices" and "the inadequate evidence to
establish the efficiency of the industry."
He concluded that DHSS felt that PPRS represented "good value for
money" furnishing medicines "at reasonable prices" ••••• but "They
recognised the limitations of the scheme and acknowl~dged that it
remained open to review and refinement."
The reasonable level of profits is based on a target agreed with the
Treasury but has never been published because the target rate for
return on capital is commercially sensitive and secret information.
It is thought to be fairly generous (4.105).
An examination of Table 4.2 shows that return on capital employed in'
the pharmaceutical industry has been, until, recently, consistently
higher than manufacturing industry generally. Furthennore within the
industry there is considerable variation in,profitability, with a
range during 1978-79 of - 0.22% to 55.51% (4.118). Though return on
capital is the most important measure of a company's performance,
it must be admitted that the use of a single accounting yardstick
,when comparing the pharmaceu~ical industry with other industries may
not provide an accurat e assessment' of the true state of the viability
of those sectors of industry. Nevertheless, it would be fair to
suggest that neither the hope propounded in the Sainsbury Report for
a defined "reasonable level of profit on capital" nor the object of
PPRS as stated 'by the Supply Board Working Group Report that:
"each pharmaceutical company's profits ••••• measured by
return on capital ••••• are reasonable"
has been satisfied.... -~,
With PPRS operating fairly, a direct relationship between savings
to the DHS~ as shown in Table 4.1 'and industry profitability, as
shown in Table 4.2, might be expected. Since profitability was,
until 1978, examined retrospectively under PPRS, profitability
and savings were plotted against time. A two year time lag was
inferred. Savings w~re plotted against profitability two years
previously and the relationship is seen in Figure 4.1. It becomes
apparent that for profitabilities of up to 20% increase in
profitability was associated with increase in savings to the DHSS,
whereas increase in profitability beyond about 20% was associated
with no net increased saving to the DHSS.
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TABLE 4.2: RETI1RN· -,-, ON CAPITAL EMPLOYED FOR PHARMACEUTICAL
MANUFACTURERS AND MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY GENERALLY
FOR VARIOUS YEARS
PHARMACEUTICAL_ __. .MA~A:CTURING
MANUFACTURERS:'~- INDUSTRY GENERALLY
YEAR RETURN ON REFERENCE RETURN ON REFERENCE
CAPITAL CAPITAL
EMPLOYED % EMPLOYED %
1954 40 4.106 16 4.106
1955 31 4.106 16 4.106
1956 30 4.106 15 4.106
1957 30 4.106 14 4.106
1958 31 4.106 14 4.106
1959 32 4.106 14 4.106
1960 31 4.106 15 4.106
1961 30 4.106 14 4.106
1962 27 4.106 13 4.106
1963 26 4.106 14 4.106
1964 N/A N/A
1965 N/A N/A
1966 N/A N/A
1967 Average 28 4.107, 4.108 12 4.108
1968 28 4.108 13 .4. 108
1969 26 4.108 13 4.108
1970 Average 20 .4.107, 4.108 12 4.108
1971 Average 20 4.107, 4.108 13 4.108
1972 Average 19 4.107, 4.108 15 4.108
1973 17 4.107, 4.56 N/A
1974 15 4.56 N/A
1975 15 4.100 N/A
1976
end Apl~ 14 4.109 15 4.115
1976 Average 18 4.110, 4. 111 N/A
1977
end Apl. Average 21 4. 109, 4.112 16 4.115
1978
end Apl. Average 24 4. 109, 4.113 16 4. 115
1979
end Apl. Average 25 4.111-4.113.10 4.116
1979 26 4.111 N/A
1980
end Apl. 19 4.113 9 4.116
1981
end Apl. 14 4.114 21 4.117
1982
end Apl. 15 4.117 18 4. 117
1983
end Apl. 17 4.117 20 4.117
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Unreasonableness was admitted in deliberations of the Public
Accounts Committee in 1983. The Committee's Report stated
(4.119):
" we believe that the PPRS has not ensured thereasonableness of drug prices generally. For
example, in 1978 the 21 per cent return on capital
earned under PPRS was five percentage points above
the return for UK industry generally, and in 1979
and 1980 the return under PPRS increased to 22 per
cent and 23.3 per cent respectively. On the other
hand, as we pOinted out in our 16th Report of Session
1981-82, since 1978 profit margins have been declining
in industry generally and in our view the average
rate for Government non-competitive contracts should
have been reduced from 20 per cent to 17 per cent
at the most."
Clearly the Schemes have not been regulating profits in the manner
envisaged by the Government.
~he impact of PPRS on hospital prices
Salmon, in the Report of the Supply Board Working Group, which
he chaired, remarked (4.103) that hospital purchasing takes place
against the background of PPRS, yet he continued by stating that
purchasing authorities (hospitals) can and do obtain considerably
lower prices as a result of their negotiations "and it may be that
there is scope for more central purchasing." It could be said
that since PPRS applies to profits generally, including those
accruing from sales to hospitals as well as general practice,
any lowering of prices negotiated by hospitals results in the
manufacturer optimising his profits by raising his general practice
prices accordingly. This view is supported, though in a different
context, by the statement of the Comptroller and Auditor General
who wrote that "any substantial reduction in the use of branded drugs
would lead to some compensating adjustment to the price of other
drugs by the firms concerned." ( 4. 120)• Prior to 1969 the prices of
individual medicines were controlled. If such control was successful
then the award of a hospital contract could result in a price lower
than that prevailing generally and the manufacturer would be unable
to raise his general practice price to compensate.
However, in a situation in which prices of individual medicines are
n9t controlled, as has been the case since 1969, the manufacturer
would be expected to recoup any lower profits or losses on hospital
sales by raising prices in general practice.
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An officer of Supply Division. of the DHSS suggested (4.121):
"Some Health Authority supplies officers have, from time
to time, questioned whether their contracting procedures
are worthwhile, given the role of the PPRS in determining
prices. This is a fair point, ••••• "
That officer continued by pointing out advantages of contract
purchasing and referred to the prices charged for medicines used
mainly or only in hospitals and "proposals for very high increases
in the prices of such products." He stated:
"we can and do intervene, frequently successfully, to
abate the level of increase."
In a communication dated 12 February 1982 that officer described
the relationship between hospital contracts and PPRS as "compatible
and complementary."
It is the submission of the author that the advantage of a contract
must be examined in isolation from PPRS since, within the broad context
of a price regulation scheme as it is organised now, the existence of
a contract is not saving the NHS any resources additional to those which
may be saved by PPRS.
As mentioned elsewhere in this subdivision of the chapter/under the
present Scheme, the DHSS, in its sponsorship role, adopts a less
benevolent attitude toward those companies with a small or non-existent
research function. Generic manufacturers, with few exceptions, carry
out little research yet they playa major role in lowering the prices
of drugs on hospital contracts.
Clearly their profits, after the most rigorous scrutiny of the DHSS
under PPRS, are still buoyant enough to allow hospitals to buy at prices
lower, in some cases considerably lower, than trade prices generally.
Perhaps those"companies are not among the 58 whose financial returns
are scrutinised in depth. It may be reasonable to assume that the
research - based companies, permitted a more liberal deal by PPRS, are
being allowed to make greater profits than the generic manufacturers.
Yet the research - based companies, likely to be preponderant among
the 58 scrutinised, are still able to offer drugs on contract to
hospitals at prices below trade prices.
It is suggested by the pres~nt author that since companies are
seeking to optimise profits the lower hospital 'contract prices result
from efforts on the part of manufacturers to acquire spin-off benefits
of increased sales to general practice.
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This has been remarked upon by the Monopolies Commission Report of
1973 (4.37). It referred to the free supplies of drugs made available
to the hospital service and the armed forces by Roche Products:
"Such free supplies, the Department said, had three effects •.
First, a potential competitor would be discouraged since he
would normally establish his initial sales in the hospital
market; secondly, hospital doctors would prescribe Roche
Products' branded reference drugs and this precedent would
tend to be followed by the patient's general practitioner
when the patient returned to his care; and thirdly, hospital
staff would tend to regard the company's products as causing
the smallest increase in the hospital's drug bill and would
not be so readily aware of the cost of treatment for patients
returned to the general practitioner's care."
The Report continued (4;)22):
"we also regard it as undesirable that Roche Produ~ts should
supply these drugs to NHS hospitals and the armed forces
free of charge, or at low prices which are unrelated to
cost savings •••••"
In its recommendations the Report stated (4.123):
"Roche Products should not differentiate in its selling prices
between customers or classes of customers (including DHSS
as purchaser for NHS hospitals and the armed forces) except
to the extent that such differentiation is justified by
normal commercial considerations such as savings in cost
arising from bulk supply."
The prime element in the price differentials between the general
practice and hospital sectors is the segmentalion of the market,
the lower price applying where competition is more elastic to
price (4.124).
Despite the recommendations of the Monopolies Commission of 1973,
there is continuing evidence of prices being offered by suppliers
to hospitals which do not reflect the cost savings arising from
bulk supply, but which instead suggest efforts to stimulate general
practice sales, a combination of penetration and promotional pricing.
The Sainsbury Report referred (4.125) to the different considerations
regarding controls and restraints on prescribing by the hospital
doctor as contrasted with the general medical practitioner.
In describing the efforts to control prescribing costs in general
practice the Report noted (4.125):
"It is impossible to be sure what the effects are of this
restraint on the total National Health Services cost of
medicines. Even if it were possible to assess the effects
on the doctors whose prescribing is scru~ned, it would be
quite impossible to make even a rough judgment of the
deterrent effect which the possibility of scrutiny must have."
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The Report continued (4.126):
"In the hospital service different considerations obtain.
Hospital doctors are made aware that excessive expenditure
on drugs and dressings will mean less money available
for other medical and general needs, and certain administrative
pr6cedures are operated. There is thus every incentive
for critical study of trends in expenditure and there are
various arrangements for promoting economy in prescribing;"
Any shift of expenditure from hospital to general practice is likely
to increase total NHS expenditure, as was referred to in a letter
to chairme,n of Health Authorities from the DHSS in 1980 (4.127).
It must be suggested that companies would set their hospital prices
at lower levels than their general practice ones irrespective of the
presence or absence of a price regulation scheme. The impact of
PPRS on hospital prices must therefore be considered marginal.
It is suggested that if'price control ,of drugs is considered
necessary, efforts carried out in the general practice setting
are fraught with difficulty. Any concentration of present efforts
in that direction may be unlikely to achieve the desired results of
reducing drug costs and in addition would arouse the resentment of
bureaucratic interference among those who feel that the prescriber
should have a reasonable degree of freedom to choose the drug of
choice for his patient, regardless of price. The conclusion must be
drawn that if control of drug expenditure is considered necessary
then there is 'no realistic alternative to governmental constraints
on drug prices or on the family practitioner service budget.
The need for such price control of pharmaceuticals should be decided
on sound economic and scientific grounds, divorced from political
dogma. Once proven necessary the scheme should be seen to operate
fairly. It would be rash to draw more specific conclusions on the
detailed workings of the VPRS and PPRS in the absence of more
detailed public knowledge of its operation, but the mere lack of
such information allows the assumption that the Scheme would benefit
from more critical analysis. It is suggested that more objectivity
in the operation of the PPRS would provide a more efficient system.
The savings attributed to the Scheme appear to follow the trend of
the profitability of the industry up to a point only. Whereas
"cause and effect" relationship between profitability and PPRS -
induced savings cannot be proved, the possibility of such a link
127
would present itself as a highly attractive proposition. Such a
hypothesis, if it could be proved. would give encouragement to
the opinion that the fewer the government contraints on the profit-
making ability of the industry, the greater the likelihood of funds
accruing to the government, both from higher tax returns as well as
those which are PPRS-induced. Excessive application of such
constraints by government would be a self-defeating exercise. An
argument could be put forward in favour of fewer restraints on
manufacturers by the government.
If it is thought that·the taxpayer is benefiting from PPRS, there
is doubtful additional benefit derived from hospital contract
purchasing of drugs while the Scheme is at present organised.
Hospital contracts and PPRS must be judged as conflicting
under the Schemes agreed since 1969, not only in a price setting but
also on the grounds of hospital contracts encouraging non research-
based companies whereas PPRS seeks to support the research-based
firms.
There is evidence that manufacturers offer their products at very
low prices to hospitals in the hope of encouraging spin-off sales
in general practice. Any shift of expenditure from the fixed-budget
hospitals sector of the NHS, with its (hopefully) continuing efforts
to control its drug bill, to the family practitioner sector, which
has an open-ended budget and relatively few efforts being made to
control its drug expenditure, would be likely to raise the total
NHS bill unless PPRS is operating with utmost efficiency.
The conclusion must be drawn that the subject would benefit from
a more detailed study.
The author's findings set out above which resulted from detailed
examination of the operation of PPRS were published elsewhere.
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4.3 Influence of Patents
The patent system which has been operating in the United Kingdom for
more than thirty years stems from the Report of the Swan Committee
of 1946 (4.128) the recommendations of which were embodied in the
Patents Act 1949 (4.129). The aim of that Act was to stimulate
technical progress by patent protection for sixteen years. The
Sainsbury Report of 1961 favoured a shortening of the patent life for
drugs whereas the Banks Report (4.130) of 1910 recommended an
extension to twenty years for all items. That recommendation was
legalised in the case of products with a remaining patent life of
'more than five years in the Patents Act 1917 (4.131). It replaced
section 41 of the 1949 Act which section had facilitated the grant of
compulsory licenses against pharmaceutical and food innovators.
Patents establish property rights in ideas and therefore provide
rights to manufacture. The patent confers a monopoly for an invention
but the Patents Act curbs abuses of the monopoly situation. When
pharmaceutical research is successful in providing a useful addition
to the prescriber's range of drugs available the opportunity arises
for those research costs to be recouped. There is a real possibility
of a competitive drug entering the market at any time and even if
this does not occur while patented, the patent life of the newly
introduced drug limits the time during which those costs can be
recouped. The manufacturer must assume that once the patent life is
exceeded the probability of competition occurring from other firms
is high. It could be safely assumed that the patent holder will
initially set the prices of his products at a high level and as noted
by the Monopolies Commission, "these tend to fall during their patent
life." (4.132).
Mitchell (4.133) suggests that since for an established drug marginal.manufacturing costs:'
"are typically very low, a major success means that
revenue becomes_largely profit. The normal pricing
pattern for a particular drug therefore is a gradual
rall .•••·The fall in price of drugs also may be
hastened by the end of patent; or by the entry or
threat of a competitor. 'Copying' firms commonly produce
mass-selling drugs at less than half the price of a
patented or branded version, a circumstance which
increases DHSS's bargaining pO\o1er." .
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Support for this opinion appears in minutes of evidence before the
Public Accounts Cor.nnitteeof 5 March 1964 (4.134) in which it is
stated that:
"when it was shown that the patent of the manufacturer SKF
on nitrofurantoin was not valid, the price (for a given
quantity) fell from 374 shillings to 50 shillings."-
DHSS statistics (4.135) add support to that view by showing that
proprietary drugs, that is those market ed under a patented brand name,
cost 91.0% of net ingredient costs yet account for 82.3% of
prescription numbers whereas unbranded drugs cost 4.7% of costs,
although accounting for 15.0% of prescription numbers. Assuming that
the quantity of the formulation prescribed is the same for branded or
unbranded drugs, the conclusion may be drawn that branded drugs are
3.53 times the price of unbranded ones. That is not a comparison of
equivalent branded with.unbranded versions of the same drugs but
rather a comparison of branded with unbranded drugs generally.
A price comparison of equivalent branded and unbranded versions of
the same drugs is given by Fell who remarks (4.136) that "the price
difference between generics (or unbranded drugs) and their branded
equivalents is less than formerly (10 to 15 ye~rs ago)." He
continues:
"Currently, most generics seem to be 60-70% of the price
of the branded equivalent; in the past some were as low
as 15-20%. The presence in the market of a generic
equivalent has ceased to inhibit price rises in branded
equivalents. For example, between March 1980 and
July 1981, while the price of the most widely used
brand of "generic" ampicillin remained constant (at
about 70% of the price of Penbritin, the original
brand), the price of Penbritin itself rose by 14%.
The most widely used generic indomethacin remained
constant in price (at about 65% of the price of the
original.brand Indocid), while the price of Indocid
increased by about 10% between March 1980 and ~~rch 1981.
The price of the most widely used generic propranolol
remained constant between March 1980 and July 1981,
at about 75% of the price of Inderal, while the price
of Inderal increased by about 15%."
In contrast Cooper (4.137), in a publication of the Office of Health
Economics, put foruA.rd an Lndus tr-y vieu in writing that !1dces do not
necessarily fall in the absence of patents and that:
"International experience has been that the absence of
patents tends to fragment the market and raise costs."
130
It must be assumed that Cooper's term "absence of patents" refers
to countries which do not grant drug patents rather. than a
situation, such as in the U.K., in which the patent life has ended.
The Patents Act has had a bearing on hospital drug purchasing.
In the late 1950's it became apparent that British drug prices were
considerably higher than those in countries abroad such as Italy,
which did not grant pharmaceutical patents, and in 1961, it became
kno\vo that some hospital pharmacists had been breaking the law by
buying those drugs at much lower prices from unlicensed manufacturers
(4.138). The aim of those pharmacists was to curb the continuing
increase in their hospitals' drug bills. The Minister of Health,
Mr. Enoch Powell, could either instruct the hospital pharmacists to
cease breaking the law by buying from unlicensed sources or he could
invoke section 46 of the Patents Act 1949. Section 46 a.lIowed
any Government or person authorised by a Government Department to
"make, use and exercise" any patented invention for the Crown, the
patentee having a right to be compensated financially. The Minister
invoked sect.Lon 46 legalising imports from unlicensed manufacturers
for the services of the Crown, that is for hospitals, and he announced
his decision on 17 May 1961. ~fuereas the dispute with the patent
holders was over the price charged generally to the NHS, the Patents
Act did not authorise the Minister to obtain supplies for general
practice even had he wished to do so.
In November 1961, contracts for supply to NHS hospitals of five
patented widely used drugs were placed with unlicensed continental
sources following the Government decision to invite competitive tenders
and apply Section 46 of the Patents Act 1949. Under this section the
patentee was entitled to royalties to be agreed between the patentee
and the Minister subject to Treasury approval. Failing agreement
the Courts would determine the royalties. In selectine the drugs
for action under Section 46 the Minister considered the length
of time the drug had been available on the market, the quantities
involved and the potential scope for saving (4.139). In November
1962, a second series of contracts for the supply of five patented
drues was placed with firms drawing supplies from the Continent
(4.140). The publication of the Guild of Public Pharmacists
welcomed the decision of the Minister to purchase under Section 46
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and suggested that it seemed "likely that the disparity" in
price between general practice and hospitals "must not be too
great" (4.141). In other words general practice prices
would have to fall.
The 1964 Emergency Laws (Re-enactments and Repeals) Act gave the
Government the pm<ler to control the maximum prices of medical
supplies to the NHS.
In 1965 the Minister of Health discontinued the imports following
his success in the action brought by Pfizer, one of the companies
whose patent had been infringed (4.142). The Ministry was to rely
on settlements with U.K. suppliers under the price regulation scheme
(4.143). The power granted to the Minister under Section 46 of the
1949 Act was included in section 55 of the 1977 Act. The Minister
could therefore obtain supplies of patented drugs from unlicensed
sources "for the services of the Crown." This power was seen to be
a reserve power only.
The Health Services and Public Health Act 1968 extended "Crown use"
powers to buy at lower prices than charged by patentees to the general
practice services.
NHS hospitals, which generally stock only one brand of any drug,
benefit from the lapse of patent to a greater extent than general
pract.Lce pharmacies. .The reason for this is that several manufacturers
of each drug compete with each other for the hospital sales of that
drug, where brand loyalty is almost absent, whereas in general
practice, whichever brand is prescribed by the doctor, that brand
must be issued by the pharmacist. The scope for price competition
in hospitals is therefore much greater and the potential savings
in the absence of a patent are larger.
The effect of patent expiry on the pharmaceutical market was noted in
the Supply Council Report (4.144) which recommended that information
on patent expiry dates should be provided to Reeions froM a central
source. The Report also noted (4.145) "the marked effect \-Thichthe
introduction of new products can have on the purchasing patterns
of pharmaceuticals."
A Government Green Paper published in December 1983 suggested that
there might be a case for patent term extension for pharmaceuticals.
The document noted (4.146), hOVlever, that evidence from the United
States showed that profitability and research investment had not been
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seriously prejudiced by limited patent life because a higher price
was charged over a shorter period.
The paper continued:
"In the U.K. the pricing agreements with the National
Health Service have the dominant effect."
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4.4 Variations in Price Over the Country
Bilateral oligopoly results generally in a variety of prices paid
by individual buyers or in individual transactions. Bain (4.147)
and Scherer (4.148) explain how oligopolistic suppliers tend to
reduce prices so as to achieve a large order, especially when they
have excess capacity. Large buyers can exploit this weakness by
concentrating their orders into big lumps, dangling the temptation
before each seller and 'encouraging a break from the established price
structure. Since the fourteen Regional Health Authorities show a
range of population and hence buying power, the primary research
of this thesis includes an examination of the hypothesis that there
is no evidence that the larger the buyer the cheaper is the drug
that he buys. Furthermore there is some evidence, described later,
that the various Regions are charged widely different prices for
the same drug for no apparent reason.
A·major factor in the apparent illogicality of the various Regions
paying different prices for the same drug is the confidentiality of
the contract system.
Turpin states (4.149):
"Hhen the competition is tal<:ingplace, absolute secrecy ~...ith
respect to tendered prices is of course the rule, but even
after the successful tenderer has been awarded the contract,
government departments regard themselves as bound by a long
standing prinCiple of confidentiality. In 1887 an inquiry
in industry overwhelmingly recoMMenced that confidentiality
continue to be observed. The reason was that the lower
prices quoted by manufacturers to government departments
would give rise to complaints from other customers. It was
also feared that constant undercutting of prices and
deterioration of the quality of goods would follow adoption
of a policy of publication of tender prices. Some contractors
thought that publication ~...ould make' it difficult for a
department to pass over the lowest tender, even for the best
of reasons, without provoking complaints and endless
correspondence, and that the likely result would be that
tenders would come to be judged exclusively on price.
The principle of confidentiality has been adhered to from
that time to the present over the greater part of the field
of procurement."
The Ministry of Health in 1959 stated that contract prices were
confidential and should not be disclosed to any unauthorised person,
but local exchange of information between pharmacists should result
in advantage being taken of the best prices (4.150). That this did
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not happen is seen from an examination of a paper, shown in Table
4.3, presented in 1962 to one Region, which showed intra - and
inter-Regional price variations (4.151). Furthermore examination
of the results of a survey (4.152) carried out in four Regions
in 1981 showed that the passage of nineteen years had not improved
communications so as to effect cheaper prices. That survey high-
lighted marked price differences in the case of generic tablets,
the most blatant divergence being the drug costing 23.3 times the
price of the equivalent in another Region. It may be fair to
assume that had the survey been extended to all fourteen Regions
that finding would have been endorsed or amplified.
The basis for the differences in the contract prices highlighted
by that survey was suggested as being related to lack of information
that particular firms were able to supply contract items and
differences in opinion as to suitability of particular firms or
acceptability of particular items from a firm (4.152). A removal
of the veil of co~fidentiality with a resultant freer flow of
information on prices paid, firms supplying, firm suitability and
acceptability of products should, it is suggested by the present
author, lead to savings to the Health Service.
The Supply Council Report of 1982 (4.153) made reference to an
"examination of prices paid in different Regions (t",hich)revealed some
price differences. indicating that contracts could achieve. significant
savings." Indeed contracts can achieve signific~nt savings, but the
Supply Council Report surprisingly makes no reference to the disparity
in prices between Regions which can be attributed to the
confidentiality of the system and the r-e'sult ing lack of exchange
of contract price information between Regions.
The Annual Report of the Ministry of Health for 1964 made reference
to drug contracts. It stated (4.154):
"A record has been compiled of the main drugs and dressings
which hospitals are using, the names of suppliers, and the
prices being charged. The record covers local as Hell as
central contracts and ''''illenable the Ministry to keep
informed of these purchasing activities and to give
appropriate advice to hospitals."
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In 1965, the Committee of Public Accounts discussed the subject
(4.155) and the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Health
acknowledged the presence of:
"a central record, which is now basically completed,
and it covers most drugs purchased by hospital
authorities under contract, and of course we are
now keeping it up to date. And these authorities
have been informed of cases where in similar
circumstances they seem to be paying different
prices for certain drugs from other authorities,
so that they can take steps to get their prices,
when their contract came up for renewal, into line;
and they were encouraged to consult us as to any
doubt about the reliability of any sources of supply,
and by reference to the central record we can give
.them advice and guidance on what is happening elsewhere
in the countrYr"
The Permanent Secretary in further evidence (4.155) repeated that
the Ministry had:
"returns of the drugs and the prices paid under
various contracts, and this information is made
available to the Regional Boards and other
authorities in order that they may see what are
the best prices at which these drugs can be bought.
If any area or Region is seriously out of step with
the prices which can be obtained elsewhere then we
inform them·of what prices can be obtained elsewhere
and we expect them to seek contracts on the same basis.
There has not been any case where this has caused any
difficulties."
The making available by the Ministry of contract prices to other
hospitals was noted by the Sainsbury Report (4.156).
According to the Ministry, confidentiality of prices did not apply
to those who needed to know within the health service. Yet there
is no evidence of the Ministry making such price information
available. The author sought a statement froM the DHSS on this
matter and the reply was that such information is not and had
never been made available. This contradict~ the statement of the
Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Health of 1965.
In 1969, the government made an exception to the rule on
confidentiality of contract prices in the case of building and
civil engineering work (4.157). Turpin (4.158) felt that the change
was welcome as likely to encourage fair dealing and realistic
competitiveness without leading to over-emphasis on price. In 1974,
the subject was discussed at the regular meetings between pharmacists
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from each region and officers of the DHSS. A view expressed then
was that once contracts had been awarded absence of confidentiality
would help competition (4.159).
It was stated that South Africa, Australia and New Zealand
published details of hospital contracts in a gazette. The spokesman
of the DHSS stated in response that "confidential" meant that
information should be passed only to those inside the NHS who need
to know for the purpose of their jobs. This position was repeated
in 1977 when the DHSS responded to a letter from Hyman, a distinguished
academic and economist who had carried out considerable research into
health service procurement, stating that contract prices paid by
Authorities and listed in contract 'documents were "confidential"
(4.160) •
Hyman felt that the buyer must have knowledge of prices being quoted
elsewhere, within his area and country and in other countries (4.161).
The United States General Accounting Office in a report in 1979
stressed the need for hospitals to share information with openness
protecting against favouritism and profiteering. It stated that
hospitals should share information on prices of common supplies and
by doing this, among other things, group purchasing's great potential
for reducing costs could be realised (4.162).
This view of the GAO was opposite to that of Lee and Dobler (4.163)
who bemoaned the fact that hospitals continuously try to compare.
their prices and suggested that this penalises the efficient while
it seldom helped the inefficient. If a hospital that is paying a
high price becomes aware of a lower price paid else~here, it will
pressure the vendor for the lower price. There is little likelihood
of it getting it but instead the vendor will equalise the prices and
so the hospital that is buying well loses. They suggested that this
is a reason for not revealing price information.
Evidence in the United Kingdom suggests that the inter-Regional
disparity in prices sometimes seen has little justification and
pressure applied by the buyer for lower pric~is likely to succeed.
The seemingly impervious barrier of confidentiality regarding inter-
Regional price variations developed a chink in 1982 when, coincidental
with publication of the results of the survey showing the price
disparities (4.152), Regional Pharmaceutical Officers reported
(4.164) that they had agreed to exchange information on companies
awarded drug contracts, so assisting savings on drug expenditure.
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The prices set for drugs follow the pattern set for other items of
trade. Mitchell, a distinguished economist, stated (4.165) that
the supplier does not charge the various customers the same price
for each product. Chapman provides evidence (4.166) that blood
pack suppliers charge the various Regions differing prices, with
price being in no way related to quantity.
The same point was made by Housley (2.51) but was contradicted by
Wil+iamson (3.70) and Bain who suggested that small buyers are likely
to pay prices set by the sellers with individual bargaining playing
no important role., He continued (4.147):
"The usual overall result is that a wide variety of
different net prices are charged to different
buyers or in different transactions, with a general
tendency being for small buyers to pay more than
large buyers."
The primary research attempts to resolve the argument as it applies
to Health Authority drug purchases.
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SUMMARY OF SECONDARY DATA
Emerging from the secondary data is a picture of an oligopsonistic
buyer, the NHS, purchasing from oligopolistic suppliers.
The buyer's objectives theoretically merge with those of his employing
authority and those of the government to which he pays his taxes.
The buyer confronts a skilled seller who views the hospital sector as
being merely a small, but nevertheless strategically influential,
portion of the market.
Contract buying imposes a centralized structure upon the fr-amewor-k,with
individual pharmacies and local health authorities giving up their
independence to more remote supplies departments of RHA's. Further-
more there is a reliance on the expertise of two distinct,potentially
rival, disciplines, the pharmacist and the supplies officer, to achieve
a synthesis of buying and technical skills, yet neither is in a
position of authority to enable quick rational decisions to be made.
Instead a committee structure is required to sat~sfy public account-
ability considerations. In essence it is a risk reducing mecbanism.
Further deliberation upon the market led to the opinion that the
buyer is theoretically virtually monopsonistic but the independent
actions of RHA's brings about the possibility of competition between
them, resulting in oligopsony tending toward atomism. The consequent
effect of that bilateral oligopoly on price is uncertain.
Each'Health Authority is legally independent but the Secretary of State
has considerable powers over them, so that independence is more
theoretical than real. English Authorities spend annually £200
million on drugs, which makes them the most expensive commodity.
However in the context of the total NHS market, hospita1s consume a
.mere fifth. It is estimated that some 60% of that hospital expenditure
is by contractual purchase.
Contract organisation is governed by Standing Orders which delineate
the method of operation in the hope of satisfying public accountability
requirements. Competitive tender is the stipulated practice, and
negotiation of price is absent from the proceedings. The process is
a long drawn-out affair taking some seven months from start to finish.
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Despite its title no contract generally exists since there is no
commitment to buy fixed quantities. It is really, therefore, a
collection of standing offers, with each RHA deciding for itself
on starting dates, time scales, scope and duration.
Purchasing by the NHS is considerably circumscribed. More than
sixty documents exerting an impact on the scheme have been issued
in the 35 years since the inception of the NHS. Examination of
those missives shows that political influences have resulted in
changes of emphasis in purchasing, while passage of time ,has
resulted in some abatement of the initial hostility between the
two disciplines involved. The recent establishment of the NHS
Supply Council has given rise to hopes of more efficient NHS
purchasing than hitherto. One of the main causes of inefficiency
is a dearth of reliable data. No studies documenting the optimal..administrative level of purchasing exist. Likewise the scope,
duration and usefulness of estimates have not been researched.
Prices could be lowered by actions on the part of buyers and suppliers.
A mo~a away from tendering to negotiation or prime vendor buying
might reduce the drug bill and, whereas there is no evidence from the
United Kingdom, data from the ,United States suggests that such a
change be investigated. The administrative costs of contracts are
thought considerable but as yet no reliable analysis has been performed.
Examination of the method by which the government controls, or seeks
to control, drug prices led to a critical review of the schemes
entitled VPRS and PPRS. Hospital contracts and PPRS negate each
other both in terms of global prices and stimuli to research-based
industrial concerns. Effect of patent life on price appears at first
sight to be notable, but in the context of PPRS must be thought
of minor significance.
Considerable inter-Regional price variation abounds. The DHSS
collects such data but does not disseminate it. Each RHA acts
without knowledge of hospital market prices, but in reality even
if RHA's were aware of such price differentials, there is little
that could rreachieved to remedy them given the present tendering
system. The occurrence of such variations implies that the National
Health Service exists in name only, and they present the onlooker
with the impression of an inefficient organisation.
Consideration of the secondary data led to the desire for a model
to explain the operation of the NHS contract drug buying system.
The,stated or implied system is portrayed in Table 4.4.
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TABLE 4.4: STATED 'Jp !!-'PLISD ~CDEL OF c~~rT?AC'!'" CRIJO E'URCHASINO..SYS'!'EM
ASPECT STArED OR IMPLIED FEATURES
Objective Drugs of adequate quality are bou~ht
Reason The resources of Health Authorities are judiciously spent
ay extension the resources of the NHS are spent well
The resources of society are spent well and the efficiency and viability of the pha~aceutical
industry are ensured.
The operation is cost effective, that is the savings of the scheme are not outwei~~ed by
administrati'/e costs
Savings would be the maximum attainable
Savings made by the mana~ed sector of the NHS should not result in increased costs co the
family practitioner sector
Prices cnarged are related to recognisedjemographiC and organisational variaoles so Chat
a model can be ~uilt up def1n~ng the means of m1ni~1sing prices
All RHA's are aware of prices being charged to the other RHA's and can therefore buy (rom
the cheapest source
Public Accountability is satisfied
2
J
4
5
5
7
8
9
Method
2
J
!t
An ideal f~amework for the organisation exists, defining the number of drugs to oe included,
the threshold value for purchases, usefulness of estimates' collation, and complexity of cocumentation
System is beneficial to both NHS and sUP91iers both being reasonably satisfied with its operation
Scheme guarantees supplies t~ the NHS at a fixed price
Scheme guarantees business to the supplier with· quantities fixed
People ro ensure maximum efficiency, minimal conflict and soeedy decision rnaki~g. one ~xpert person
organises the contract
2 7here are m existence full data of the human energy expended in =rgani3ing the contract so as
~o permit full costins
Place The contract is organised at that admini3trative level whicn is consist8~t with responsi'/eness
to local needs, us~ng manpower effectively and resulting in ~inical duplication of effort
2 The scheme ensures local needs are satisfied
T~e The scheme ensures speedy supply
2 The duration of contract ensures max~um oenefit to both parties, NHS and supplier, at
minimum cost
3 An ideal framework txists for starting dates and time scales
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SECTION TWO
DERIVED TESTS
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CHAPTER 5
HYPOTHESES
Collation and appraisal of the secondary data enables the advancement
of a series of hypotheses which fall into two broad categories, those
pertaining to price and those pertaining to organisation.
Price
It is hypothesised that:-
prices of contract drugs are significantly lower than
trade prices,
1 (a) the variation in price will be greater in multi-source supply
situations compared with single (monopoly) supply situations
and in both cases lower than trade prices,
2 in relation to the demographic/industrial/attitudinal
variables tested there is a random distribution of prices,
2 (a) prices of contracted drugs show no significant relationship
to the following demographic/industrial/attitudinal variables:-
demographic
(i) physical size of area served by the Health Authorities,
(ii) population served by the Health Authorities,
(iii) population density of Health Authorities,
(iv) number of hospital pharmacists employed within the
Health Authorities,
(v) number of hpspital pharmacies catering for the needs
of the Health Authorities,
(vi) number of buying points involved,
(vii) number of delivery points served,
(viii) density of delivery points,
industrial
(ix) number of pharmaceutical manufacturers operat'ing
within the RHA boundaries,
(x) strength of local pharmaceutical industry, as
represented by the number of pharmaceutical industry
employees within the RHA boundaries,
attitudinal
(xi) duration of contracts,
(xii) price perception by senior NHS personnel within
the RHA's,
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(xiii) degree of divergence of opinions held by the
senior pharmacist and the supplies officer involved
in contract organisation within the RHA,
(xiv) degree of popularity among NHS staff of restrictions
to allow price reductions,
demographic/industrial
(xv) price paid by diverse RHA's,
industrial/attitudinal
(xvi) those factors perceived by industrialists as being
major price determinants,
3 there is a direct relationship between the spread of contract
prices and the number of sources of supply.
Explanatory Note:
The number of firms supplying drugs to English hospitals
.ranges from one upwards. The relationship between the degree
of competition and the standard deviation of prices nationally. .
would illustrate the market conduct applying.
Organisation
It is hypothesised that:-
4 for both buyers and suppliers there is no relationship between
perceived time spent on price discussion and the considered
adequacy of that time,
5 there is an inverse relationship between the degree of
centralised political control, as represented by political
party in power, and the emphasis giveA to locally organised
drug contracts,
6 the weighting of criteria considered important in purchase
of drugs has altered over time,
.6 (a) the importance allotted to certain purchase criteria is a
function of the relationship between the pharmacists and
supplies officers involved in the purchasing process.
A fundamental concern in an examination of any system is its degree
of effectiveness and efficiency. Value for money is very important
in hospital drug buying, with the cost of drug purchases, the
efficiency of the buying process and the administrative overhead costs
being topics of public interest. The hypotheses presented should help
quantify the operation's success.
In addition to those hypotheses promulgated above other hypotheses
were contemplated but were rejected on the grounds of absence of
suitable means of testing. Those discarded were:-
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I There is an inverse relationship between purchaser's rigidity
in conditions of the drug contract and the price charged. An
attempt was made to measure the specificity of demands made by
NHS buyers and to relate that to price paid. Since no method
of measuring such demand specificity could be determined no
test could be performed.
II The weighting of purchase criteria is directly related to
the balance of influence exercised by pharmacist and supplies
officer in the purchasing process. The test could not be
performed since no suitable method of measuring the influence
of each discipline within RHA's could be demonstrated.
Had sufficient price data from companies been available an attempt
would have been made to relate price to the ownership of companies,
absolute value of hospital sales, the relative importance to companies
of hospital sales, the patent status of companies' products and the
pattern of distribution of firms.
Attempts will be made to validate or disprove hypotheses 1 to 6 (a)
by the primary research findings. In order to achieve that goal
prices for a range of drugs would be compared for as many RHA's
as possible. Efforts will be made to try to ascertain the demographic
characteristics of the RHA's as well as measures of pharmaceutical
manufacturing activity within their boundaries, and, by census,
compare the viewpoints of the two senior buying disciplines from
each RHA, one a pharmacist the other a supplies officer. So as
to ensure comprehensiveness and objectivity, the vie~s of.indust-
rialists will be sought and the census results analysed with
reference to the derived hypotheses.
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SECTION THREE
PROCEDURE
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CHAPTER 6
METHODOLOGY
Contract drug purchasing by NHS hospitals presented itself as a topic
immobilised by time and hallowed by ignorance. It was considered by
the author as a suitable candidate for research although it was
appreciated that there was a need to overcome two major obstacles,
namely, the aura of secrecy, euphemistically termed confidentiality,
surrounding the prices paid, and, stemming to some degree from that,
the absence of academically sound knowledge of its workings. Those
factors served to encourage the pursuit of the research in that the
need was pressing but the possible aChievements startlin~.
The research need had been identified. The method to be adopted
followed traditional patterns. Initially a literature search,
including computer assisted retrievals, was conducted and any papers
or references identified, which might have a bearing on the subject,
were obtained. The literature was read and extracted and this process
was maintained throughout the research programme.
Parallel with the literature search personal interviews on an informal
basis were held with sales and marketing personnel of pharmaceutical
manufacturers as well as senior NHS staff involved in the medicines
buying process. Such staff were seen regularly by the researcher as
a normal feature of his occupation as pharmacist in charge of two busy
hospital pharmacies. Those discussions continued for the duration of
the research.
The thoughts distilled from both the literature and the conversations
developed into outline hypotheses and it became apparent that censuses
of staff on both sides of the buying-selling interface would be
necessary. As described below questions appropriate to each group
were collated and formed the basis of test questionnaires which were
completed and assessed. As a result the hypotheses were clarified
and formulated so as to be tested in the subsequent research programme.
The first census pursued was that of the NHS staff, and that of the
industrialists followed some three'months later. The time lapse was
a deliberate tactic designed to ensure that NHS staff would not be
influenced by knowledge of.an industry census or the specific questions
raised in it. Knowledge by industry staff of a census of NHS staff
would be of minimal concern to them and so considered as unlikely
to taint their objective views. Contemporaneously demographic and
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organisational data on the English Regional Health Authorities were
acquired together with contract prices for most RHA's. An integrative
analysis of the research data was performed, related to the secondary
findings and conclusions drawn. This thesis represents those research
efforts. The objectives and methodologies of the two censuses are
presented separately to facilitate clarity.
Census of Regional Supplies Officers and Regional Pharmaceutical
Officers on Drug Contracts
Objectives
Drug contracting is organised in Regions in differing ways within the
constraints placed upon them by DHSS. This should allow local needs
to be satisfied and allow innovations to occur, such as variations in
organisation between different Regions. It is axiomatic that suppliers
offer goods at a price which will be low enough to be competitive
against others being offered yet high enough to enable a profit to be
made. An efficiently organised system of contracting should
encourage maximum innovatory activity of both purchaser and supplier
allowing the maximum competition and also providing scope for
suppliers to make sufficient profit to encourage them to want the
business. An attempt was made by census to determine what, if any,
factors within the various Regions gave rise to greater efficiency.
It was thought that the following may have an effect on efficiency:-
(1) degree of price discussion with suppliers which takes place
(2) identification of organisational improvements which have
occurred over the years
(3) knowledge of prices being charged in other Regions
(4) subjective assessment of usefulness of contract
(5) the degree of working/friendly relationships which exist
with suppliers
(6) the degree of working/friendly relationships which exist
between supplies officers and pharmacists
(7) degree of forward-thinking and forward-planning
(8) number of delivery pOints
(9) number of buying points
(10) frequency of revision or degree of stability of contract.
The historical background to and the present organisation of the drug
contract were critically examined and it was hoped that the census
would help to predict the ideal future organisation of the contract
service so that suggestions could be recommended which would provide
the necessary future structure.
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Methodology
A list of questions was designed to form a framework for a personal
interview to be carried out by a member of a market research unit.
The market researcher used a semi-structured questionnaire, similar
to that issued subsequently for the postal census, consisting of
questions based on the information gleaned from an analysis of
secondary sources, many useful conversations with (a) supplies
~fficers and pharmacists considerably experienced in drug contract
organisation, and (b) many marketing and hospital sales directors,
managers and representatives employed in the pharmaceutical industry.
The author was told that 25-30 people could be surveyed with 15-20
questions. Those carrying out the survey had undergone training to
ask questions in an unbiased manner. It was hoped that answers
would be more detailed than the minimum laid down. The r-espondents
would be one pharmacist and one supplies officer in each Region,
in other words, Regional Pharmaceutical and Supplies Officers or
their delegated representatives. By that term "delegated" is meant
those whom the Regional Officer authorises to organise the drug
contract. Often within a Region, one district's pharmacist.or
supplies officer has the responsibility for organising the drug
contract for the whole Region.
A letter outlining the objectives of the project and inviting
participation was sent to every R.S.O. and R.Ph.O. in England, a
total of 28.
The experiences gained by the market research survey, though limited,
were nevertheless very useful in rephrasing some questions to make
them unambiguous or more searching. Additionally ideas were
pr.esented " for the inclusion of further questions not previously
considered. The subjects covered were the authority level at which
contracts were organised, the personnel. involved 5 years ago, now,
5 years from now and ideally, the stages in the contracting procedure,
changes in system during the last five years, duration of contracts,
attitudes to the present organisation, disadvantages, advantages
and beneficiaries of present arrangements, suggested improvements,
prices paid for drugs, time spent on price negotiation, attitude
towards retendering and acceptable conditions which would lower prices.
Constraints of time and finance prevented the researcher personally
surveying the relevant personnel so it was hoped "that a mailed
questionnaire would attract a reasonable response rate.
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Considerable attention was given to factors likely to improve response
rate and these are referred to in connection with the industry survey.
Consequently, in October 1982, a further letter, reproduced in
Appendix 2, signed by the two supervisors of the research study and
the Mersey R.Ph.O.,was sent to the 28 officers stating the objectives
and seeking co-operation.
To forestall suggestions of possible collusion in replies between any
Region's R.S.O. and R.Ph.O. a one week interval was left between
mailings. At that time an offer was made that the author· would·
personally pose the questions, if preferred. It was hoped that some
would reply positively to that offer so that some additional infor-
mation might be gleaned.
Each questionnaire was coded prior to issue to enable detailed analysis
to be performed consistent with the guarantee of anonymity provided
to the respondents.
The questionnaire is reproduced.in Appendix 2.
Some of the questions may appear similar but they contained elements
which required different emphasis and so to avoid duplication of
,
results by respondents those questions were deliberately listed out
of natural sequence.
Of the questions posed nine were open and, of the remainder, 89
choices out of 219 options were possible. In addition the closed
questions allowed space for at least 13 subsidiary comments to be added.
The results were collated and analysed. The statistical significance
of differences between responses from the two disciplines, pharmacist
and supplies officer, was sought. Chi-squared values would provide
such information and were therefore considered but necessarily
rejected on the grounds of the relatively small sample size which
would render invalid any firm conclusions.
Responses
5 Officers agreed to assist in the personal interview aspect at the
preliminary stage of this research. They represented 3 R~H.A.'s,
3 being supplies officers and 2 being pharmacists. They were inter-
viewed by appointment between the end of May and end of July 1981.
Since the questions posed were subsequently modified in the light
of experience and included in the postal survey, the results are
not given separately so as to avoid duplication. The obvious
advantage. of a personal census is that a more detailed response can
be provided. Such additional information is recorded.
159
The reasons for the ;poor response to the market research approach may
be speculated on. Some potential respondents viewed with caution,
if not hostility, the involvement of a non-NHS employee, the market
researcher, and the motives of that individual were questioned. Some
sheltered beneath the excuse of "confidentiality" of contract infor-'
mation, lack of time or inability to help market researchers. Others
refused without the courtesy of a reason.
The lack of success with the market research effort was overturned
by the 93% response to the postal questionnaire followed by a reminder
telephone call a few weeks later. Representing equal numbers of each
discipline, 26 of the 28 responded positively, one of them agreeing
to answer questions posed verbally. Responses were received from
all RHA's•.Of the respondents 21 requested a copy of the collated
results. This response rate compared favourably with that achieved
in other postal surveys. It is thought that the endorsement of the
co-signatories of the covering letter, together with mention of the
interest in the achieved results on the part of the Supply Council
helped raise the response level.
A further inducement may have been the offer of availability of
summarised results, as suggested by the resulting high request rate.
In view'of the high response rate the results must be thought reliable
and reasonably accurate. The results are not presented in the order
of the questions of the survey form but under subject headings in -
Chapter 8. In conformity with the guarantee of confidentiality
offered to respondents no individual respondent or Regional Health
Authority is identified.
Census of Pharmaceutical Suppliers on Contract Drug Supplies to
Health Authorities
Objectives
Deliberation upon the drug purchase scene demands equal attention to
and consideration of the opinions of suppliers and buyers engaged in
the operation.
It became apparent that many of the topics of concern to buyers were
of equal concern to pharmaceutical companies.and determination of
those sentiments held by industry personnel would help to confirm
or refute those provided by the NHS Staff. In addition there were
topics on which only the suppliers could furnish realistic and
reliable data. Some subjects, however, were considered irrelevant
or of little concern to industry.
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Those themes considered applicable to suppliers as well as to buyers
were:-
(a) the organisational ones.concerned with changes in the
last 5 years and duration of contract,
(b) the attitudes including satisfaction with, disadvantages,
advantages, beneficiaries of and improvements proffered
for contracts, and
(c) pricing and tendering aspects embracing comparison of prices
charged to the various RHA's, volume of discussion on prices,
retender conditions, maximum allowable price increases, and
restrictions to reduce prices.
Aspects solely of concern to suppliers or factors on which NHS staff
could not be expected to display insight or unbiased knowledge were:-
(a) the organisational topic of variation between RHA's.,
(b) the attitude implicit in interest displayed towards
tendering and importance attached to hospital sales,
(c)· pricing and tendering aspects consisting of methods
of price calculation, the accuracy and usefulness of
estimates and the time scales for contract co~unications,
(d) factors specific to patented drugs, and
(e) features, additional to those catered for under attitudes -
disadvantages and advantages, concerned with deliveries.
Subjects of prime concern to, or those on which detailed knowledge
was held by, buyers alone, and on which the suppliers could make
little contribution were:-
(a) the organisational topics of administrative level of
contract arrangements, the stages in contract award
procedure and NHS personnel involved in exerting an influence
upon contract execution.
Whereas the latter theme was not considered worthy of pursuit with
suppliers the former subjects were thought suitable candidates for
inclusion in a survey of industry staff.
It was intended that detailed information and opinions would be
provided on those topi~s and that the results achieved when con-
sidered in harness with those resulting from the survey of NHS
officers would build up a comprehensive picture of the past, present
and future arrangements of the contract operation as well as a clear
defi~ition of its failings and potential improvements.
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In addition by categorisation of the respondents it was hoped to
build up a profile of opinions likely to be held by companies of
various characteristics and,therefore, to predict the behaviour
under different conditions.
The aim of the exercise was to provide the first definitive explor-
ation of the pharmaceutical industry-NHS managed sector supply-
purchase interface and a demonstration of that industry's attitudes
on and responses to NHS drug contracts.
Methodology
Analysis of the secondary data had highlighted the relevant points in
the contract operation worthy of primary examination and the resulting
thoughts were considered for consolidation into a questionnaire. This
was an ongoing process modified as a result of many discussions with
marketing and sales directors, managers and representatives,
Regional Pharmaceutical and Supplies Officers, senior NHS personnel
and officers of the NHS Supply Council. The discussions had proved
most useful but whereas it would have been desirable, constraints
of time and resources militated against a personal interview of each
company in the industry. A postal census was ,thus planned and it
was felt that only a structured questionnaire would lend itself to
strict comparisons between companies and the time saving as well as
possible greater accuracy of computer analysis and tabulation of
results. Facilities for such work were available. In addition,
so as tO'glean further unprompted information several open questions
were included, a further benefit of which would be their role as a
release valve for strongly held views ~ot otherwise catered for.
The wording of the questions having been finalised, attention was given
to their 'sequential order. A deliberate effort was made to place
simple questions at the start of the questionnaire so as to en-
courage its completion. The questions would appear therefore out
of natural subject sequence. Further reflection on this confirmed
the wisdom of order subversion because several of the questions were
similar and close proximity of them within a document was considered
likely to impede realistic responses being provided.
It was thought that certain features present within the pharmaceutical
industry could influence the responses given. It was hypothesised
that 5 characteristics might have an influence on the opinions
generated, towards the contract system, those factors being the
country of origin of the company, the absolute value of U.K. hospital
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sales, the relative value of U.K. hospital sales, the products sold
and the method of distribution. The country of origin could be (1)
United States, (2) United Kingdom,or. (3) Europe. The absolute value
of U.K. hospital sales ranged from over £15 million downwards (1982
prices). The relative value of hospital sales could be determined
from the proportion of sales to hospitals and the community. Since
20% of total U.K. NHS drug sales occur in hospitals, a company showing
less than 12.5% of sales to hospitals was deemed to supply prefer-
entially to community pharmacy, whereas those displaying more than
25% of sales to hospitals were above the national average for
hospital transactions and therefore were considered to accord
hospital sales relatively more importance than does the average
company.
The products could be proprietary (branded) drugs or non-proprietary
(generic) drugs. The method of distribution could be direct
servicing, wholesaler delivery or mixed. Companies with up to one
third of sales direct were considered to deliver via wholesaler
while those with more than two thirds of sales serviced direct
were classed as dealing direct.
The co-operation of a market research organisation was enlisted and
this enabled all those factors except products to be quantified
accurately. Unfortunately, a subjective assessment for the products
of the companies was necessary but, given my professional experience,
it was thought that a realistic opinion could be manifested. An
additional problem was that data on all pharmaceutical companies
were not available. Those for which sales information was provided
recorded hospital sales of value £239 million out of a total esti~
mated U.K. hospital market of £262 million at 1982 prices. It was
considered that the .provided list of companies, while not
comprehensive, was reasonably representative of the industry as a
whole, showing U.K. hospital sales ranging from £0.03 million to
over £17 million in 1982, displaying a range of 1 to 567 currency
units, and total U.K. sales from £0.05 million to £78 million, a
range of 1 to 1560 currency units.
Each questionnaire was uniquely coded before issue to allow detailed
analysis of the results consistent with the guarantee of anonymity
given to respondents. This was considered essential to full
exploitation of the data generated but was objected to by two
respondents who sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to erase the device.
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.A high response rate was considered essential so that a sound
database could be created and realistic conclusions drawn.
It is known that various factors improve the response rate to
questionnaires. These include the wording of the covering letter,
inducements to respond, inclusion of stamped self-addressed
envelopes, quality of reproduction of the questionnaire document,
timing of issue, and person to whom addressed.( 6.1).
Considerable thought was given to the wording of the questionnaire
to ensure that no misunderstanding, misinterpretation or ambiguity
existed. The first stage was the drafting and issue of a typed
version to five companies, the marketing or sales managers/directors
of which were personally known to me. The potential respondents
were asked to consider the questions and submit any comments on them.
In addition a copy was submitted to ABPI, the organisation representing
the interests of the pharmaceutical industry as a whole, with the
information that it was proposed to submit it, once revised as a
result of comments received from those to whom a draft copy had been
sent, to a large number of pharmaceutical companies. The.ABPI was
asked to forward any objections. As a result of.the trial run a few
questions were rephrased. The ABPI raised no objections, suggested
some minor word changes, but predictably wished to leave the decision
on whether or not to respond to the individual companies. Signif-
icantly the ABPI requested that a copy of the results of the proposed
survey should be sent to it.
It was thought that the offer of any inducement to respond would be
considered ethically questionable as well.as being possibly counter-
productive in achieving the desired objectives and so was discounted.
However, the offer of a summary of the results was made as it was
thought likely to improve upon the project's success.
Self-addressed stamped envelopes were included with the questionnaire.
The questionnaire document and covering letter were printed and are
reproduced in Appendix 3. This improved the appearance of the
document giving it a professional air and no doubt facilitated
its success.
The timing of the issue was carefully considered. Many of the
questions were similar to those posed to the NHS officers and at
the time of issue of the questionnaire to the NHS staff they were
not aware that the views of the industry were to be elicited.
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,Had they known that information it is possible that some might have
felt threatened by potential criticisms of the system and, by
implication, themselves expressed by the industrialists and may have
withheld their co-operation. It was thought judicious,therefore,
to await the return of the NHS questionnaires before embarking upon
this portion of the project. It was posted during the first weekend
in February 1983 some three months after the NHS questionnaire had
been distributed, shortly after the last buyers' completed form was
returned. It was hoped that the envelopes would be delivered on the
Tuesday or Wednesday when postal deliveries tend to be lighter and
hopefully an envelope is then more likely to receive speedy attention.
The addressee was thought to be a significant factor in the potential
success or otherwise of the exercise, both from consideration of the
status of the person and his/her name. It was of utmost importance
that the questionnaire should be completed by the person who had most
interest in and dealings with hospital drug contract sales.
At a very early stage in the research it was discovered that there was
considerable variation in the inter-relationships and organisation.
of pharmaceutical companies. It was known that several companies
possessed associates and it was thought counter-productive to issue
two separate questionnaires to companies in which they would be
completed by the one individual. Inquiries were therefore initiated
and,as a result,an original list of 112 firms for which data were
available was reduced to ·100. For those companies which shared sales
divisions and which therefore were to be sent one questionnaire only,
the data for them were combined to provide a composite picture to
parallel the composite questionnaire response. Furthermore,the
status and job title of the most apt individual for this purpose
differed. Since at that early stage a questionnaire was contemplated
a file of names and titles of appropriate staff was built up. By this
means as well as the use of directories and, in a few cases, telephone
calls,a list of relevant staff was composed. Considerable efforts
were expended to determine the names of the individuals on the
assumption that a personally named and addressed letter and envelope
would effect a higher response rate.
The questionnaire format was discussed with staff of the Liverpool
Polytechnic Computer Services Department. They also provided an
objective opinion of the questions which resulted in some rewording
of questions. It was printed with computer codes to allow analysiS
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'and retrieval by such means of the information gleaned, and the
responses were awaited.
Follow up telephone calls were made to a few companies to speed
up the returns. Additionally all letters received which gave
reasons for a company's inability to respond, nine in all, were
investigated and the senders contacted in the hope of allaying their
fears or convincing them of the usefulness of the project and the
importance of their contribution. In each case the efforts were
met with success.
Of the questions listed, six allowed individually furnished and
formulated unprompted comments while the closed questions provided
for at least 8 further statements. The bulk of the questionnaire
consisted of closed questions providing 97 choices out of 260 options.
As a check on consistency of replies some questions were included,
the answers to which were already available from non-company sources.
That objective information was to be compared with the subjective
information reported to test the validity of the responses.
The last return arrived some 3i months following despatch. The
necessary computer codes were appended to each document and the results
were analysed using cross tabulations and Chi-square tests of
statistical significance as described in the "Statistical Package for
Social Sciences""(6.2).
It is convention in social sciences to accept as statistically
significant relationships which have a probability of occurring by
chance 5% of the time or less, that is in 5 out of 100 samples.
This would be denoted by a significance figure of 0.05. In the
analyses performed any significance of 0.05 or less is reported. An
alternative method of deSignating this result is the statement that one
can be 95% confident that the result did not occur by chance.
A Significance of 0.01 or less is highly significant and one can be 99%
confident that the result did not arise by chance.
To comply with convention a zero response is denoted by - and positive
response of less than 1% is denoted by *.
Responses
Of the 100 questionnaires issued 84 (84%) responded. This compares
favourably with similar postal surveys conducted elsewhere, though is
a lower rate than achieved by the NHS staff questionnaire. Neverthe-
less, in view of the depth of some questions and the concern expressed
in several quarters that commercially valuable information was being
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sought, an 84% response must be considered satisfactory.
A large proportion, 69,of the 84,or 82%,expressed the desire to accept
the offer made in the questionnaire of a summary of the research
results. That offer was thought to have influenced some people to
respond.
3 of the 84 were returned with the information that they were to
represent in each case two individual portions of one holding company.
Although they provided separate marketing and sales divisions they
wished to combine their responses. In such cases the data for those
companies were combined to parallel the combined response. In
essence, therefore, an 81% positive response was seen.
When the responders were compared with the non-responders no notable
differences in characteristics described earlier were found and the
responders must,therefore, be considered as being reasonably repre-
sentative 'of the sample as a whole. Hospital sales for 1982
attributable to non-responders were under £16 million,whereas those
for responders were more than £223 million, again pointing to the
adequate representativeness of the responses recorded.
Given the limitations of a postal questionnaire it was felt that the
high response rate coupled with the positive responses to the check
questions fnoted individually) helped the researcher to consider the
results reliable and reasonably accurate.
The results are presented in Chapter 9 under subject headings, not in
order of questions in the survey document. To maintain confidence
the identity of individual replies is not recorded. Relevant~.
differences in replies according to the firms' characteristics are
referred to. Absence of such reference implies that no notable
differences were determined.
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SECTION FOUR
PRIMARY DATA
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CHAPTER 7
R.H.A. PROFILES AND PRICE ANALYSES
FACTORS INFLUENCING CONTRACT PRICE
The fourteen Regional Health Authorities in England are the successors
to the fourteen Regional Hospital Boards. The delineation of their
boundaries was designed to encompass a geographical area and population
of such dimensions as to be manageable rather than identical. As
portrayed in Table 7.1 the geographical area of the largest is 5.9
times that of the smallest, and in the most populous region reside
2.7 times that of the least populous. The demographic picture is
completed by examination of the population density which shows the
densest. Region having 7.0 times the concentration of the least
closely packed.
Clearly the RHA's differ in their catchment areas and populations
served. The pattern is reflected in the diversity of pharmaceutical
or buying characteristics demonstrated by the Regions. Those
features are illustrated in Table 7.1. The most populous Region,
West Midlands, possesses the largest number of hospital pharmacies,
73, and the least populous, East Anglian~ has the smallest number,
22. The RHA best endowed with hospital pharmacists is Trent with
237, the least East Anglian with 73. Associated with the hospital
pharmacies, the number of buying points shows a range from 17 to 63.
There is no equal distribution of drug companies throughout the
country. Some Regions are well represented by pharmaceutical
manufacturers in their midst, whereas others are almost denuded.
Thus six Regions share 118 companies while one Region possesses
a solitary firm. Within one Region 8.2 thousand people are employed
in pharmaceutical companies whereas another shows 0.2 thousand.
Logically it would be expected that those Regions well endowed
with pharmaceutical facilities would benefit from low delivery
distances and resulting costs.
Delivery costs must therefore be expected to show a wide variation
from Region to Region.
Contract duration shows six having opted for one year, seven for
two years, and one ongoing.
The extent of divergence of views on contracts would be obtainable
from Table 8.10.
An examination of the.demographic, pharmaceutical and buying data
of the RHA's would furnish those characteristics most likely to
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,generate lower prices for drugs acquired. Ideally a weighting
could be assigned to each factor, but such must remain to be
speculated upon. It is suggested that the following are likely
to be associated with lower prices, though it must be emphasised
that one factor alone is unlikely to exert an overriding influence:-
Demography of Region
compact area
large population
high density of population
Characteristics of buyers
large number of hospital pharmacies and pharmacists
large number of hospital buying points
small number of hospital delivery points
high density of hospital pharmacy delivery points
high degree of convergence of views on contract
on the part of senior staff
Characteristics of sellers
large number of pharmaceutical employers (industry)
large number of pharmaceutical e~ployees (industry)
The buying process
long duration of contract
The prices of a range of standard drugs chosen.arbitrarily were
sought. Some RHA's refused to supply such information on
confidentiality grounds whereas others responded favourably. Clearly
interpretation of DHSS guidance was subject to the whims of individuals.
The NHS Supply Council was most helpful in ascertaining the position
in many RHA's. The price and supplier findings are demonstrated in
Table 7.2. In accordance with the guarantee of confidentiality
of prices given to respondents the identity of the Regions, the
drugs, suppliers and prices are disguised. The number of drugs
whose price has b~en quoted is necessarily limited because the
range of items of equivalent pack sizes for which contracts are
awarded shows inter-Regional variation, markedly restricting
those cornmon to all. For example some Regions buy small packs
in ready-to-issue size while others buy in bulk and repackage the
drugs prior to issue.
Whereas a larger sample of drugs could have been analysed for a
smaller proportion of the RHA's, it was considered statistically
more reliable to analyse data from a wider range of Regions but
thereby reducing the number of drugs tested in the process.
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'Contract price relative to·demographic and organisational variables
within RHA's.
Statistical comparison of average drug price, as shown in Table 7.2,
and the demographic and organisational variables, depicted in Table
7.1, was performed. Scatter diagrams were produced and correlation
coefficients calculated using the "Statistical Package for Social
Sciences" (6.2). They are displayed in Table 7.3.
The price of contract drugs bought by the Regional Health Authorities
is directly related to geographical area, number of hospital pharmacies,
hospital delivery pOints, hospital pharmacy delivery point
concentration, industry employers, industry employees, and contract
duration.
Contract drug price is inversely related to population, population
density, number of hospital pharmacists, hospital buying points and
degree of divergence of opinion between supplies officers and
pharmacists.
In interpreting the findings caution must be exercised since none
of the characteristics provides a statistically significant result.
Nevertheless some general inferences can be derived. In the absence
of practical data it would have been predicted that had the
characteristics been the sole variables price would be directly
related to geographical area and the number of delivery points
reflecting delivery costs, as well as the degree of divergence of
opinion between the senior officers who must co-operate in the contract
organisation. The predicted negative correlations would be between
price and population representing drug uptake, population density,
number of hospital pharmacists, number of hospital pharmacies, buying
points, delivery point concentration, industry employers, industry
employees and contract duration, reflecting quantity discounts and
delivery costs.
In the light of the primary research findings the predicted opinions
are substantiated in the case of area, population, population density,
number of hospital pharmacists, number of buying points and number
of delivery points.
The characteristics which provided an unpredicted result were number
of hospital pharmacies, delivery pOint concentration, strength
of the local pharmaceutical industry, as represented by the number of
employers and employees, contract duration and divergence of opinions
between senior NHS staff.
It must be concluded that when they determine drug prices,
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TABLE 7.3: CORRELATION COEFFICIENT FOR PRICE AGAINST
DEMOGRAPHIC AND ORGANISATIONAL VARIABLES
OF REGIONAL HEALTH AUTHORITIES.
R.H.A. CHARACTERISTIC PRICE SIGNIFICANCE
CORRELATION
COEFFICIENT
r p
Geographical Area
Population
Population density
Hospital pharmacists
Hospital pharmacies
Hospital buying points
Hospital delivery points
Hospital pharmacy delivery
points per area
Pharmaceutical industry
employers
Pharmaceutical industry
employees
Contract duration
Divergence of opinion
between supplies officer
and pharmacist
0.016
- 0.046
- 0.050
- 0.030
0.145
- 0.031
0.017
0.960
0.882
0.870
0.923
0.636
0.920
0.955
.0.014 0.964
0.318 0.290
0.182
0.029
0.553
0.926
- 0.445 0.170
NOTE: Correlation coefficient is the measure of association
between two variables. It is 0 if the variables are
not associated and it has a maximum value of 1 if
the points in the scatter diagram lie exactly on a
straight line. It is negative if high values of one
variable tend to be associated with low values of
the other variable. It is positive if the two variables
are high.or low together.
Significance is the measure of probability of the
result occurring by chance. Thus a significance
of 0.01 or less is highly significant and one can
be 99% confident that the result did not arise by
chance.
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,industrialists do not place the predicted degree of emphasis on the
number of hospital pharmacies served, delivery costs or duration of
contract. There is some evidence to suggest that the possibility
of losing a contract after a year encourages companies to offer lower
prices from the outset. Whereas it might be supposed that the greater
the divergence of views between senior NHS officers the higher the
price paid, no such assumption can be promulgated since a negative
correlation has been shown to exist. Of all the RHA variables tested
the one which comes nearest to statistical significance for correlation
relative to price is the divergence score (r = - 0.445, p = 0.170).
On that basis it could be said that consensus is not consistent with
low price.
Hypotheses 2 (a) (L) to (xi) and 2(a) (xiii) we're validated by the
research findings.
Contract price relative to individual drugs.
Table 7.2 depicts the prices charged for a range of products. In
almost all cases companies charge the various RHA's different prices
for their products.
Drug Alpha is a diuretic manufactured by a small number of companies.
There is a moderate inter-Regional price variation showing a standard
deviation of 14.89 with the contracts being shared nationally by two
suppliers.
Beta is an analgesic manufactured by several firms and this competition
is reflected in the five companies sharing the market and is
reflected in the prices charged. There is high inter-Regional price
variation with a standard deviation of 41.80.
Gamma is a central nervous system depressant drug produced by a few
firms, two of which share the hospital market. Price analysis shows
a moderate spread, with a standard deviation of 13.46.
Delta, a nutritional product, shows similar characteristics to Gamma
with a standard deviation of price 24.21.
Epsilon, an anti-infective agent, shows a large number of suppliers,
yet a.high inter-Regional price variation (standard deviation of 99.16).
Region 7 is paying 15.3 times the price paid by Region 10.
Zeta, an antidepressant, is supplied by four companies whose prices
show a small standard deviation, 6.31. Two companies Nand Pare
charging the highest and lowest price, providing a hint of collusion
to establish market sharing. Eta, a tranquilliser, though produced
by several firms, is sold on contract by one firm to all those RHA's
which awarded a contract. It shows a moderate price standard
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.deviation 16.19.
another.
Theta, a drug affecting the cardiovascular system,is provided by four
That supplier is charging one RHA twice as much as •
suppliers who share the market. There is a high level of inter-
Regional price variation, with standard deviation of 45.33.
Iota, an anti-infective agent, though produced by several firms, is
sold to RHA's on contract by two firms only. The drug prices depicted
point to a low level of inter-Regional variation, with a standard
deviation of 4.36.
Kappa, a nutritional material produced by several manufacturers, is
sold by three companies only, and the prices charged show a small
inter-Regional price variation, with a standard deviation of 5.33.
Contract price relative to individual companies.
As illustrated in Table 7.2 firms are selective in the items they
produce and the oligopoly referred to in the secondary material is
confirmed by the primary findings.
Furthermore, as illustrated in Table 7.4 four of the companies
listed, a,N,p. and Q sell drugs at the highest and lowest price.
Clearly some manufacturers do not view the market globally, but
instead price each individual product in accordance with their
perceived view of the price attainable. Support for this assumption
is provided by the information, depicted in Table 7.4, that shows
that 6 of the highest price drugs are the former patented versions
provided by companies specialising in proprietary production, .and
a further one is produced by the former patent holder, albeit .
speCialising in non-proprietary products. In contrast 5 of the
highest price drugs are produced by generic manufacturers which did
not formerly hold the patent. Of 14 lowest prices only three·are former
patented brands, and'all but two represent products of generic
manufacturers.
A 2 x 2 contingency table was constructed (Table 7.5) to depict
the numb~r of highest and lowest prices from generic and proprietary
firms.
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TABLE 7.4:SUPPLIERS AND VARIATION IN PRICES.--
SUPPLIER MAIN PRODUCT NUMBER OF HIGHEST NUl1BER OF LOWESTRANGE PRICE DRUGS PRICE DRUGS
A Generic 2
B Proprietary 2* 1*
C tfuolesaler
D Mixed 1
E Generic
F Generic
G Generic
H Generic 2·
I Proprietary 2'
J Proprietary l'
K Generic
L Generic
M Generic
N Generic l' l'
0 Wholesaler
P Proprietary l' l'
a Generic
R Mixed 1
S Generic
T Generic 1
U Generic
• Former patented brandts) sold on contract.
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TABLE 7.5: CATEGORIES OF SUPPLIERS AND PRICES CHARGED
NUMBER OF DRUGS
Catesory of Manufacturer Highest Price Lowest Price Total
Generic (n = 13) 5 10 15
Proprietary (n = 4 ) 6 2 8
TOTAL 11 12 23
A chi-square test was performed on the data. The value attained was
3.63 and p was < 0.1. Though the two categories of manufacturer
provided contrasting numbers of highest and lowest price drugs,
they were not statistically significant.
Further statistical analyses on the basis of country of or.igin,
absolute value of hospital sales, relative value of hospital sales
and delivery method were precluded because of limited data availability.
For those firms represented in Table 7.4 for which sales profiles could
be established, 3 companies were United States based and they provided
3 highest and lowest price drug, whereas the 10 UK firms sold 5
highest price and 6 lowest price drugs, and the 3 European firms sold
3 of the highest and 3 of the lowest price drugs. For 5 large hospital
sales firms 6 highest and 3 lowest prices were seen, whereas the 2
medium firms showed 2 highest and 1 lowest, and the 2 small firms no
highest price drugs but 2 lowest price drugs. When classified
according to relative importance of hospital sales, the 3 hospital
suppliers sold 4 highest and 2 lowest price drugs, the 4 average firms
sold 3 of each and the 1 community firm 1 highest and no lowest price
drug.
When classified according to delivery route, the 7 direct firms
represented showed 7 highest and 4 lowest prices, the 1 mixed delivery
firm showed highest and 1 lowest price drug, and the 1 wholesaler
delivery firm showed no highest but 1 lowest price drug.
Few definite conclusions can be put forward on the basis of the
restricted data but the generic/proprietary characteristic analysis
allows a conclusion to be drawn.
Considerable brand loyalty exists, resulting from a limited desire by
generic firms to extend their product ranges, or a desire on the part
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-of NHS staff to rely on the quality of the product as propagated by
the original patent holder.
Nevertheles~ it must be concluded that generic companies appear to
playa considerable and disproportionate role in lowering prices to
the managed sector of the NHS.
It must be thought that national market forces exert little influence
on price determination by companies supplying Regional Health
Authorities.
Contract price relative to the number of contracting firms
The relationship between number of firms contracting nationally and
standard deviation of prices paid by the various RHA's is illustrated
in Table 7.2 and collated in Table 7.6. It was examined statistically
and a relatively high positive correlation was determined, r,'being
0.659. That relationship was found to be significant, p having a
value of 0.038. Hypothesis 3 was validated by the research
findings. Such a finding was not unpredicted. It would have been
expected that the greater the number of suppliers the keener the
competition would be, that competition being reflected in the divergence
of price patterns. There is apparently a close association between the
number of suppliers nationally and price standard deviation which
suggests that normal market considerations manifest themselves in the
NHS drug contract purchasing sphere. The NHS buying the bulk of the
output of the industry has been regarded as an oligopsonistic
purchaser tending toward monopsony. However, in view of the variation
in prices between RHA's that opinion must be revised. It is apparent
that each RHA acts independently and the buyer characteristic must be
considered as tending toward atomism. Furthermore the research
findings demolish any suggestion of price collusion between suppliers.
Contract price and number of tenders submitted
The contracts awarded nationally reflect the countr~ide variation in
price and the scope and intensity of the NHS drug purchasing agreements.
It was hypothesised that the local tender offers would parallel those
offer prices accepted nationally, and increase in standard deviation
or prices would be associated with increase in number of competitor
companies. In order to test the hypothesis a random selection of about
1 in 16 of offers submitted to one RHA were collated and analysed. By
random selection a fully representative picture not only of prices but
also of number of competitors was established so that realistic
conclusions could be drawn.
All prices as depicted in Table 7.7 were transformed to a mean of 100
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TABLE 7.6: STANDARD DEVIATION OF PRICES FOR VARIOUS
NUMBERS OF CONTRACTORS
Number of Contractors Standard Deviation Mean Standard
of price Deviation
1 16.19 16.19
2 14.89,13.46,24.21,4.36 14.23
3 5.33 5.33
4 6.31, 45.33 25.82
5 41.80, 99. 16 70.48
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TABLE 7.1: PRICES AND STANDARO DEVIATION OF PRICES FOR VARIOUS
NUMBERS OF TENDERING COMPANIES.
No. of Drug Price (adjusted to Standard Mean standard
tendering provide a mean of deviation devia tion of
drug 100) of price price
companies S
1 A 100
2 B 96, 104 5.66
C 90.02,109.98 14.11
D 98~46,101.54 2.18 13.77
E 130.85,69.15 43.63
F 97.70,102.30 3.25
3 G 141.11,11.67,147.22 76.56
H 99.51,88.22,112.27 12.03
I 99.80,98.03,102.11 2.08
J 134.69,34.11,131.20 51.09 29.42
K 151.84,91.99,50.11 54.28
L 148.88,18.26,12.86 42.42
M 96.63,106.14,91.22 5.23
N .94.87,94.81,110.26 8.89
0 98.65,94.59i106.76 6.20
4 P 66.13,115.03,142.69
16.15 35.42
Q 44.76,113.07,117.19,
124.38 37.12
R 98.45,99.63,111.16,
90.16 8.42 45.65
S 48.28,285.52,35.86,
30.34 123.91
T 80.00,133.33,97.78
88.89 23.38
5 U 115.96,77.31,75.16,
126.34,105.23 22.96
V 133.00,71.43,71.43,
61.58,162.56 45.03 34.00
6 W 161.88,63.34,66.86,
49.21,100.29,158.36 49.50 49.50
"
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·for each drug both to facilitate statistical comparison as well as to
disguise confidential price offers. The standard deviations of prices
were calculated. The means of those for the various numbers of
tenderers were computed and are shown in Table 7.7.
The correlation coefficient for all the standard deviations against
number of tendering companies was calculated. The correlation
coefficient, r., had a value of 0.332 with a significance of 0.131 •
•There was thus a positive correlation between price standard devlation
and number of tendering firms though the correlation was shown not to
be significant.
The conclusions are:~
Two drugs N and V out of 23 show two c9mpanies quoting identical prices.
There is therefore evidence of price alignment.
Oligopoly is demonstrated' by the relatively small number of companies
who tender for each item, the range being from 1 to 6 with three
being the most prevalent.
The range of price offers is sometimes considerable. The greatest
variation demonstrated was a ratio of 1 to 12.6 for drug ,G.
Increase in range of prices with increase in number of tenderers
parallels the national contractor picture. That relationship points to
the presence of competitive forces between the companies. The final
conclusion to be drawn from the findings is that one can predict that
the more companies tendering the greater the variation in price, and
so efforts to encourage companies to diversify and extend their range
should result in greater price competition.
Contract price relative to individual RHA's
The success or otherwise attained by RHA's in buying at low prices is
shown numerically in Table 7.2 and depicted in Figure 7.1. Clearly
Region 7 the average price of which is very significantly higher
«0.01) than the mean is paying an average 1.69 times as much for its
contract drugs as Region 10. Lest too many conclusions be drawn from
the average findings, it must be st~ted that no weighting has been
accorded for drug usage and there is individual drug variation.
That factor is illustrated in Table '7.8. For example, Region 7, in
general the most expensive, is paying the least for one drug and
Region 10, the least expensive generally, is paying the most for two items.
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TABLE 7.8:INTER-REGIONAL PRICE LIMITS
REGION NUMBER OF HIGHEST NUMBER OF LOWEST"PRICE DRUGS PRICE DRUGS
.1 1 3
2 3
3 1
4 1
"5 2 1
6 1 2
7 2
8 1
9 2 -
10 2 3
11 2 2
12 2
13 3.
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In order to derive some statistically meaningful, results the results
depicted in Table 7.8 were analysed further. The Regions were
categorised in terms of the net expense of their drugs. Thus Region
1 with one highest price drug and three lowest price drugs was
allocated a score of -2. All those with a minus or zero value
were grouped as "least expensive", those with a score of 1 as
"medium" and scores of 2 or 3 were classed as "most expensive".
The results were constructed in a classification table (Table 7.9)
and a chi-square test was performed. The value attained was 7.243
and the sieruficance level attained was <0.05. There is therefore
a significant difference in price between the groups of Regions.
Hypothesis 2 (a) (xv) was apparently validated by the primary research.
TABLE 7.9: REGIONS AND PRICES PAID
Category of Regions Number of Number of
highest lowest
price drugs price drugs
8 1
8 3
7 11
23 15
Total
Three most expensive Regions
Five medium expense Regions
Five least expensive Regions
TOTAL
9
11
18
38
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.Contract price within a Re·gion relative to trade price
It is surmised that contract price is lower than trade price. The
extent of that difference had not previously been quantified. At
random twenty drugs were chosen and their contract price was related
to the trade price, the drugs being categorised according to whether
.or not there was a monopoly supply position.
The prices were those obtaining in December 1980 but are not quoted
since confidentiality considerations militate against such treatment.
The results are shown in Table 7.10.
For monopoly supply the mean relationship of contrac~trade price
is 0.695 with a range from 0.357 to 0.949, a standard deviation of
0.217, p < 0.005.
For .multi-source supply the mean relationship of contract to trade
price is 0.575 with a range from 0.066 to 0.901, a standard deviation
of 0.276, p <0.001.
The statistical test for difference between the means of monopoly
source prices and multi-source prices was performed. The significance
level, p, determined was < 0.3 and so the difference between them
must be considered as being not statistically significant.
On the evidence presented it must be concluded that prices of
contract drugs are significantly lower than trade prices, and the
variation in price will be greater in multi-source supply situations
compared with single (monopoly) supply situations and in both cases
lower than trade prices.
Hypotheses 1 and 1(a) are therefore apparently validated by the·
research findings.
It can be seen that institution of contracts results in an average
saving pf about 36%, with generally lower savings being seen in
situations of monopoly supply. .
In multi-source circumstances the savings sometimes are so large
as to defy accepted purchase price criteria. It might be assumed
that the hospital contract price is sometimes set very low, not as a
reflection of the costs of production but the encouragement of general
practice sales which would recoup any losses in the hospital sector.
This must be considered a combination of penetration (predatory) and
promotional pricing.
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TABLE 7.10: CONTRACT PRICE COMPARED WITH TRADE PRICE
MONOPOLY SUPPLY .'MU['TI~SOURCE SUPPLY
DRUG CONTRACT PRICE DRUG CONTRACT PRICE
TRADE PRICE TRADE PRICE
1 0.692 1 0.645
2 0.592 2 0.645
3 0.949 3 0.848
4 0.600 4 0.723.
5 0.948 5 0.415
6 0.636 6 0.839
7 0.403 7 0.340
8 0.357 8 0.066
9 0.875 9 0.901
10 0.895 10 0.323
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CHAPTER 8
NHS QENSGS
A Census of senior NHS personnel was performed as described in
Chapter 6 and it provided data assessed under the following headings:-
(a) Organisation of Contracts
(i) Authority level
(ii) Personnel involved
(iii) Dissonance and concordance within
RHA
(iv) Steps in contract award process
(v) Changes over last five years
(vi) Duration of contract
(b) Attitudes tm/ard3 drug contract orF;anisation
(i) Satisfaction with current procedure
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
Disadvantages of contract system
Advantages of contract system
Beneficiaries of the system
Improvements sUf~ested
(c) Pricing, tendering and negotiations
(i) Comparison of prices with other regions
(ii) Time spent in negotiation/discussion
,,,,ith suppliers
(iii) Retendering
(iv) Acceptance of restrictions to lower
price
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(a) Organisation of Contracts
(i) Authority Level
Question 1 determined the authority level at which drug contracts
were currently organised.
Examination of Table 8.1 shows that contracts are primarily
Regionally based, though in addition one of the RHA's possesses
a multi-Regional/hospital element, the multi-Regional component
being vaccine purchase, one a multi-Regional component and one a
district/hospital component in its organisation. The additional
factors were referred to by one officer only from each Region.
Generally the RHA is the authority responsible for contracts.
(ii) Personnel Involved
Questions 6, 8, 10 and 12 sought details of staff involved in drug
contract organisation (a) five years ago, (b) now, (c) suggested
five years in the future, and (d) ideally.
Table 8.2 shows the expected declining role of Area Supplies
Officers in the future compared with both the past and the present,
and this reduced role appears to meet the.ideal expectations of
the respondents.
On the other hand a slightly increased role is expected for the
Regional Supplies Officer. Given that the questionnaire was
issued to R.S.O.'s (though not necessarily completed by them),
the response may be a reflection of their own perceived importance
·in the drug contract scenario.
Table 8.3 attempts to show the difference in responses provided by
the two disciplines, pharmacist (P) and supplies officer;(S).
The view of the future declining role of the supplies officer below
RSO grade is more prevalent among pharmacists than supplies officers.
This pOints to a lack of appreciation of the role of those supplies
officers by some pharmacists. ·There is low correlation between the
views of the supplies officers and pharmacists as demonstrated in
Table 8.3, r.being of value 0.533, p = 0.174. This suggests a
divergence'of views on the scale of involvement, both predicted and
ideal, of supplies officers in drug contract organisation, and it
may be thought that the responses are a reaction on the part of
pharmacists to the supplies officers' present greater role than that
which existed five years ago. It might be considered that the
pharmacists feel threatened by the supplies officers'enhanced
position in the organisation.
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TABLE 8.1: ADMINISTRATIVE LEVEL AT WHICH DRUG CONTRACTS ARE ORGANISED
ADMINISTRATION LEVEL OF ORGANISATION
Multi-Re~ional/Regional/Hospital
Multi-Regional/Regional
Regional
Regional/District/Hospital
(n = 26)
3.61
3.8
84..6
3.8
Now
TABLE 8.2: GRADE OF SUPPLIES OFFICER INVOLVED IN CONTRACT ORGANISATION
Grade Five Years
Ago
Ln = 26)'
57.7%
30.8
3.8
65.4
26.9
•3.8
Five Years Ideally
Ah~ad
(n = 26) (n = 26)
One A.S.O.
S~veral A.S.O. 's
Divisional S.O.
Senior Admin.~ .~..
Officer (Supplies)
Another S.O.
R.s__,O.
3.8
6!J'.2 76.9
46.2
23.1
(n = 26)
42.3
15.4
76.9
3.8
80.8
",NOTE: "Totals for columns 'exceed-,U)O% because-some-respondents ticked 'several boxes.
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The role of the pharmacist can be similarly examined from the results
shown in Table 8.4.
In the future there is a predicted greater involvement for pharmacists
as compared with five years ago, and the ideal is almost identical to
that future role. It is'thought that the future will show a
diminished role for pharmacists below R.Ph.O.grade with an enlarged
role for the R.Ph.O's. This opinion may reflect the fact that R.Ph.O's
were recipients of the questionnaire.
Examination of Tables 8.2 and 8.4 shows that generally at each stage
of the historical scene and in the ideal view pharmacists playa
bigger role than supplies officers.
Table 8.5 analyses the different opinions of the two disciplines toward
the role of the pharmacist.
Comparison of Tables 8.3 and 8.5 shows that pharmacists generally
perceive their own role as being of more importance than do the
supplies officers.
Table 8.5 suggests that each discipline sees a growing involvement
of the R.Ph.O.
Statistical analysis of the data demonstrated in Table 8.5 indicates
a high correlation (r. = 0.949) between the pharmacists' views and·
those of their supplies oolleagues. The correlation is very signi-
ficant (p = 0.00032). Apparentfy the supplies officer sees a
smaller role for his pharmacist colleague than does the pharmacist,
but there is nevertheless considerable agreement between the two
groups of workers.
Apart from pharmacists' and supplies officers' roles, other
disciplines appear to playa very small part in the organisation.
Auditors in the view of one respondent have played and will continue
to playa role and ideally should do so. The Treasurer in the view.of one respondent has and is playing a role, but will not and should
.not in the future.
The consultant medical staff were mentioned by 4 respondents as
playing a role both 5 years ago and at present, with 6 respondents
suggesting their future role and 8 suggesting their role ideally.
Their usefulness ranges, in the view of the respondents, from being
very helpful to being a hindrance.
The nursing staff receive little acknowledgement perhaps because,
unlike the consultants, they were not specifically listed in the
questionnaire. One respondent noted a past theoretical involvement
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· and one (or possibly two) ;uggest.:an ideal role.
Though not specifically listed as a category to be ticked, many
respondents referred to Quality Control pharmacists who loom larger
in the thinking of the respondents now than five years ago but
suggest in future a slightly diminishing role both practically and
ideally.
The results are shown in Table 8.6.
The supplies and pharmacist disciplines show little difference in
their view of QC involvement for the present, future and ideally.
This result is somewhat surprising in view of the often vaunted
claim of pharmacists that their own discipline rather than the
supplies officer gives greater emphasis to quality. The role of
the quality control pharmacist was little recognised in the past by
the supplies officer but is now sufficiently important for QC to be
listed and remarked upon by almost as many supplies officers as
pharmacists.
The lay member of the Authority, representing the view of the impartial
observer,does not figure very markedly in the thinking of the two major
disciplines involved~ One respondent suggests a past role, one (or
possibly two) suggests a future role and one an ideal role.
Other responses cover the range of grades in hospital pharmacy and
supplies but no tangible conclusions can be drawn.
The influence exerted by the three disciplines,pharmaci~s, supplies
officers and medica~ on the contract organisation was determined by
questions 7, 9, 11 and 13. The results are shown in Table 8.7.
The question had sought the opinion on the single discipline with
the most influence and so the multiple answers must be discounted.
Table 8.7 shows that clearly a greater influence appears to be exerted
at all stages of the historical timescale by pharmacists than supplies
officers. Those results are broken down by respondents in Table 8.8.
Table 8.7 demonstrates that Consultants appear to be considered non-
influential in contract organisation.
The supplies officer should not ideally, in the view of any of the
responding pharmacists, exert the most influence on contract
organisation, whereas almost. equal numbers of supplies officers
perceive each discipline as ideally being most influential in the
organisation of the contracts.
In the historical perspective both pharmacists and supplies officers
see their own influence diminishing in practice and the other
-195
TABLE 8.4: GRADE OF PHARMACIST INVOLVED IN CONTRACT ORGANISATION
Grade Five Years Now Five Years Ideally
Ago Ahead
(n : 26) (n : 26) (n : 26) (n : 26)
One Ph.O 7.7% 3.8 7.7 11.5
Several Ph.O's 88.5 96.2 80.8 80.8
Other below
R.Ph.O 38.5 88.5 69.2 73.1
R. Ph.O 96.2 84.6 92.3 100
TABLE 8.5: PHARMACISTS' AND SUPPLIES OFFICERS' VIEWS ON PHARMACIST
INVOLVEMENT IN CONTRACT ORGANISATION
Pharmacist
grade involved
Five Years Now Five Years Ideally
Ago Ahead.
P S . p.' S· P S P S
tl:1~· tl=1l (n:13)(n:13) (n:13 (n:13 (n:13) (n:13)
154% 115 208 169 169 146 177 154
100 92 92 77 85 100 100 100
Below R.Ph.O
R. n: 0
TABLE 8.6: QUALITY CONTROL PHARMACIST INVOLVEMENT IN CONTRACT
ORGANISATION
Five Years Now IdeallyFive Years
Ahead
P S P S P S
(n:13) (n:13) (n=13) (n=13) (n:1)} (n=1:j)
46 38 38 31 31 31Q.C. Pharmacist
Ago
P S
n:13) (n:13)
46% 8
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TABLE 8.7: INFLUENTIAL DISCIPLINES IN CONTRACT ORGANISATION
Five Years Now Five Years Ideally
Ago Ahead
(n=26 ) (ri=26) (n=26 ) (n=26)
Supplies Officer 23.1% 7.7 7.7 11.5
Pharmacist 65.4 57.7 53.8 65.4
Consultant Medical
Staff
Supplies Officer and
Pharmacist 3.8 26.9 23.1 15.4
Supplies Officer,
Pharmacist and
Consultant '3..8 3.8 3.8 3.8
TABLE 8.8: PHARMACISTS' AND SUPPLIES OFFICERS'VIEWS ON THE MOST
INFLUENTIAL DISCIPLINE IN CONTRACT ORGANISATION
Five Years Now Five Years Ideally
Ago Ahead
P S P S P S .P S,
(n=13Hn=13) (n=13) (n=13) (n=13)(n=13) Q:1=14 Q:1=13)
Supplies Officer 23% 23 15 8 8 23
Pharmacist 77 54 85 31 69 38 100 31
TABLE 8.9: PHARMACISTS' AND SUPPLIES OFFICERS' VIEWS ON THE MOST
INFLUENTIAL DISCIPLINE IN CONTRACT AWARD
All Pharmacists' Supplie6
Respondents View Officers'
View
(n=26) (n=13) (n=13)
Supplies, Office~
Pharmacist 76.9% 92 62
Neither 19.2 8 31
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.discipline's role increasing slightly.
The influential discipline in drug. contract award was considered in
question 22. The results are shown in Table 8.9.
Almost all pharmacists perceive themselves as the most influential
discipline in the contract award, whereas the supplies officers are
divided with one third of the respondents favouring neither discipline
and two thirds suggesting the pharmacists.
Tensions between the two disciplines are suggested by the responses
to question 6-13 and 22. Those tensions in each R.H.A. are examined
later when an examination is made of the degree of dissonance or.
concordance between supplies officers' and pharmacists' responses.
Since drug contracts are organised at R.H.A. level it is to be
expected that the R.S.O. and R.Ph.O. are involved in their
organisation. In the main their role tends to be one of overseer and
chairman (or joint chairman) of the adjudicating committee. The
R.S.O. and R.Ph.O. often act in an advisory capacity to the district
staff who perform the groundwork, although, as chairman, they do have
a chairman's right to a casting vote should the need arise. The
survey indicated that the Regional Officers renain in the background
and prefer to do so and delegate the basic responsibilities to subord-
Inate staff. Those personnel often have a specifically defined role
and at the adjudicating stage the groundwork performed by both
groups is combined to produce a synthesis of appropriate specification,
quality, price and manufacturerviability.
The quality control pharmacists write and update product specific-
ations, test the drugs considered for contract and report on the
relationship between their test results and the specification drawn
up.
The supplies officers are concerned with the reputation and viability
of the manufacturer and they will assess the likelihood of new
companies being able to supply an item when required. Often the
supplies officer and O.C. or technical pharmacist· visit potential
contractors to assess their efficiency and viability.
It must be readily apparent that in contract drug purchasing the
two disciplines, pharmaceutical and supplies, must work closely
together in order to harness their respective skills and knowledge.
(iii) Dissonance and Concordance within each R.H.A.
Responses relating to opinions, not fact~ were analysed by comparing
the two responses for each R.H.A. which provided two responses.
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Twelve R.H.A.'s fell into that category. Identical responses were
scored 0, diametrically opposite results scored 1. Where a gradation
of response was possible, for example "very important" - "fairly
important" - "not very important" - "not important at all", the
semantic differential was applied and a score of 0.33 between each
consecutive response was given, allowing a total difference from
"very important" to "not important at all" of 1.
To illustrate the scoring scheme, question 3 allowed a choice of
five answers. A score of ~ was therefore allocated between "very
satisfactory" and "satisfactory", between "satisfactory" and "neither
satisfactory nor unsatisfactory", between the latter and "unsatis-
factory", and between "unsatisfactory" and "very unsatisfactory". If
the two respondents from a R.H.A. provided identical responses the
score would be zero. If they would answer "very satisfactory" and
"very unsatisfactory" the score would be one. In this way the degree
of parallel thinking between respondents of one R.H.A. could b~
numerically described and a quantified result could be derived from a
descriptive term.
It can be seen therefore that the higher the score the greater the
dissonance shown. The results are shown in Table 8.10.
The maximum dissonance possible would create a score of 60. The
results show that the R.H.A.'s showed a range from 6.6 to 16.8.
There is, according to this scoring system,a high degree of concordance
within each R.H.A. between pharmacist and supplies officer.
The questions which brought about the most dissonance were those which
asked for a decision on the most influential discipline in contract
award,and whether or not there should be the option to retender when
a drug comes off patent.
(iv) Steps in Contract Award Process
Questions 2 and 2a sought information on the stages in the contract
award. Ten respondents referred to procedures additional to those
defined in the question, but they were seen on examination to be
merely subgroupings of the main headings. One of the respondents
referred to the system of issuing call-up lists to hospitals and
noted that his RHA had dispensed with them since the estimates have
proved inaccurate and unhelpful. This subject is covered in greater
depth in connection with the survey of pharmaceutical suppliers.
(v) Changes over last five years
Question 5 covered changes in contract organisation over the last five
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years and the answers are shown in Table 8.11.
The additional responses volunteered were change to buying guide (4
responses) and one response each for no estimates, more attention to
communication and bioavailability, information needed on origin,
positive vetting, more items on contract, more vetting and contact
with suppliers, more management supplies involvement and selected
number of items on contract, each mentioned by staff of one RHA.
Of all changes listed, QC received most attention, more so than shown
in Table 8.6. Every RHA is represented in that opinion.
The contracts now are generally of longer duration (9 RHA's) but cover
fewer drugs (8 RHA's). For one RHA the contract period is now shorter.
For five RHA's there is now more formalised RHA staff involvement.
The impression is created of a more streamlined contract and of note
is the equal attention given by the two disciplines to supplier service
and packaging. This result demolishes any argument that supplies
officers give less consideration to those matters than do pharmacists.
The staffing changes over the last five years are examined in
section (a) (ii).
Clearly hypothesis 6, namely that the weighting of criteria consi~ered
important in purchase of drugs has altered over time, is validated
by the research findings.
(vi) Duration of Contract
Those surveyed were asked if they preferred a one or two year duration
of contract in question 31 and reasons.for the choice were sought in
question 32. Results are shown in Table 8.12.
No clear division of opinion between the two disciplines was apparent
but the majority favoured a two year contract. This result of
preferences must be compared with the reality of the system in which
six regions possess one year contracts and seven possess two year
contracts.
The reasons for the preferences are shown in Table 8.13.
Clearly subjective reasoning clouds the reasons for the preferences
which are not often satisfied in reality, and it is suggested that
the subject would benefit greatly from a comparison of prices charged
and administrative costs in two regions, one having a two year contract
the other having an annual review.
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·TABLE 8.11: CHANGES IN CONTRACT ORGANISATION OVER THE LAST FIVE YEARS
All Pharmacist Supplies .. No. of
Respondents Officer RHA's
(n=26) (n=13) (n=13) Represented
Increased involvement
of QC Pharmacists 88.5% 85 92 14
Smaller number of
items on contract 46.2 54 38 8
Longer duration
of contract 57.7 46 69 9
Shorter duration
of contract 7.7 8 8
More formalised
RHA staff
involvement 19.2 23 15 5
More consideration
given to packaging 73.1 69 77 13
More consideration
given to supplier
service 46.2 46 46 9
Others 30.8 15 46 8
TABLE 8.12: PREFERRED DURATION OF CONTRACT
All Pharmacist Supplies No. of
Respondents Officer RHA's
(n=26) (n=13 ) (n=13 ) Represented
Prefer two years 53.8% 46 62 10
Prefer one year 23.1 23 23 5
No preference 11.5 23 2
Joint choice 11.5 8 15 3
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TABLE 8.13: REASONS FOR PREFERRED DURATION OF CONTRACT
Duration
Preferred Response Reason for preferred duration(n=26)
One year 11.5% Volatile market makes placing of long-
term contracts unsatisfactory.
11.5 More drugs coming off patent and so
competitively priced from generic
manufacturers.
7.7 Allows annual review of products'
demand to ensure that contract is
worthwhile.
3.8 Two years is too long in inflationary
times.
3.8 To encourage a competitive market.
Two years 42.3
11.5
7.7
7.7
Reduces administrative costs/workload.
Improves continuity of supplies.
Simplifies quality control.
Allows manufacturer to build up
adequate stocks.
7.7 Improves price.
7.7 Provides reasonable expectancy of
substantial business to bidders.
3.8 Contract should be limited to well
established products.
3.8 Allows time for contract to settle down
3.8 ·Supplier sourcing warrants longer
contract.
No preference 15.4
3.8
3.8
Depends on market circumstances and
product, e.g. p~oprietaries could be
on relatively long contract related
to list price and generics would be
more open to competition (and
implicitly more favourable prices if
shorter contract).
Too many amendments over two years in
highly inflationery times.
If schedule can be split or is small
one year is preferred but for a large
schedule two years is preferred to
reduce administrative workload.
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(b) Attitudes towards Drug Contract Organisation
(i) Satisfaction with current procedure
This topic is discussed in questions 3 and 4.
The results show in Table 8.14 a generally satisfactory view of the
current contract procedure within each RHA. However, may one assume
the same degree of satisfaction with the system of contracts itself?
Whereas the respondents remarked that the personnel involved, their
actions and the make up of committees are satisfactory their views
on the system itself show a degree of dissatisfaction. This topic
is discussed in the next sub-section.
(ii) Disadvantages of Contract System
The disadvantages of the existing contract system were elucidated in
questions 18, 19 and 20. It would appear that there are several
disadvantages. Those volunteered in question 18 were related to:-
1. Inflexibility of system
2. Poor utilisation of management information and
communications within NHS
3. Lack of commitment
4. Unhelpful and possibly damaging to industry
1. The inflexibility of the system was noted sixteen times with
eleven of those mentions arising from pharmacists. It was felt that
market or price changes were not being catered for. Further, user
problems were not being accommodated. Positive negotiation was
suggested by ten pharmacists.
2. Utilisation of resources was remarked upon seventeen times,of
which eleven were from supplies officers. The 'absence of full time
contracts officers in the NHS, representing both pharmacy and supplies,
was bemoaned by one supplies officer, as was the amount of admin~
istrative work and cost. Inadequate NHS QC information was remarked
upon by two pharmacists. Poor coordination between RHA's causing
duplication of effort was remarked upon by a pharmacist, as was the
inclusion in contracts of items for which no real competition existed.
More need for information on prices/packs, more monitoring of
effectiveness in relation to number of items on contract, inaccurate
estimates and unpredictable demand were noted as disadvantages.
3. The lack of commitment to adhere to contracts was noted by three
respondents, of whom two were pharmacists.
4. Problems for the supplier were noted by two of each discipline.
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TABLE 8.14: HOW SATISFACTORY IS CURRENT PROCEDURE?
All
Respondents Pharmacist Supplies No. of
Officer RHA's
m=26)' (n=13) (n: 13) Represented
Very satisfactory 23.1% 8 38 5
Satisfactory 53.8 62 46 10
Neither satisfactory
nor unsatisfactory 23.1 31 15 4
Unsatisfactory
Very unsatisfactory -
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'The damage to the industry wh~n a contract is awarded for low margin
items or overloading of orders at the start of the contract were listed.
What is particularly noteworthy is that despite a generally sat.Ls-o.: .,
factory view of contr-acts generated by questions 3 and 4 (see Table
8.14) earlier in the questionnaire,considerable disquiet exists
among respondents regarding the system as it is at present operated.
As may be predicted user problems were a concern to pharmacists.
What was not so predictable was the considerable body of opinion
among pharmacists that the system was too rigid and more scope for
negotiation should develop. Equally the absence among supplies
officers of any concerted view in favour of a negotiated contract
rather than the current sealed tender system must be noted.
The supplies officers in particular would wish to see more realistic
information on estimated demand, usage and administrative costs.
Question 19 listed specific disadvantages of the contract system and
sought an opinion on the degree of importance attached to each and
reasons for such views. The results are as shown in Table 8.15.
The largest response for a very important disadvantage was "no drug
cost'savings" with 19% mentions followed by 12% mentions each for
"too rigid", and "does not satisfy local needs/preferences". A
purview of the "not a disadvantage at all" column indicates 65%
response, a very high score, for "no drug cost saving". Clearly
opinion was divided on the savings accruing from the scheme •
.62% response for "too few delivery points" and "too few ordering
points" in the "not a disadvantage at all" column show that there is
a large body of opinion in favour of a reduction in buying and delivery
points, a'view held particularly strongly by supplies officers.
In order to derive more detailed information from the results a
relative numerical rating was assigned to each yardstick on the.
scale 1 to 3, using the semantic differential as follows:-
each "very important" response scored 3 pOints;
each "fairly important" response scored 2 pOints;
each "not very important" response scored 1 point.
Whereas, there is no guarantee that the score alloted is totally
accurate it allows quantitative analyses to be performed and is
thus recognised as an appropriate tool in attitude measurement
work. The scores derived are as shown in Table 8.16.
Table 8.16 shows the tabulation resulting from the scoring system.
The local needs, rigidity, lack of supply continuity and costly
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TABLE 8.16: PERCEIVED DISADVANTAGES OF CONTRACTS
Response
Does not satisfy local needs
Too rigid
Lack of continuity of supply
Costly administration
Unsuitable pack sizes
No drug cost saving
Irregular/unpredictable deliveries
Excessive demands on storage space
Reduced deliveries
Too few delivery points
Too few ordering pOints
TABLE 8.17: PERCEIVED DISADVANTAGES OF CONTRACTS
Response Scores
All Pharmacists Supplies
Respon- Officers
dents
No drug cost saving 13 5 8
Local needs/preferences
not satisfied 13 10 3
Too rigid restricting
local choice 11 8 3
Inflexible to market
changes 9 6 3
Costly to administer 8 6 2
Lack of continuity of
supply at contract
expiry 6 5
Quantity of order makes
excessive demands on
storage space 6 3 3
.208
Score
27
23
22
20
19
17
16
16
10
5
4
.administration weigh heavily in the minds of the officers whereas the
few delivery and order points are of little significance.
Respondents were asked to rank order the disadvantages under question
20. For each "most important" a score of 3 is given, "second most
important" 2.and third most important 1. The results are shown in
Table 8.17. Scores of 3 or less are omitted.
Using that scoring system the three most important disadvantages
are the same as those apparent from Table 8.15. The pharmacists'
concern for local needs and the lack of flexibility which restricts
choice is marked.
Question 19 left space for additional disadvantages to be listed.
Supplies officers noted restriction of initiative, administratively
cumbersome and inflexible to market changes,whereas pharmacists
remarked upon inaccurate estimates, uneven quality of suppliers of
cheap generics, insufficient feedback from purchasing pharmacists of
difficulties and annual contracts.
Verbal questioning of officers regarding the unacceptability of
bargaining within the tendering system elicited the response from
two officers that the resulting restriction on trading was equally
a disadvantage to suppliers. For all its guidelines the system does
not guarantee supply to the user and business to the supplier.
This topic is discussed further in connection with the survey of
pharmaceutical suppliers.
The views of the senior officers responsible for N.H.S. drug purchasing
procedures shed considerable light on the failings. Some background
to their thought processes is provided by the additional comments
noted under "reason" in question 19 and suggested remedies are given.
The views propounded are given below.
1. Order quantities and their demands on storage space only cause
problems if not adequately considered at tender stages. A remedy is
to disallow minimum order stipulations from contractual terms of
suppliers or centralise storage.
2. The rigidity restricting local choice is a disadvantage to be
remedied by participation of pharmacists in decision-making regarding
supplier as well as in influencing prescriber. Clinical choice is
considered by several respondents to be a myth.
3. No drug cost saving was a topic which showed the considerable
divergence of opinion and lack of information available. Five
pharmacists categorically confirmed drug cost savings by contracting.
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4. Local needs or preferences not being satisfied are as given under
2 above.
5. Unsuitable pack sizes should be adequately covered by specification
but some firms will not supply small packs. The remedy is to encour-
age firms to provide small packs or repack within region. The expense
of that was remarked on by one pharmacist.
6. Lack of continuity of supply at contract expiry can arise with
specialised contracts, unreliable sources or inadequate notification
being given to new supplier. It can be remedied by adequate consul-
tation and information during contract award process.
7. Irregular or unpredictable deliveries should be covered by using
reliable sources, buyers reporting problems and a reference to
deliveries being included in contract conditions.
8. Administrative costs were considered worthy of comment and thought
to be low by five respondents (2 of whom were supplies officers)
though three officers (pharmacists) admitted a lack of knowledge.
9. Reduced deliveries would be dealt with under conditions of
contract and/or stock control measures.
10. Too few delivery points is a subject which should be adequately
covered in the conditions of contract. Five respondents, including
three pharmacists, felt that there were too many points.
11. Too few ordering points is a response which shows the features
and remedy of the previous topic. Five officers,including three
pharmaeists,bemoaned the too large number of ordering points.
(iii) Advantages of Contract System
In parallel with the disadvantages the advantages were analysed in
questions 15, 16 and 17. The opportunity was provided in the open
question 15 for the respondents to volunteer their own views.
The most noted advantages were cost saving on drugs remarked upon by
11 pharmacists and 8 supplies officers, predictable quality stated
by six respondents of each group, the lack of need for individual
hospital price negotiation mentioned by six supplies officers,and the
continuity or guarantee of supply noted by five supplies officers.
Other responses were as shown in Table 8.18. Given the perceived
difference in influence exerted by and the extent of divergence
of views on the part of each discipline, as highlighted previously,
it must be concluded that the importance allotted to purchase
criteria is a function of the relationship between them and so
hypothesis 6(a) was validated by the research findings:
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·'TABLE 8.18: FERCEIVED ADVANTAGES OF CONTRACTS
Response
Administrative saving
Manufacturer more able to predict
and satisfy needs
Compliance with standing orders/
legal requirements
Easier Pharm. Admin./one document
listing all drugs
Standard pack size
Reduces variety and unco-ordinated
buying
Psychol. benefit to supplier
Involvement of RPhO and DPhO's gives
high degree of user satisfaction
Same brand in all hospitals
Allows monitoring of usage
Combines technical and commercial
expertise
Very few, needs major revision
None
Provides sound data base for
evaluating alternative purchasing
methods
231
Pharmacists
(n=13)
23%
31
8
8
8
8
8
8
Supplies
Officers
(n=13)
8
23
23
15
15
8
8
8
8
8
Of note is the equal concern for quality among both groups.
Question 16 listed some specific advantages of the contract system,
and in a similar format to question 19 sought decisions on the
importance of each and the reasons for that perceived view. The
results are shown in Table 8.19.
"Cost saving on drugs" is rated by 81% of respondents as being very
important. Next in importance is "obviates individual hospital price
negotiation" mentioned by 73% of respondents, followed by "predictable
quality". Somewhat unpredictably more supplies officers than
pharmacists consider this of major importance.
So as to derive more detailed information the columns were scored
for the degree of importance attached to each response, with three
points for "very", two for "fairly" and one for "not very" important
response. The scores derived are shown in Table 8.20.
Examination of Table 8.20 shows that the derived rank order and that
of Table 8.19 are the same for the four most important factors.
Under question 17 respondents were asked to rank order the advantages.
As previously each "most important" is scored 3, "second most import-
ant" is scored two and "third most important" is scored 1.
The results are presented in Table 8.21.Scores of 3 or less are
omitted.
Cost saving on drugs is shown to be the major advantage of contracts.
Again the higher score by supplies offl'cers than pharmacists for
predictable quality as an important advantage is noteworthy.
Question 16 allowed additional advantages to be listed. A pharmacist
noted that the contract ensures a supplier for certain items and
another pharmacist listed as very important the psychological
pressure for suppliers and, as a fairly important advantage, the
identification of requirement for low use items.
The reason for the perceived advantages of the contract system was
allowed for in question 16. Those reasons were:-
1. Administrative saving. There was a broad range of responses to
this answer with some emphasising the greater workload than would
be the case in the absence of contracts, some respondents doubting
savings and others recognising the avoidance of duplication.
2. Continuity of brand for contract duration. This was felt
unimportant by some provided quality was assured. Some felt it
was important to attain user confidence. Central prepacking allows
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TABLE 8.20: PERCEIVED ADVANTAGES OF CONTRACTS
Response
Cost saving On drugs
Obviates need for individual hospital price negotiation
Predictable quality
Appropriate labelling
Continuity of brand for contract period
Manufacturer can predict usage and more easily
satisfy needs
Administrative saving
Predictable deliveries
Standard pack sizes
TABLE 8.21: PERCEIVED ADVANTAGES OF CONTRACTS
Scores
All Pharmacists Supplies
Advantages Respon- Officersdents
Cost saving on drugs 52 28 24
Predictable quality 37 14 23
Administrative saving 17 8 9
Obviates need for individual
hospital negotiation 12 8 4
Continuity of brand for
contract period 9 8
Appropriate labelling 4 4
.214
Score
71
66
64
55
47
46
45
44
31
information of change of brand to be notified in advance.
3. Quality predictability was thought to save QC costs and time but
one respondent thought quality could vary throughout the duration
of the contract and another felt it essential that prescriber
confidence was retained.
4. "Cost saving of drugs" was doubted by one respondent but was
generally considered the main aim of the exercise.
5. "Predictable deliveries" were not limited to contracts. Two
respondents noted that delivery times may "be included in the contract
conditions. One respondent noted that predictable deliveries should
save money.
6. "Manufacturer can predict usage and so more easily satisfy needs"
realised three comments on the unreliability of estimates. Two
respondents felt that their uptake was a small proportion of the
market and so hardly likely to affect the seller's strategy.
7. "Standard pack sizes" was thought by four respondents to apply
equally to non contracts. Two respondents referred to regional
prepacking units and their needs to be satisfied. One person
referred to the difficulty in achieving agreement on packs.
8. "Appropriate labelling" was considered equally applicable in the
context of non contractual purchases. It can be dealt with at the
adjudication stage. The difficulty in achieving agreement on
labelling was referred to.
9. "Obviates need for individual price negotiation at hospital level"
should, in the opinion of three respondents, apply with a saving of
time.
(iv) Beneficiaries of the System
Question 27 asked which party, the NHS or supplier derived the most
benefit from the drug contracts and question 28 sought reasons for
that response. The results are given in Table 8.22.
The majority, 58%,of the respondents felt that both derived benefit
from contracts. In addition 15% could not commit themselves. Of
the remainder more felt that the NHS rather than the supplier
derived most benefit.
The respondents who felt that the NHS derives most benefit suggested
as reasons cost savings, predictable quality and the freeing of
individual hospital pharmacists from the need to negotiate. One
suggestion was that there was no obligation on the NHS to take up
estimated quantities yet the agreement was binding on the supplier •
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TABLE 8.22: PARTY DERIVING MOST BENEFIT FROM CONTRACTS
All Pharmacists Supplies
Respondents Officers
(n=26) (n=13) (n=13)
NHS 19.2% 23 15
Supplier 7.7 8 8
Both 57.7 54 62
Don't know 15.4 15 15
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Those who thought that the supplier derived most benefit suggested as
reasons the guaranteed or increased sales, planning production and
absence of need to compete with other firms (assuming, of course,
that the company is awarded the contract). It was thought that
the contract kept the firm's products constantly before medical
and other staff. One respondent felt that companies can play R.H.A.'s
off against each other.
The reasons adduced by those who suggested that neither party derived
most benefit were the cost savings, rationalisation and continuity
of supply to the N.H.S. and planned production, stability, manpower
and resources planning, openings to the GP market, continuity of
orders and reasonable prediction of take up as benefits to the
supplier. One respondent felt that since the contract had been
negotiated, it must by definition be of equal mutual benefit. This
"is a view which is difficult to uphold given the absence of any
meaningful negotiations in the process. One respondent, suggesting
that both parties equally benefit, felt that both could benefit more
if the N.H.S. placed a year's order instead of a year's ~stimate.
(v) Improvements suggested
The officers were provided with an open question, number 21, in
which they could note spontaneously any desired improvements in any
feature of the contract system. The answers ranged over the whole
spectrum of aspects of the process.
The inflexibility of the system was noted by six pharmacists and
three supplies officers. In contrast three supplies officers and
one pharmacist regretted the lack of commitment by or pressures on
health authorities to ensure compliance with the contract.
More utilisation of expert skills of pharmacists and supplies
officers was referred to by two pharmacists and three supplies
officers, some suggesting permanent negotiating and monitoring terms.
More improved management information, including computerisation and
word processing, more accurate estimates and records of uptake, was
mentioned by six pharmacists and three supplies officers.
'Greater co-operation between Regions was suggested by two pharmacists.
Other suggested improvements were improved QC input, more influence
from users on packaging and presentatlon,and more flexibility in
dealing with defaulting suppliers, each being listed by one pharmacist,
whereas supplies officers sought a reduction in delivery pOints, no
changes at all, greater understanding by suppliers, particularly
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wholesalers, of the objectives of contracts, and more flexibility in
achieving direct or wholesaler deliveries. Each of those was men-
tioned by one officer.
It is useful to contrast those improvements with the disadvantages
of the contract system raised previously. As before, the desire for
a more flexible approach was particularly common among pharmacists
whereas the supplies officers were more inclined to regret the lack
of commitment to the rigidity of the system. Considering that it
would be primarily the supplies officer whose negotiating skills
would be utilised if a more flexible framework were adopted those
officers appear somewhat reluctant generally to accept the challenge
which would be presented.
(c) Pricing, Tendering and Negotiations
(i) Comparison of prices with other regions
Nine questions were devoted to pricing, tendering and negotiations to
try to elucidate in depth the opinions of the NHS officers on the
prices charged, the price negotiations which occur or which they
would wish to see, the circumstances surrounding a changing market
or price fluctuation, and their acceptance or otherwise of restrictions
likely to allow a drop in price~ •
The first aspect confronting the respondent was the price being paid
compared with that prevailing under other RHA's. Question 13a
aSKed whether a systematic comparison had been made. The responses
are shown in Table 8.23.
At first sight it might seem strange that the vast majority of senior
officers do not systematically compare prices with those of other
RHA's. But is there any benefit in so doing? It might be thought
that such comparison would be very actively encouraged or even
made mandatory, by the DHSS.
But DHSS attitude has been equivocal with the result that in only five
of the fourteen RHA's in England is a systematic comparison of prices
made. A further complication would be the decision on which dis-
ciplines should perform that task. One supplies officer in responding
"no" added the comment "but the pharmaceutical officer has". In fact
that was not the case.
Question 14 asked the officers to denote how they believed their
regional prices compared with other regions'. The respondents were
given a range of five answers and the results are shown in Table 8.24.
218
•
"TABLE 8.23, IS SYSTEMATIC PRICE COMPARISON PERFORMED?
All Phann- Supplies No. of RHA'3
Respon- acists Officers represented
dents
(n:26) (n= 13) (n:13)
Yes 23.,~ 31 15 5
No 69.2 69 69 11
Occasionally 3.8 8 1
Once 3.8 8 1
TABLE 8.24' RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTION OF HOW HIS RHA'S PRICES COMPARE
Wlm OTHERS.
All Phann-
Respon- acist3
dents
(n:·26) (n: 13
Supplies
Officers
( n:13
. .
10% + cheaper
'2 - 10% cheaper
The sarne!. 2%
2 - 10% dearer
10% + dearer
No response/Don't know
23.1%
46.2
23
54
23
39
38.5 31 46
NOTE, Totals of columns exceed 100% because some respondents
ticked two boxe3.
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Table 8.24 shows that none of the sendor-of'f'Lcer-econsiders his prices
to be dearer than other regions'. Considering this result together
with that of the previous Table it is remarkable that with so little
comparison actually occurring so many, 62%, are prepared to hazard a
guess and yet in so doing to assume that their prices are no dearer
than their neigh'bours' •
At least one could have expected all to respond "the same", but none
wishes to believe that his prices are dearer.
(ii) Time spent in negotiation/discussion with suppliers
In order to elicit some realistic answers to the question of time
spent in negotiation/discussion with potential suppliers, respondents
were asked in question 23 to comment on whether they felt six man days
per year was above, below or equal to the time spent in their regions
on discussions on prices before contract award,and in question 24 to
estimate that time. The results are shown in Tables 8.25 and 8.26.
So as to quantify the average time spent on price discussions an
assumption is made that the descriptive term of Table 8.25 "less
than . 6 man days per year" is 3 and "more than 6 man days per year"
is 9. By this means pharmacist respondents can be assumed to feel
that on average 7.0 man days per year is spent on price discussions
and supplies officers 5.7 man days per year.
Analysis of data shown in Table 8.26 provides an average pharmacist
response of 9.7 and a Supplies officer response of 10.25 man days per
year. One can assume, therefore, that the perceived time spent is
between 6 and 10 man days per year.
Opinion on this to~cis divided, with great inter-Regional variation.
The two subsequent questions dealt with whether the respondent thought
that the time spent on price negotiations with suppliers was adequate
or otherwise.and reasons were sought. The responses to the former are
shown in Table 8.25.
Chi square analysis of the data demonstrated in Table 8.25 to try to
elucidate ~yrelationship between perceived time spent on price
negotiation and thoughts on the adequacy of that time was considered
but necessarily rejected owing to the small number of responses.
Despite that restriction the impression produced by the findings on
examination of Table 8.27 is of little relationship between perceived
time spent on price discussion and its considered adequacy. Hypothesis
4 is therefore validated for buyers~
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TABLE 8.25: PERCEIVED TIME ~ND ADEQUACY OF TIME SPENT ON PRE-AWARD
PRICE DISCUSSION.
Response All Pharmacists Supplies
Respondents Officers
(n=26) (n=13) 'tn:13)
Less than 6 man days per year 26.9% 15 38
About 6 man days per year 11.5 15 8:
More than 6 man days per year 34.6 38 31
Inadequate 46.2 46 46
About right 42.3 46 38
TABLE 8.26: ESTIMATED PERCEIVED TIME SPENT ON PRICE DISCUSSION
Pharmacists Supplies Officers
Number of man days per year About 0, 2, 2, 6, 6,
10-12, 10-15, 12, 15,
30.
0, 0, 2, 6,
12, 12, 20, 30
Average number of man days
per year 9.7 10.25
TABLE 8.27: NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS WHO EXPRESSED A VIEW ON ADEQUACY
OF PRICE DISCUSSION AND PERCEIVED TIME SPENT ON PRICE
DISCUSSION
Time spent on price discussion
considered to be
Too About Too Total
much right little
Price discussion up to
6 man days 0 3 5 8
Price discussion about
6 man days 0 2 3
Price discussion over
6 man days 0 4 5 9
TOTAL· 0 9 11 20
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Despite a considerable spread of responses to the question of actual
time spent on negotiating price there is a considerable body of
opinion which suggests that the time spent discussing prices is
either too little or about right. No respondent considered the time
too much. The open question, number 26, sought comments on this topic.
Those respondents who felt that too little time was spent on price
negotiations felt that an increase would enable the NHS to derive
benefit. One felt a need for ireprovement of grade of staff with time
available with one specifying the need for a full time suitably
motivated officer. Two felt that there needs to be a commitment to
buy by the NHS. Two supplies officers referred to the public account-
ability limitation on the use of negotiating skills. Three pharm-
acists and three supplies officers referred to the formality and lack
of contact: with suppliers and the possibility of the NHS using its
bargaining power to its own advantage if negotiations occurred.
Those who responded that the time spent on negotiation was about
right suggested that it allows RHA staff to keep in touch with drug
purchase/usage (2 pharmacists) and the public accountability require-
ment precludes price negotiation (2 supplies officers).
In general the comments reflect those reported previously with a
desire on the part of both disciplines for more negotiation and
discussion with potential suppliers so as to improve the service
and prices charged to the NHS.
(iii) Retendering
The circumstances in which the option to retender during a contract
period should prevail were provided in question 29. The responses
are shown in Table 8.28.
It is clear from examination of Table 8.28 that NHS senior officers
consider that poor service or deliveries and an unacceptable request
for a price increase are good grounds for -retendering. That
opinion was almost unanimous. The two disciplines' opinions were-
virtually identical on those topics. Of slightly less importance
with 81% responses was theretender when the product was subsequently
shown to be not to specification. Whereas one might have predicted
the pharmaCists to give this item more weight Table 8.28 shows that
supplies officers considered it more important. An "unsatisfactory
new product" resulted in 62% responses, "a drug coming off patent"
46%,with less interest in "arrival of new significant drug" (27%
responses), "change in price structures" (27% responses),
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TABLE 8.28: CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH RETENDERING SHOULD OCCUR
All Pharmacists Supplies
Respondents Officers
(n=26) (n=13), (n=13)
Drug comes off patent 46.2% 38 54
Unacceptable request for
grice increase 92.3 92 92
Poor service/deliveries
from supplier 96.2 100 92
Unsatisfactory new
product 61.5 62 62
Product subsequently
shown not to specification 80.8 77 85
Likely contract winner
tendered late 7.7 8 8
Arrival of new
significant drug 26.9 38 15
Significant change in
prescribing habits 26.9 38 15
Change in price
structures 26.9 15 38
Tender documents lost
or failed to arrive 19.2 23 15
• 223
,.
"significant change in prescribing habits" (27% responses),and
"tender documents lost or failed to arrive" (19% responses}. There
is little desire for retendering in the event of a likely contract
award winner tendering late, with 8% responses.
Additional items proferred were "quality no~ matching samples",
"significant fall in market price" or "poor paper work (invoicing
etc.) from supplier", "bankruptcy" or "total inability to supply",
each receiving one mention.
There should, in the opinion of the respondent~ be scope to change
or cancel contracts. As regards the unacceptability of price increase
requests that ,topic was raised in question 30. Respondents were
asked what price increase should be tolerated before retendering
should occur and the results are shown in Table 8.29.
No general consensus appeared from the results. In addition one
supplies officer suggested "above inflation rate" and four supplies
officers stated "depends on competitor prices". In conformity with
standard practice, chi-square tests were not performed as the numbers
in a contingency table would be too small to yield a statistically
acceptable result. No major conclusions can be determined from that
question.
(iv) Acceptance of restrictions to enable price reductions to be
offered
Pharmaceutical suppliers have suggested, as a means of reducing prices,
some restrictions. The opinion of respondents on those restrictions
was sought in question 33 and reproduced in Table 8.30.
Table 8.30 shows that payment at the beginning of the year would be
unacceptable to a large number of each discipline with none accepting
it. 42% respondents would regard guaranteeing to buy a particular
uptake as being unacceptable, whereas 46% would view it as being
acceptable.
The most. acceptable restriction was a reduced number of buying points
(85% respondents) with 4% against. Another acceptable restriction
with only 15% against was a reduced number of delivery' points (73%
respondents). Less frequent deliveries though unacceptable to 19%
would be acceptable to 62%. A two year contract instead of a one
year one would be unacceptable to 12% but acceptable to 7'r/Orespondents.
When asked to nominate those restrictions they would be most pleased
to acceptythe two year contract emerged with 54% votes, reduction
in buying points 42%, reduction in delivery points 31%, guaranteed
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TABLE 8.29: MAXIMUM PRICE INCREASE BEFORE RETENDERING
All Pharmacists Supplies
Respondents Officers
.(n=-26) (n=13) (n=13)
o - 3% 3.·8% 8
1 - 3% 3.8 8
4 - 10% 23.1 31 15
11 - 20% 11.5 15 8
More than 20% 7.7 15
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drug quantity uptake 23%,and less frequent deliveries 8% votes.
On their own these preferences do not impart a great deal of
information but if it is knownhow much suppliers would in fact
'be prepared to reduce prices in the presence of any of the
restrictions listed then a realistic picture could emerge of
the cost/benefit relationship. This information is provided
by the questionnaire submitted to pharmaceutical suppliers and
referred to later.
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CHAPTER 9
INDUSTRY CENSUS
The census of senior pharmaceutical industry personnel enabled the
acquisition of results and inferences presented under the following
headings:-
Changes in the last five years
Duration of contract
Variation between RHA's
Interest in hospital sales
and satisfaction with contract
system
Disadvantages
Advantages
Beneficiaries
Improvements suggested
Inter-Regional variation 1n
price
(ii) Factors influencing price
(a) Organisation of Contracts (1)
(iil
(iii )
(i)(b) Attitudes towards contracts
(ii)
(iii)
(c) Pricing and tendering
(iv)
(v)
(i)
(iii) Estimates of uptake
(iv) Price discussions
(v) Communications
(vi) Retenderine
(vii) Methods of reducing prices
(d) Patents
(e) Deliveries
(a) Organisation of Contracts
(i) Changes in the last five years
The noted changes in contract procedure during the last five years
in response to question 4 are shown in Table 9.1. Other prompted
responses were: buying guide/separation of proprietaries and
generics 6.0%, lack of conformity between regions 3.6%, little or
no change 1n procedure 4.8%, more QC involveme~t/want inspection
of premises 2.4%.
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Individual responses (1.2% of respondents) were: lack of appreciation
between brands, decreased accuracy of estimates, 'rationalisation
programmes with more central buying, penalty clauses, requirements
for quantities static, no up to date planning, more competition
from wholesalers, statistical information requirements, variation
in what is included, increased tendency for absence of quantity per
item, and less provision to offer equivalent preparations.
Clearly the suppliers perceive a change in NHS personnel involved
over the last five years, with 44% noting this. A majority note
the changed dur-at.Lonof contract. 41% refer to the different
starting dates of contracts, with substantial minorities refer-
ring to the different conditions of contract (29%), more complex
form filling (29%), and fewer drugs on tender form not",(29%).
Whereas 29% regard form filling as being more complex now, 11%
feel it is less so, and although 29% cite f'ewerdrugs on tender
forms now, 21% refer to more now.
Breakdown of the results into categories highlights the large
divergence or view on change in conditions of contract held by
companies of various sizes. The larger the C'ompan"iesthe more
weight given to this factor. Possibly large businesses which are
contracting more frequently perceive this most strongly. In a
similar way they respond to "more complex form filling". Those
responses suggest that the larger the company's hospital sales·
the more it desires standardisation and simplicity.in forms used,
an obvious desire given the number of tenders the large company
tends to submit.
(ii) DuraUon of Contract
The changed contract duration referred to by 51% of respondents to
question 4 was the subject of questions 22 and 23 in which the
respondents were asked their preference for contract duration and
reasons. The replies are shown in Table 9.2.
The majority (60%) of respondents prefer a one year duration of
contract with an additional 6% favouring an even shorter duration.
Clearly some two thirds of respondents favouring a duration of one
year or less.is a factor which must be considered by NHS staff and
that response must be contrasted with the 25% preferring two years
or more. There appears to be little support for contracts of less
than one year or more than two years. Breakdown into categories
shows that companies which supply through wholesalers prefer one
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'year to two year contracts in the ratio of 82% to 14%.
The reasons for those preferences of contract durations provide
background and are summarised below. It must be emphasised that
those responses represent the vast majority of those returning
the completed questionnaire document.
Those respondents who preferred a one year contract thought it
allowed flexibility to cope with pack changes, price increases
and shortfall in uptakes, as well as being administratively more
convenient and cheaper. A one year cycle parallels the industry
cycle of production, sales budgeting and profitability.
The two year contract was thought preferable by some industrialists
since it allowed a reasonable period for planning production runs
and reduced paperwork for both parties. It was suggested that a
two year contract allowed greater scope for bulk delivery and extra
discounts. The increasing practice of submitting half the drug
schedule each year for a two year contract was favourably
remarked upon.
If a scientifically based, objective assessment of administrative
costs to the NHSof the various durations were to be performed,
then those views would help to predict the likely opinions of and
problems for the industry regarding any alterations envisaged.
(iii) Variation between RHA's
Question 26 sought opinions on the awareness by respondents of
specified and unspecified variations between health authorities
in contract procedures. Results are shown in Table 9.3. The
unprompted responses were:-
increase in buying guides
bulk purchasing and ward pack requests
calling for samples
lines of communication and awareness
brand names versus generic names
bias towards some companies
information required
timing of communication re tenders/offers etc.
way estimates are expressed - some two year, some one year.
A large majority, 83%, note the variation in starting dates with
smaller majorities referring to variation in number of drugs on
tender forms (73%), durations (70%), complexity of documents (66%)
and relative officer involvements (61%).
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It is hard to justify the existence of some of those differences between
portions, albeit large ones, of a single NHS organisation. In partic-
ular the size, complexity, .duration and staff involved are character-
istics which must have an ideal value, given the relative similarity
between RHA profiles and it is suggested that thought be given to these
by decision-makers.
Examination of the responses according to firms' categories highlights
a gradation from the large sellers to SMall sellers for "involvement of
pharmacists and supplies officers", "complexity of documents" and
"conditions of contract" with the largest firms giving the largest
response in each case.
That is probably a reflection of the greater tendering performed by
larger companies and so those factors are perceived more strongly by
them.
There is a gradation of response to "conditions of contract" depending
on relative value of hospital sales, with those supplying mainly the
community sector (general practice) noting this more than the average
or hospital suppliers. This is probably a response to the difference,
not between RHA's themselves, but between RHA's and general practice.
Hospital sellers find the difference in conditions between RHA's less
noticeable.
(b) Attitudes towards Contracts
(i) Interest in hospital sales and tendering, and satisfaction
with contract system
The questionnaire document was commenced with simple questions, the
first being whether or not the reader had submitted tenders for an
English Health Authority contract within the last two years. This was
the only question which was answered by every respondent so its choice
as lead-in question must be considered justified. Table 9.4 shows the
answers given, with a large majority, almost Q2%, having tendered within
the last two years. This would lead one to believe that drug contracting
is popular with companies, a thought considered later. Statistical
analysis shows that distribution method and response to that question
are Significantly related, the significance being 0.0319, with direct
distributors all responding positively, those with mixed distribution
methods showing a 91% positive response and those who use wholesaler
routes showing an 82% response. This result was expected and probably
reflects the reliance upon the wholesaler himself to tender shown by
several companies who prefer wholesaler distribution.
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Question 1(a) sought to quantify that interest in tendering and the
results are shown in Table 9.5.
A majority, 51%, have submitted 16 or more tenders in the past two years.
A further 20% have submitted 11 to 15 tenders. It must be remembered
that half the RHA's have·two year contracts as opposed to one year ones
organised by six, and so the maximum number of tenders would be about
nineteen for two years.
Question 1(a) confirms the high level of interest apparently shown by
companies toward tendering as displayed in question 1. Statistical
analysis shows a significant (0.0130) relationship between size of
hospital sales and number of tenders submitted. There is a gradation
of interest seen with large firms submitting more tenders than smaller
ones. That .questionnaireresuit would be predictable. Specuiatlon
might give rise to the opinion that the amount of work involved in
completing tender documents dissuades the smaller companies, with
presumably fewer 'staff, from regular tendering. The result of this
must be that the large companies, in terms of hospital sales, are
likely to become larger and the small smaller. A large untapped
reservoir of pharmaceutical goods is likely to develop, as far as
hospitals are concerned, if this suggested link prevails, with the
inherent danger of a monopoly evolving.
The historical perspective adds to the picture of interest in hospital
drug tendering which emerges. Question 2 posed the options of more,.
the same,or less tendering than five years ago with the responses being
shown in Table 9.6. Whereas about half of the respondents 'are sub-
mitting the same number of tenders, about 12% are submitting less, with
31% submitting more.
Apparently tenders have not lost their interest for companies generally.
The only major categories of company to display substantial minority
opinion for less tendering now than five years ago are those who mainly
supply the community sector of the NHS (25%) and those with mixed
distribution methods (24%). Statistical testing showed a significant
(0.0421) relationship between distribution method and present tendering
compared with the past with a considerable body of opinion among direct
distributors that more or the same tendering than in the past is
occurring (97%) against 71 or 72% for the other categories of distri-
bution method. This appears to confirm the finding of question 1 that
tendering is less favoured by non-direct distributors of pharmaceutical
goods and this role of tendering is being carried out for them to a
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greater extent now than five years ago by wholesalers themselves.
The actual satisfaction with the contract system was the subject of
question 3. A range of responses to this question is seen on examin-
ation of Table 9.7.
There is a bias toward dissatisfaction with the contract system with
some 36% expressing a degree of dissatisfaction and some 21% satisfied.
Generic manufacturers are the group which expresses dissatisfaction
most strongly with 13% very dissatisfied and provides a counterweight
to the 13% satisfied. Although only 4% of large hospital sellers
claim to be very dissatisfied, the addition of the 52% stating dis-
satisfaction provides a 56% sample of that group unhappy to some
degree'with the system. Whereas these results are not significant
statistically they must sound a cautionary note to those decision-
makers in the NHS who might be tempted to complacency in their
thoughts on the system.
To add a further dimension to the emerging picture the degree of
importance, irrespective of volume, attached to hospital sales com-
pared to total sales was questioned in number 32. All respondents
claimed they were important to some degree. The most notable result,
though not statistically significant, is seen from examination of
Table 9.8 in which apparently those companies which preferentially
supply hospitals show a much higher response (81%) for "very
important" than average sellers (50%) or community sellers (46%).
This result might have been predicted and helpsoshow the responses
to be reliable and reasonably accurate.
'The reason for the degree of importance, irrespective 'of volume,
attached to hospital sales compared with total sales was the question
posed in number 33. Many respondents, some two thirds of all who
replied, took the opportunity provided to give their reasons for their
view on importance of hospital sales. Those respondents who felt
hospital sales were of marginal importance referred to the volume
of hospital sales being low, despite the clear wording of the
question. Those who felt hospital sales were important or very
important referred again to volume of sales as well as the 'prestige
of selling to hospitals, the encouragement of G.P. sales, the immed-
iate and instantly measurable sales, promotional endorsement and the
motivation of representatives provided.
No further information was forthcoming from that question.
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"(ii) Disadvantages of Coatracts
The disadvantages of contracts were considered under questions 9 and
10. The former listed specific items with space for additional
unprompted ones and the degree to which each was thought a disadvantage
was marked. The results are tabulated in Tables 9.9 to 9.17.
Examination of Table 9.9 shows "formality" as being classed in the
main "not very important". Table 9.10 demonstrates "paperwork" as
being not very important. "Inflexibility" is generally considered
important, as seen from Table 9.11. Table 9.12 shows "impersonal"
to be a marginally important disadvantage. "No guaranteed uptake"
is very important, as seen from Table 9.13. Table 9.14 gives rise
to the opinion that "administratively costly" would be thought to be
a not very important disadvantage of contracts. "Too many contracts'
nationally" is not very important (Table 9.15), "too few contracts
nationally" is not important at all (Table 9. 16) and "organisation of
contract biased in favour of health authority" is generally thought
very or marginally important, as seen from Table 9.17.
Scrutiny of summary Table 9.18 shows "no guaranteed uptake" as being
~hat disadvantage thought to be very important by more respondents
than any other, with 39% noting it at that degree. Next in order of
mention was "bias in favour of health authority" with 24%. For items
considered not a disadvantage at all "too few" received 38% of mentions
with "formal" at 23% and "too many" at 22%. It would appear that
respondents generally feel that contracts should provide for guaranteed
uptake, less bias in favour of the NHS, and less formality. Analysis
of respondents by categories showed that the impersonal nature of
contracts, losing contact with individual hospitals, was related
significantly to both country of origin of supplier and distribution
method. In the case of country of origin the result was highly
significant at 0.0090 and in the !case of distribution method it was
significant (0.0226).
The responses for country of origin show U.K. companies attaching less
importance to the disadvantages implicit in impersonal contracts while
U.S. companies strongly disagree with the term "impersonal" being
applied to contracts. In the case of distribution method companies
who supply direct are more likely (29%) to regard loss of contact
with individual hospitals as being not a disadvantage at all compared
with other companies (4 or 5%). It must be assumed that those
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companies who deal direct feel that the advantages of contracts,
whatever they may be,do not in themselves create an impersonal
relationship with hospitals.
No guaranteed uptake as a disadvantage was significantly related to
products at 0.0141, with proprietary producers in general considering
it an important or very important disadvantage whereas generic
producers regard .it as very important or marginally important. The
reason for this finding can be speculated upon.
Administrative costs are related significantly to country of origin
of companies, with a significance of 0.0125. U.K. companies feel
administrative costs to be of less importance as a disadvantage of
contracts than do U.S. or European firms though in general little
weight is given to this factor by companies in the total sample.
At a significance of 0.0210 distribution method of company is related
to opinion on "too few contracts nationally" as a disadvantage.
Direct suppliers strongly favour more contracts as compared with those
using wholesaler routes.
Contracts' bias toward the NHS is the strongly held view of companies
supplying via wholesalers compared with direct suppliers, though the
finding is not statistically significant.
Whereas question 9 sought a ranking for degree of disadvantage for
each specific item, question 10 sought a ranking of those items for
the greatest degree of importance. The results are demonstrated in
Tables 9.19 to 9.21, and summarised ·in Table 9.22.
"No guaranteed uptake" is shown as being the most important dis-
advantage with 45% noting that as first choice with "inflexibility"
recorded by 16% and "bias in favour of health authority" with 11%.
The list of second most important disadvantages confirms the three
topics uppermost in companies' thoughts.
U.S. companies accord a high score to "too much paperwork" as do
companies with large absolute hospital sales.
Ranking of items listed in question 9 by scoring 3 for the most
important noted in question 10, 2 for second most important and 1 for
third most important produces the following list:-
No guaranteed uptake 195, bias 97, inflexible 90, impersonal 57,
paperwork 52, formality 18, too many 13, administratively costly 11,
too few 2.
The·unprompted replies listed as "others" for questions 9 and 10 were
as follows:-
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Very important
Focuses on price to exclusion of other factors
No meaningful negotiations possible
Omission of certain drugs
Contract not binding
QC - too many duplicating personnel and quality not fully considered
Important
Non standardisation of tender forms
Extreme price competition.
(iii) Advantages of contracts
As a counterweight to the disadvantages, advantages of contracts were
considered earlier in the questionnaire in questions 7 and 8. The
former question required a decision to be made on the degree of
importance to be applied to specific and unprompted advantages.
Table 9.23 shows that the advantage of spin off sales being encouraged
in general practice is considered generally by companies as important.
United States and European companies would think it very important.
Relatively large community suppliers consider it very important (50%
response), average sellers very important/important (76%) and hospital
sellers important 38% or irrelevant 25%. To a degree the result could
be predicted and shows the result to be reliable and reasonably
accurate. That relationship between relative value of sales and
importance of encouragement of G.P. sales was found to be statistically
very significant at 0.0088. Examination of the relationship between
products and view on encouragement ofG.P. sales shows a statistically
very significant relationship at 0.0003. Generic suppliers regard it
as marginally important or totally irrelevant (62%), in contrast to
proprietary producers who feel it is important or very important (76%).
"Administrative saving" is shown in Table 9.24. It is generally
considered a marginally important advantage with a 30% response.
Company profiles do not add much useful information to that description.
"Prescribers' brand loyalty" is generally thought important with 31%
of the responses, as shown in Table 9.25. Generic manufacturers give
it a lower degree of importance than proprietary suppliers as may be
predicted. The relative weight given to very important/important/
marginally important is 34%/29%/15% for proprietary suppliers and
6%/38%/31% for generic manufacturers.
"Predictable usage" is thought in the main to be important, with 33%
of the responses, as seen in Table 9.26. No major conclusions can be
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derived from analysis of company characteristics. "Standardised pack.
sizes" is unimportant as seen from Table 9.27. 29% gave that response.
Degree of importance of standard pack sizes was significantly related
to relative sales at a significance value of 0.0465. Community
suppliers generally consider standardised pack sizes of much more
importance than average sellers, and average sellers more so than
hospital sellers. This is predictable given the markets being catered
for by each group.
Similarly, though not significantly, generic suppliers attach less
importance to that factor than proprietary suppliers.
"Standardised labelling" responses are seen in Table 9.28. It is
generally thought unimportant, with 33% of responses. Hospital sellers
think it less important than community sellers. Likewise generic
suppliers think it less important than proprietary companies. This
must be considered a reflection of the target markets and their needs.
Absence of hospital price negotiation was thought in the main to be
important, the response being 39%. This is seen from perusal of
Table 9.29. No conclusions can be drawn from analysis of the company
characteristics.
Standardised deliveries as an advantage of contracts was thought
generally marginally important, the response being 30%. Examination
of Table 9.30 shows that company characteristics do not add any
further information on this subject. Table 9.31 shows summaries.
When asked to rank the advantages in order of importance the results
seen.in Tables 9.33-34 and Summary 9.35 are produced. "Spin off
sales in general practice" are the most important, at a 35% response
level.
Next in importance are "encouragement of brand loyalty among pre-
scribers" and "obviating individual hospital price negotiation" each-
with a response of 16%. "Predictable usage allowing easier satis-
faction of needs" received 12% of responses. "Administrative saving"
was ranked very low in the list of most important advantages with 6%
of responses, but appeared to be the most popular choice at 23% in
the "third most important" list. "Standardised pack sizes", "labelling"
and "deliveries" are not considered important.
When the responses to questio~ 8 are scored 3 for most important, 2 for
second most important and 1 for third most important, the rank order
developed is the same as that shown above, the scores being G.P. sales
150, Brand loyalty 110, Obviates individual negotiations 88, Predicts
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usage 71, Administrative saving 62, Standardised deliveries 23,
Standardised pack sizes 9, Standardised labelling 1.
Examination of company characteristics and responses to question 8
shows a significant relationship at 0.0215 for products manufactured,
with generic companies giving more weight than proprietary producers
to administrative saving, predictable usage and obviates individual
hospital negotiation (Table 9.33).
In contrast proprietary companies give more weight to G.P. sales
encouragement and brand loyalty encouragement. Those results were
predictable given the sales promotion of branded drugs in general
practice.
Other advantages quoted by respondents in questions 7 and 8 were
as follows:-
Very important
Production scheduling easier and less expensive
Gaining contract award
Sales turnover
Encourages direct buying
Keeps direct account of business - not always known via wholesaler
Improves margin at expense of wholesaler
Important
Improved production planning
Marginally Important
Makes reps job easier.
(iv) Beneficiaries of Contracts
It was hypothesised that any views on contracts held by industry staff
would be coloured by their perception of the beneficiaries of the
contract system and so questions 11 and 12 sought to analyse this
subject.
Question 11 gave four options of party gaining most benefit from the
contract system, "NHS", "Supplier", "Both equally" and "Neither". The
resul ts are shown in Table 9.3.6.
The majority, 55%,suggest the NHS as most benefiting from the drug
contract system, with a further 40% noting both NHS and Supplier or
Neither benefiting ,equally, Only 4% feel the supplier is the most
benefiting party, though one can add'to that the 40% suggesting a
joint benefit.
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Clearly the industry considers itself to be at a distinct disadvantage
in terms of benefit from the system, and this result must be regarded
as an indictment upon the system and demonstrates the need for greater
emphasis to be placed upon the mutual benefit which contracts can and
should bestow~pon both parties.
U.S. owned companies show the strongest opinion of all categories
of firms' owners, with 61% stating that the NHS is benefiting most
32% both or neither parties and 7% the supplier. In contrast: U:K.
suppliers showed 45% the NHS, 45% both or neither and 5% the supplier.
Companies demonstrating average relative sales show a score of 63% for
NHS, 33% for both or neither and 4% for supplier.
Question 12 sought reasons for the·beneficiary answer given. The
question was answered by some seven eighths of respondents. Those who
suggested the NHS as most benefiting from the contract system referred
to lower prices attained by the NHS, the unreliable estimates of uptake,
no guaranteed sales and proven quality of products for NHS. The
results could be summarised by the comment "a distorted balance of
obligations" •
One respondent admitted that the NHS price offered is often below the
supplier's own costs, proof positive of promotional pricing policies
pursued by suppliers.
Those who felt that both the NHS and the supplier gained equal benefit
from the contract system suggested as reasons the guaranteed best prices
and reliability of products for the NHS and the following benefits for
suppliers; guaranteed sales to suppliers, controlled costs and net
returns to companies, economy of scale to companies, higher uptake,
assurance of use, production planning, ability to promote contracted
items and spin off sales.
One supplier referred to both parties benefiting provided the contract
is upheld and no buying off contract occurs. A critical examination of
those reasons promulgated would lead an observer to comment that whereas
contract prices are very often lower than normal trade prices the
presence of a contract does not guarantee the lowest possible prices.
Items on contract are not necessarily of appropriate quality and the
presence of a contract does not automatically confer adequate quality
standards upon drugs. Obviously the award of a contract does not
guarantee sales to suppliers but 'should provide the company with
increased sales. The contract would be most beneficial if it did
guarantee sales and so allow more realistic production planning to firms.
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Those respondents who answered "Neither" as benefiting from the
contract system did so for the following reasons; for the NHS they
are administratively cumbersome, time consuming and cause loss of
special offers, they ·are binding oc the supplier but not on the NHS,
they have an inflexible price structure, they are ineffective, costly
and provide no information on why decisions are made. Several respon-
dents referred to no advantage to any party and one put forward the
view that "we do not contract now and neither the NHS nor us suffer.".
Clearly a wide divergence of opinion is apparent but through all the
answers comes a desire on the part of companies to lower prices in
response to fairer treatment and more flexibility in the system.
A natural sequel to such topics is the aspect of improvements in the
system which is considered next.
(v) Improvements Suggested
Some two thirds of respondents took the opportunity provided by
question 25 to suggest improvements in the drug contract system.
The unprompted answers may be classified under set headings and are
given below.
Standardisation
Conditions, format of documents, integration of contracts and buying
(otherwise known as discount or ongoing) guides, separation of
generic items from proprietaries, procedures, one year with fewer
items, two year duration, dates, duration policies, description of
drugs, absence of·trade names, sample call-up and all prices quoted
to be consistent in excluding or including VAT.
Informa tion
On the membership of the contract committee, the products awarded
contracts, more communication between RHA's and hospitals, register
of contracts personnel of each authority, more realistic estimates,
frequency of deliveries expected should be quoted, more discussion
on service, quality and efficacy, less conflict between contracts
and formularies, smaller committee composed of knowledgeable people
beyond reproach and information should be provided to confirm receipt
by the RHA of completed documents or samples.
Clarification and Simplification
Less paperwork, easier clearer forms, inclusion of company product
name, a simple offer to supplier rather than formal legalistic one-
sided contract, tender document may contain 500 items when only one
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or two are produced by many firms (one RHA before contract invites
offers and tender documents only contain those items), and packs of
offers differ from those on tender forms.
More flexibility for suppliers
More loyalty to patent originator once patent expires, facility for
several contractors for one item, more customer flexibility, oppor-
tunity for interim tenders for new products or prices, acceptance
of guaranteed price based on minimum order value, negotiation,
variance between trade and contract prices omitted, complete
dissolution of contract system, less centralisation, quicker response
to new products/packs, recourse to personal representation and samples
required only when absolutely needed.
Less flexibility for NHS
Should be binding on both parties, 80% of items should be covered
allowing 20% for new products suggested by either party, realisation
that best prices with "standard" packs and requests for reduction in
price for "one drop" or "bulk" orders increase costs, guaranteed
quant Lty-, emphasis on standing orders to reduce costs and admini-
stration, reduction 'in delivery points, reduction. in number of
buying points, less frequent deliveries, payment before delivery and
centralisation of the whole system so that company is only dealing
with one body at one time.
Some of the suggested improvements appear relatively difficult to
implement. Many, on the other hand, could, it is thought, be
pursued successfully. The comments under "more flexibility" and
"less flexibility" are not mutually exclusive, many possessing much
merit.
It is suggested that detailed consideration be given to those
volunteered suggestions for improvement of the drug contract system,
some of which would undoubtedly be of advantage to the supplier
with little or no benefit to the NHS, and others of which would be
to the advantage of both parties.
(c) Pricing and Tendering
(i) Inter-Regional variation in price
Question 5 asked whether different prices were quoted to the various
RHA's. Responses are shown in Table 9.37. Question 5{a), aimed
at those who did not differentially price, asked if respondents knew
or believed that other companies differentially priced. Answers
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·are shown in Table 9.38.
Whereas the question was aimed only at the 70% who claimed they did
not differentially price themselves, nine of the "yes" respondents
to question 5 answered question 5(a).
It is apparent that 29% of respondents admit to differential pricing
with 58% knowing or believing others to carry it out. This infor-
mation bears out data collated by the author which point to companies
optimising their profits by adjusting their prices to the various
RHA's.
Analysis of the data generated by questions 5 and 5(a) under
characteristics of respondent provides information that, compared
with respondents generally, British companies are more likely to
quote different prices and European ones are less likely. For all
companies a majority claim not to quote different prices.
Community sellers show a substantial minority, 44~ quoting
different prices and direct distributors again showing a substan-
tial minority, 31%, as quoting different prices. Reasons for these
results can be speculated upon.
United States based firms, though not particularly noticeable among
those quoting different prices, nevertheless show a substantial
minority, 32%, as knowing it occurs. British firms,though heavily
represented, at 35%, among differential pricers, are almost equally
represented, 30%, among those claiming neither to know nor believe
differential pricing occurs.
(ii) Factors influencing price
The factor~ taken into consideration by companies in their offers
to regions were considered in questions 6(a) and 6(b), the former
seeking those factors considered, the latter the single most important
factor. Results are shown in Tables 9.39 and 9.40.
The I!others" conform to four general headings. They-are:-
(a) Competition/market factors 8% of responses ~ignificant
for relative value of hospital sales},
(b) type of packs ordered 2% of responses
(c) gaining contract award/requirement
for volume at prevailing prices 4% of responses (significant
for absolute value of hospital sales)
(d) each contract treated the same 1% of responses
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·As shown those factors which loom large, in the expres~p.d opinions
.of respondents, when price. offers are ,being formulated by firms are,
in order of precedence:-
U) "estimated uptake 63% of respondents
(11) duration of contract 57% " "
(iii) total volume of Single order 52% " "
and (iv) actual previous uptake 44% " "
Those factors of some importance to respondents are:-
(v) number of delivery points
(vi) number of buying pOints
29% of respondents
21% " "
Those considered of very little consequence in offers are:-
(vii) .population served
(viii) competition/market factors
(ix) geographical 'spread of regton
(x) need for business to be acquired
and (xi) type of packs' ordered
Examination of responses for.the "single most
again estimated uptake as the most important
single order as the next in importance.
Statistical analysis of the responses provided the data shown in
Tables' 9.41 to 9.45.
Table 9.41 shows that the absolute value or hospital sales influences
response to duration of contract and the sigltificance is 0.0192.
Clearly smaller companies accord significantly more consideration to
duration of the contract 1noffers than do their medium sized or
larger counterparts. To some extent the loss or gain of business for
, .
an app~eciable length of time might have been predicted to play a
more, dominant role among small compani~~ than among bigger ones •.
The loss of a contract for a small company is more likely to have a
harmful effect,than for a larger one •
..
8% of respondents
8% It "
6% " "
4% It "
2% " "
impor.tant factor" shew
with total volume of
, '
l'a,ble9.42 shows that the type of products ·sold has a bearing on
response to geographical. spread of region with the raw ·signi.ficance
being 0.0162.·
Corrected ~ignificance wa~ 0.0691. Generic manufacturers consider
geographical· spread of region, including resulting delivery costs,
1n offer price formulation and the opinion is significantly di~ferent
from those companies which in the main supply proprietary ite~s.
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TABLE 9.41: RESPONDENTS' ABSOLUTE VALUE OF HOSPITAL SALES AND
CONSIDERATION OF CONTRACT DURATION IN PRICE DETERMINATION
Response Sales Sales £1 Sales <£1
>£2.5 to ,,£2.5 million'
million million
52% 58 24
48 42 16
Duration of contract
not considered
Duration of contract
considered
TABLE 9.4~: RESPONDENTS' PRODUCTS AND, CONSIDERATION OF REG~ONS' ,
GEOGRAPHICAL SPREAD IN PRICE DETERMINATION
.,-Response Proprietary Non-proprietary'
Producer Producer
Geographical spread not
considered 91% 81
'Geogr,aphical spread considered 3 19
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TABLE 9.43 RESPONDENTS' ABSOLUTE VALUE OF HOSPITAL SALES AND
CONSIDERATION OF ACTUAL PREVIOUS UPTAKE IN PRICE
DETERMINATION
Response Sales Sales £1 . Sales <£1
)£2.5 to £2.5 million
million million
Actual previous uptake not
considered
Actual previous uptake
considered
59% 79 36
41 21 64
Responses depicted in Table 9.43 show that the absolute volume of
hospital sales influences the response to actual previous uptake
being considered in price offers and this is very significant at
0.0052. Medium sized companies (in terms of hospital business)
generally accord previous sales figures little importance. The
large companies accord more importance to that factor with the
smallest ones giving it most consideration. The reason for this
must remain in the realm of conjecture. Whatever the explanation
if estimates of usage are inaccurate, as appears to be the finding
referred to in the next section, the actual previous uptakes would
be a more reliable guide for manufacturers to possible future usage.
It might be thought that in such an environment a small manufacturer
could be more harmed by excess production than the larger ones.
TABLE 9.44: RESPONDENTS' RELATIVE VALUE OF HOSPITAL SALES AND
CONSIDERATION OF COMPETITION AND MARKET FACTORS IN
PRICE DETERMINATION
Response Mainly Average Mainly
Community Sales Hospital
Sales Sales
100% 79 94
21 6
Competition not considered
Competition considered
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Examination of Table 9.44 shows that the relative value of hospital
sales influences consideration given to competition in price offers
and has a significance of 0.0220. Those companies who rely to a
large extent on the hospitals fo~ their sales give little thought
to competition or market factors when they formulate their price
offers. In a similar way those selling little to hospitals give
apparently no consideration to competition from other companies.
Those who sell to both sectors of the NHS give a small amount of
thought to market forces. In view of the relatively small number
of respondents who remarked on this subject this factor is not
considered worthy of major emphasis.
TABLE 9.45: RESPONDENTS' ABSOLUTE HOSPITAL SALES AND CONSIDERATION
OF NEED FOR BUSINESS IN PRICE DETERMINATION
Response Sales
>£2.5
million
Sales £1
to £2.5
million
Sales <£1
million
Need for business not
considered 100% 88
Need for business
considered 12
Table 9.45 shows the percentages of the various sales
100
categories.
The significance of the results is 0.0205, but in view of the small
number of companies who suggested the response, three in all, it is
thought unworthy of further consideration.
Analysis of responses by company characteristics in Table 9.39
provides some additional insight into their behaviour. U.K. firms
attach less importance than foreign'firms to'total volume of single
order in price offers. Small sellers attach more weight to volume
of single order than larger ones.
,"Number of buying points" is of more concern to U.S. companies than
U.K. and of more concern to U.K. ones than European ones. It is
twice as much of concern (28%) to hospital sellers than community ones
(14%) with average sellers showing a 21% response. Generic sellers
give this subject a 31% response compared with proprietary producers
at 19%.
Twice as many U.K. companies as foreign ones (15% compared with 6 or
7%) consider population served as being important. "Estimated uptake"
which is the biggest single consideration is the subject of question
16 in which it is seen that estimates are reputed to be inaccurate.
e86
Clearly a contradiction is presented which is difficult to resolve.
Company characteristics and responses to question 6(b), which seeks
the single most important factor considered in price offers, add little
information to that for companies generally. The results are shown in
Table 9.40.
(iii) Estimates of Uptake
The accuracy and usefulness of uptake estimates to companies were
discussed in questions 16 and 17 with results shown in Tables 9.46
and 9.47. Some 62% of respondents describe estimates as being
"inaccurate" or "very inaccurate" as contrasted with 33% suggesting
them to be "accurate" or "very accurate".
In general Table 9.46 shows that U.K. companies regard estimates,
perhaps somewhat chivalrously, as being more accurate than the general
sample and more accurate than inaccurate, while European companies
regard them as more inaccurate than the general sample and more
inaccurate than accurate.
In view of the large amount of time, though unquantified, expended
by NHS staff in gathering such data, the industry responses must be
regarded as a major criticism of the drug contract system and a waste
of scarce human resources. However inaccurate, the question 6
responses pOint to the usefulness of estimates in price offers.
Estimates' usefulness appears generally acknowledged, as shown in
Table 9.47 with 62% noting them as "very" or "fairly" useful as against
35% stating "not of much use" or "of no use at all".
In an attempt to correlate perceived accuracy of estimates and their
usefulness a contingency table was prepared and is demonstrated in
Table 9.48. A chi-square test was considered but rejected as
inappropriate owing to the limited data in some cells. Nevertheless
some inferences can be drawn from an examination of that Table.
Whereas a sole respondent described estimates as being very accurate
no attempt was made to describe their usefulness. Generally, as
predicted, those who felt estimates to be accurate thought them
useful to some extent, whereas those who thought them inaccurate or
very inaccurate showed no clear view on their usefulness.
Combining some results a 2 x 2 contingency table is produced and the
data presented, as shown in Table 9.49, allows a chi-square test
to be performed. The chi-square value is 7.976 with a significance
of <0.005. The results are significantly different from those
theoretically expected and it is seen from Table 9.49 that a greater
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TABLE 9.48: RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTION OF ACCURACY AND USEFULNESS OF
ESTIMATES
Very Accurate Inaccurate Very No Total
Accurate Inaccurate Response
Very useful 8 6 16
Fairly
useful 15 20 36
Not of much
use 4 13 3 21
Of no use 4 4 8
No response 3
TOTAL 27 43 9 4 84
TABLE 9.4~ RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTION OF ACCURACY AND USEFULNESS OF
. ESTIMATES
Very accurate or accurate Inaccurate or.very
inaccurate
Very or fairly
useful 23 27
Not of much use
or of no use 4 24
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than expected proportion of respondents apply the terms useful and
inaccurate to some degree, whereas, a much smaller than expected
proportion consider estimates both accurate and useless. However,
accuracy is predictably associated with usefulness and vice versa.
It would appear that despite their inaccuracy many companies find
estimates of some use.
United States firms think them less useful than companies generally,
U.K. companies more useful than generally. This latter response
may reflect their perception of estimates' accuracy.
(iv) Price Discussions
Price discussion was the subject of questions 13, 14 and 15.
Question 13 asked respondents to denote the number of man days spent
discussing contract prices with each Health Authority in a year and
the responses are shown in Table 9.50.
It shows that on average a little less than four man days effort is
expended by each company in price discussions with each Health
Authority in a year. Respondents answering "more than three days"
were provided with space to enter an ,estimate. Sixteen of the
twenty one wrote in a figure the range extending from 5 to 30 man
days. The actual responses were 5, 5, 5, 5 to 6, 7, 7 to 8, 10, 10,
10, 10 to 12, 10 to 15, 15, 15, 15, 20, 30 man days. Clearly a
wide divergence of opinions is apparent.
Company characteristics show a bias in favour of more price
discussions by United States firms than those based elsewhere.
Proprietary manufacturers tend to spend more time on price discussions
with health authorities than non-proprietary firms. Perhaps this is
a reflection of the desire of branded drugs' suppliers to encourage
their drugs' inclusion in contracts to promote their sales in general
practice.
Direct sellers spend more time discussing prices than those supplying
through other means. Perhaps those who distribute through wholesalers
tend to rely on the wholesalers to engage in price discussions on
their behalf.
Question 14 broached the subject of the view of the respondents on the
quantity of price discussions and the results are demonstrated in
Table 9.51.
Table 9.51 shows that no clear-cut opinion exists, with the majority
feeling the amount of price discussion is about right with a slight
tendency towards the opinion "too little".
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Analysis of the results in terms of company characteristics did not
provide any further insight into company staff thoughts or behaviour.
Analysis of a comparison of responses to questions 13 and 14 provided
the results demonstrated in Table 9.5~. Chi-square tests showed no
statistical significance in the results attained p having a value of
< 0.8. No relationship can be said to exist between perceived price
discussion and perceived adequacy of such discussion. Hypothesis 4
was shown .t.o .beyalida ted"for suppliers •
Question 15 wished to pursue the reasons for the opinions expressed
on whether time spent on price discussions with Health Authorities was
"too much", "about right", or "too little". Over half the respondents
answered the question.
Those who felt it was "too 11ttLe" did so for the following r-eaeonsr
the frequent lack of pooling of company offers information because of
lack of co-operation between NHS pharmacists and supplies officers,
the lack of encouragement to price flexibility accorded by the terms
and conditions of contracts, the absence of negotiations caused by
few regions having staff able to discuss details outside a standard
price discount tender, the difficulty in obtaining information,
absence of personal communications and involvement with RHA staff, the
disproportionate time spent promoting drugs to prescribers, lack of
time for both parties to explore all priCing options, lack of access
to NHS committees to present case, lack of ability to attain award of
contracts, the reluctance on the p~rt of health authorities to be
approached by the industry and the desire for more opportunity to
negotiate.
Those who felt it was "about right" put forward the following reasons:
the time spent was reasonable, there was no merit in wasting NHS or
company's time repeating information already provided, and minimum
negotiation was needed. Several referred to the time quoted in the
previous questions 13 and 14 as including all the time spent on the
documentation of contracts. Other comments included the fact that
more time could create price confusion, both parties need to understand
each other's reasoning and the need to educate supplies officers in
therapeutiCS, and the "time was sufficient given the absence of real
discussion. Respondents feeling that the time spent on price
discussion was "too much" referred to the following reasons: excessive
amounts of paperwork involved, the absence of any company advantage in
price discussions, the irrelevance of contracts, the absence of
294-
TABLE 9.52: NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS WHO EXPRESSED A VIEW ON ADEQUACY
OF PRICE DISCUSSION AND PERCEIVED TIME SPENT ON
PRICE DISCUSSION
TIME·SPENT ON PRICE
DISCUSSION CONSIDERED
TO BE
Too About Too Total
Much Right Little
Price discussion
< 1 man day 1 14 4 19
Price discussion
1 man day 1 7 3 11
Price discussion
2 to 3 man days 4 14 4 22
Price discussion
> 3 man days 14 6 21
Total 7 49 17 73
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decisions, the referral of everything to "faceless men", the fact that
time is better spent elsewhere and the bias inherent in the system
against the supplier.
(v) Communications regarding tenders, offers and contracts
Communications between Health Authority and suppliers were discussed
in questions 18 and 19 and the responses are shown in Tables 9.53
and 9.54.
Table 9.53 shows that in general the period during which the company
must complete its tender document is considered about right. Once
the tender has been returned it is generally felt that there is too
long a gap until the offer is accepted (or rejected). Once the offer
has been accepted the period until the company is ·informed of acceptance
is generally thought to be about right with 54% responses but with a
substantial minority of 33%..for "too long".
To comply with the desires of the companies the NHS would have to
speed up the deliberation process on tenders and once the decision on
contract award is made the company should more speedily be informed.
This finding confirms complaints from companies that in some instances
contract orders had been received from NHS hospitals prior to the
company itself being told of its tender being accepted.
Analysis of the results by characteristics shows that those companies
showing a higher than general response for "too long" a time period
from tender return to offer acceptance are United States based, large,
community and generic suppliers. By contrast the following companies
show higher responses for "abolitright" than "too long"; United
Kingdom based, medium sized and those supplying via wholesalers.
As a sequel to the previous subject it was thought useful to seek from
the respondents their views on the ideal time scales. Examination of
Table 9.514 shows that ideally the average company would wish to see a
time scale of about 4 to 5 weeks in which to complete the tender
document, about 4 weeks in which Health Authorities collate the
information, deliberate upon it and award contracts, and about 2 to 3
weeks following offer acceptance the company would be informed.
United Kingdom companies are more generous to the NHS in suggesting a
longer period for tender return to acceptance than companies generally.
In a similar way they favour a longer gap between offer accertance and
notification.
'Under the question of improvements (question 25) note is made of the
. 296
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desire expressed to receive notification of receipt by the RHA of
tender forms and/or samples. Lack of such information coufd deprive
the NHS of a source of supply and deprive a company of substantial
business.
Whereas these ideals may not be feasible for Health Authorities,
information on them may be of some help in remedying the more traumatic
experiences which some companies claim to have undergone.
It was thought instructive to compare those ideal time periods with
the practical reality of a typical RHA's arrangements. As outlined
in the secondary research, in 1984 the Mersey RHA allowed four weeks
from issue of tender to return. Allowing for postal delays the
company has about 3~ weeks in which to examine, consider, complete
and return the documents. Though identical to that of 1982, it was
a reduction from the theoretical five 'weeks allowed in 1980. This
time period would be thought too short by 57 per cent of companies.
Whereas in 1982.eight weeks was thought sufficient, in 1984 Mersey
RHA required more than ten weeks to compile the information received
and ,decide upon its acceptances. This was almost double the 5~ week
period alloted four years previously, effectively requiring companies
to hold prices stable much longer. Suppliers think that four weeks
would be ideal, no respondent feeling that a period such as ten weeks
is ideal, and this is confirmed by the majority view that the NHS
devotes too much time to this portion of the procedure.
After one week has elapsed Mersey RHA informs companies of the outcome
of the deliberations. This time period is viewed by companies as
being about right as ideally it should be about two or three weeks.
From the suppliers' vantage point passage of years has seen a
deterioration of communication time scales but the NHS is effectively
securing longer price stability and greater opportunity for quality
analyses of products offered.
(vi) Retendering
Retendering was the topic of questions 20 and 21. Those circumstances
posed in question 20 requiring retender during an existing contract
period were analysed and shown in Table 9.55. So as to, hopefully,
elicit a more realistic response the question was deliberately worded
"circumstances affecting a competitor" since this phrase was thought
to make the respondent reply more objectively than if he had been
asked a more general question •
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An unprompted answer was "significant proC:uct development" with 1% of
respondents proposing it.
Space was allowed f~r respondents to denote reasons new products were
found unsatisfactory and nine of the respondents took the opportunity
to record them. They were quality (3 responses), adverse drug
reactions (2 responses), any (2 responses), out of specification (1
response) and packaging/formulation etc. (1 response).
Table 9.55 shows that a large majority of respondents favour retend-
ering when suppliers give poor service or deliveries (74%), bank-
ruptcy or total inability to supply (73%) and quality of drug not
matching pre-award samples (70%). Moderate majority approval was
given for retendering if price increase request was unacceptable (61%)
and product subsequently shown not to specification (58%). The other
categories attracted minority support. As seen the companies adopt a
constructive, ethical approach to behaviour expected of competitors,
and implicitly of themselves, once awarded a contract.
The poor service/deliveries criterion for retendering showed a
significant (0.0385) response for country of origin of company.
Foreign owned companies give more weight to supplier service than do
British ones, with United States manufacturers being more conscious
of this factor than European ones. Reasons for this significant
result might be speculated on. It could be thought that because of
their non-British dimension', foreign firms therefore feel at a
disadvantage and so try harder to please the customer. Alternatively
it might be a reflection of the respective home markets where more
emphasis might be given to service in America and Europe than in
Britain.
The unsatisfactory new product requirement for retendering is
significantly related to method of delivery. The Significance is
0.0336.
Companies who supply via wholesalers consider unsatisfactory new
products as warranting retender more than do those who supply direct
with the least support being given by those who supply in both ways.
No satisfactory explanation for this finding can be provided. Product
not to specification as a requirement for retendering was found to
significantly relate to type of products produced by the company.
The significance is 0.0307.
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Proprietary manufacturers give significantly more weight to drugs
conforming to specification than do their generic manufacturer
counterparts. Proprietary manufacturers have long claimed that they
rather than generic firms give more emphasis to quality of products
and the above finding gives support to that assessment.
The arrival of a new significant drug showed a significant relationship
to three criteria of companies. They were (i) relative value of
hospital sales, (ii) type of products and (iii) distribution method.
Table 9.55 points to the significant (0.0344) relationship between
relative sales and views on arrival of new significant drugs. For
those companies which rely heavily on hospital sales 75% of their
respondents feel that the arrival of a new significant drug does not
warrant retender whereas a majority of those whose business is not
biased toward hospitals fee~that such a development does warrant
retender. Clearly companies resent the threat posed by new drug
developments and the potential loss of business likely to manifest
itself.
Table 9.55 shows the significant (0.0187) relationship between those
two variables, category of products and·views on arrival of new
significant drug. Generic manufacturers feel very strongly that such
a new drug does not require retendering, whereas the other companies
have mixed feelings on the subject. As in the previous ~ection those
relying on hospital business, in this case the generic firms, resent
the intrusion into the market of newcomers.
Table 9.55 shows the significant (0.0386) relationship between
distribution method and opinions on arrival of new drug. No valid
reason for the finding can be promulgated.
Views on significant change in prescribing habits were found to bear,
if raw chi-square is used~ a significant relationship (0.0280) to
type of products. Corrected chi-square shows a lower significance
of 0.0589.
Generic manufacturers feel very strongly (94% against 6%) that
significant changes in prescribing should not require retendering
whereas proprietary manufacturers express the same view much less
strongly (66% against 34%). Again, as shown previously, resentment
is aroused against new arrivals or prescribing changes which are
strongly resisted by those with most to lose, such as generic
manufacturers.
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Question 21 viewed the retender process in price increase terms with
specific price increase ranges denoted. As in the previous question
reference in the question to "competitors" was deliberately made to
encourage objective opinions. The results are seen in Table 9.56. A
majority, 64%, felt that price increases of up to 10% should be
tolerated before retendering occurs. Further examination of the
responses shows that non-proprietary manufacturers were generally more
inclined to allow price rises of greater than 20% than any other
category of Company.
(vii) Methods of reducing prices
Restrictions on Health Authorities as a means of reducing prices were
referred to in Question 24 in which specific points were listed and
respondents were asked to express their degree of acceptance of them
by allowing no price reductions, up to 10% and over 10%.
By their nature the price reductions are mutually exclusive, and so
ticks in more than one column were replaced by the highest price
discount ticked in all cases, except the category "none", where more
than one tick was replaced by that for the lowest price discount
marked. The responses are shown in Table 9.51, and summarised in Table
9.58. Thus a guaranteed drug quantity uptake would be-Most popular
with the industry, being welcomed by 76% of companies. Almost as
welcome would bea reduction in delivery paints showing 68% response,
less frequent deliveries at 62%, and reduced number of buying points
with 58%. Opinion was more divided over payment at the beginning of
the financial year, in other words before delivery, (49%), and two year
rather than one year contracts (49%).
If the topic is looked at from the viewpoint of scope for price
reductions rather than popularity as ab~ve then a slightly different
picture emerges and this is shown below.
More than 10% Reductions
Payment before delivery
Guaranteed drug quantity uptake
Less frequent deliveries
Reduced number of delivery points
Two year rather than one year contract
Reduced number of buying points
9.5%
7.1%
6.0%
6.0%
3.6%
2.4%
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Up to 10% Reductions
Guaranteed drug quantity uptake
Reduced number of delivery pOints
38.1%
31.0%
Less frequent deliveries 23.8%
Payment before delivery 23.8%
Reduction in number of buying points 19.0%
Two year rather than one year contract 10.7%
What emerges clearly is that if health authorities were prepared to
pay for drugs, the usage of many of which could be readily predicted,
before delivery at the beginning of the financial year, then
considerable savings would accrue. Obviously accountants' advice
would be sought but it would appear to be a source of substantial
savings to the NHS. Even if some unknown factor 'militated against
that measure the mere guarantee of buying specific uptakes would
result in savings from over 7% of companies and those savings would
be more than 10%.
Whereas those companies with the largest absolute hospital sales do
not appear interested in giving more than 10% discounts in response to
guaranteed uptakes or payment before delivery, medium sized and smaller
firms would do so in 8 to 9% of cases for guaranteed uptake and 13 to
15% of cases for payment before delivery. Those two factors, guaran-
teed uptake and payment before delivery at the beginning of the
financial year pose no cost implication problems to the NHS and so it
is suggested that the matter be given considered but urgent attention
by the health authorities. Those companies in the medium and small
hospital sales' category represent 36% by value of hospital sales.
Assuming that implementation of either payment before delivery or
guaranteed uptake occurred and resulted in savings of only 10%,
probably an underestimate, from 10% of those companies the result.
would be the release of about three quarters of a million pounds from
the drug bill to other pressing needs. Similarly other savings are
possible but they may have cost implications.
Reduction in frequency of deliveries may require investment in greater
stocks and storerooms; reduction in number of delivery paints may
require investment in buildings for stores; reduction in number of
buying points may require re-deployment of buying staff; and
implementation of two year rather than one year contracts may have cost
implications that have not previously been quantified.
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It is suggested that all those factors be investigated scrupulously.
Statistical analysis pOinted to a significant relationship, at
p.: 0.0405, between relative sales and opinion on guaranteed drug
quantity uptake as a means of reducing prices. A large proportion
(50%) of community sellers would offer no reduction in price whereas
fewer (21 or 22%) mixed or hospital sellers view price reductions for
guaranteed uptake in that way. This response reflects the relative
perception by sellers of the importance of the hospital market, and
the fact that a company, however large or small, that is less heavily
dependent on hospital sales will be less adversely affected by failure
to take up the estimated demand. Those companies most likely to offer
savings of more than 10% for ·guaranteed drug quantity uptake are U.S.
based. (13%), medium sized (8%), small sized (9%), community suppliers
(11%), hospital sellers (9%), and those distributing via wholesalers
(11%)•
There was found to be a significant relationship (p : 0.0334) between
country of origin and views on reduction of buying points to reduce
prices. 33% of European-based companies compared to the average of
19% suggest they are likely to reduce prices ~y up to 10%. There is
a suggestion, though not marked, at 1%, that United States based
companies in general appear most prepared to offer reductions of
greater than 10%.
British companies, while welcoming such a change are more cautious in
the scale of price reductions they are prepared to offer and apparently
are not prepared to offer any reductions. Medium sized companies appear
willing to offer greater than 10% reductions in8% of cases.
Reduction in delivery points would be more likely to produce discounts
of more than 10% from community sellers (11%) and United States based
concerns (10%).
Less frequent deliveries would encourage discounts of more than 10%
from European and hospital supplying companies (9%).
Payment before delivery apparently would result in price falls of more
than 10% offered by U.S. based companies (13%), European ones (12%),
medium sized concerns (13%), small companies (15%), average sellers
(13%), proprietary suppliers (12%), and companies distributing through
wholesalers (18%).
Lengthening contract duration (for those regions retendering each year)
would result in offers of more than 10% discount made by U.S. based
companies (1%), medium sized companies (8%), community sellers (7%)
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and direct distributors (9%).
As seen a profile could be built up to demonstrate the pharmaceutical
manufacturer most likely to respond to efforts to.reduce prices. The
responses show considerable scope for such savings which would re2dily
be achieved.
(d) Patents
Patents were discussed in questions 27 and 28. The former sought
information on how useful contract awards were considered for patented
drugs compared with unpatented ones. The latter listed specific bene-
fits which the respondent could tick if considered applicable to
patented drugs governed by a contractual purchase agreement.
The results of those responses are shown in Table 9.59 and Table 9.60'
respectively.
Examination of Table 9.59 shows that for drugs under patent, inclusion
in a contract would be of little use, with some 10% noting it as being
of use. To that figure must be added the 49% responding that a contract
award was of use for both types of product. But the balance is in
favour of contract award being of more use for unpatented drugs with
a 37% response.
Company characteristic analysis provides little further information on
this topic.
The specific benefits for patented drugs being included in a contract
are shown in Table 9.60 with "prand loyalty encouraged" showing 76%
of responses, "G.P. sales indirectly encouraged" and "obviates need for
individual price negotiation at hospital level for each drug" both
showing a 63% response. Next in popularity is "predictable usage of
drug and so needs are more easily satisfied" with 46% of responses.
Less popular are "standardised deliveries" and "standardised pack
sizes" both with 17% of responses and "standardised labelling" showing
11% responses.
Additional subjects written in by respondents were, with 1% response
for each, as follows:- consistency of treatment between hospital and
community, encourages direct buying, reduces unnecessary involvement
of wholesalers, product endorsed/correctly used early in life cycle,
and indicates confidence in the therapeutic use of product which
G.P.'s value.
Brand loyalty encouragement is significantly related to three
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· characteristics. These are (i) Company country of origin (ii) Relative
value of sales and (iii) Products.
(i) The relationship of country of origin is at a significance level
of 0.0286. United States companies respond 87% compared with 55% for
U.K. firms and 79% for European ones. Clearly foreign companies
tend 'to understand promotional sales to hospitals and the benefits of
encouraging G.P. prescribing through consultant referral, even though
it may require lower selling prices under a contractual arrangement
to hospitals.
(ii) Brand loyalty encouragement is significantly related to relative
value of sales, the significance being 0.0157. Those companies
whose products are sold preferentially to general practice record a
response of 89%, compared with 83% for average sellers and 59% for
those selling preferentially to hospitals. This result may be
predicted given the emphasis to brand loyalty prevalent in the general
practice sector of the NHS.
(iii) Brand-loyalty encouragement is very significantly related to
products sold with a significance of 0.0002. Proprietary producers
respond 85% to generic suppliers 38%. This is a predictable result,
points to the validity of the subjective decision on products taken at
the outset, and shows that responses are realistic and accurate.
Generic suppliers are little interested in brand loyalty and wish to
see it curtailed, whereas proprietary suppliers with a high investment
in branded products seek to recoup costs by encouraging brand
prescribing~
Encouragement of G.P. sales shows considerable variation in popularity
depending on company characteristics. It is seen to be significantly
related at 0.0454 to company country of,origin and distribution at
0.0424 and very significantly related to both relative value of sales
at 0.0006 and products at 0.0081. With a 73% response European firms
are most likely to consider G.P. sales encouragement as a benefit of
contract award for patented drugs compared with a slightly smaller
response, 68%, by United States based suppliers and a much smaller
response 40% by U.K. firms. Foreign firms appear to have a better
developed appreciation of the total U.K. drugs market than their
British counterparts.
Relative value of hospital sales shows a similar relationship to
"G.P. sales encouraged" as it did to "brand loyalty encouraged" with
315
82% response from community sellers, 75% from average sellers and
38% from hospital sellers. This result was predictaole,as was that
for relationship to products. Proprietary producers respond 71% as
opposed to the 31% of generic suppliers. Direct suppliers are
considerably less likely to consider G.P. sales' encouragement as a
benefit than other companies. The responses were 49% as opposed to
68% for.·companies utilising wholesalers and 81% for both routes. A
possible reason for this relationship is that:the presence on a whole-
saler's shelves of a brand of drug may influence the wholesaler to
encourage its dispensing in general practice. This may be a topic
worthy of further exploration.
The advantage of absence of need for individual hospital price
negotiation on patented drugs if included in contracts was related
significantly at 0.0492 to country of origin of respondent company.
Foreign companies at 70 or 71% responses are more likely to feel this
to be a benefit than United Kingdom firms which responded at 40%. The
conclusions to be derived from this finding are similar to those
presented previously. The apparently greater awareness on the part.
of non-U.K. companies of the total drug market makes the loss of
personal contact with hospitals of little concern to those foreign
firms. They suggest the advantages of inclusion of their patented
drugs in a contract heavily outweigh those personal contact losses.
Scrutiny of Table 9.60 and comparison with Tables 9.23 to.9.30 which
showed the results of question 7, provide insigh~s into convictions
\
on patented and unpatented drugs.
Although it may not immediately be apparent, the benefits listed
in question 28 for patented drugs are identical to those included as
applying for drugs generally as shown in question 7, but their
sequence within the q4estions was deliberately altered. The scores
for those who felt the specific item to be very important, important
or marginally important in question 7 are shown in Table 9.61
against those noting it as a benefit in question 28.
Generally, as predicted from question 27 (Table 9.59), a higher score
is derived for all drugs than patented ones. A notable exception is
brand loyalty which appears of almost equal consequence for patented
and all drugs.
It is suggested that the brand loyalty engendered among prescribers
is a major preoccupation for drug manufacturers. Inclusion of a
patented drug for which there is no competing brand is likely to
316
TABLE 9.61: BENEFITS OF INCLUSION OF DRUG IN CONTRACT AND RESPONSES.
FOR PATENTED AND ALL DRUGS
Benefits of Contract All Drugs Patented Drugs
Brand loyalty 77.5% 76.2%
G.P. Sales encouraged 80.9 63.1
Standardised deliveries 47.7 16.7
Administrative saving 59.6 20.2
Standardised pack sizes 40.5 16.7
.Standardised labelling 29.8 10.7
Predictable usage 72.6 46.4 ..
Obviates hospital negotiation 75.0 63.1
317
provide for the supplier loyalty to their brand which can only mean
spin-off benefits in general practice. This is alluded to in the
relatively high score for patented drugs under the description "G.P.
sales encouraged".
Those findings confirm the previously mentioned ones and serve to
place patents in the appropriate context of NHS drug sales as a whole,
rather than the more limiting arena of hospital drug supplies.
(e) Deliveries
Servicing of a contract was included in the survey for two reasons;
firstly to determine any influence of delivery on contract operation,
and secondly to validate or disprove the questionnaire responses
since the method of delivery was accurately known. Questions 29 and
30 asked for preferences of delivery method, and, if that varied, those
factors influencing one or other type of delivery. The results are
tabulated in Tables 9.62 and 9.63.
Scrutiny of Table 9.62 shows a majority, 61%.claiming to deliver'
direct, 19% through wholesalers and 18% variable. Breakdown into
categories shows the predictable result which helped validate the
survey. Delivery route subjectively preferred and responses according
to route objectively derived were related very significantly. The level
of significance was 0.0000. In other words there is a certainty of
more than 99.99% that those two are related not by chance. The
questionnaire responses were therefore validated.
Question 30 analysed reasons for particular delivery routes.
Table 9.63 shows the responses which point to small order size and
inaccessibility of hospital heavily favouring wholesaler routes. On
the other hand product limited shelf life and extremely high unit cost
favour direct delivery.
Other unprompted responses were as follows ;'-
Favouring direct delivery
Products under major promotion
Product range and local factors
Special pricing
Large orders
Use of specialised product
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Favouring wholesaler delivery
High transport costs (e.g. heavy low cost items)
Identical competitor product
Stock shortages
Product range and local factors
Urgent delivery
As seen "Product range and local factors" included in both lists was
in fact one response favouring neither route in particular but.
obviously varying. Unfortunately the respondent failed to identify
which products and which local factors would favour use of one route
or the other.
Statistical analysis of the results showed a significant relationship
between objective route of sales and subjective responses of route for
extremely high cost items. The significance was 0.0112. Of those
objective wholesaler users, 7% favoured direct deliveries (companies
generally responded 19%) and 11% wholesalers (compared with companies
generally at 4%).
Objective direct delivery firms responded 17% for direct deliveries
against none for wholesalers. Objective mixed routes firms responded
38% in favour of direct routes against none for wholesalers. This
was a predictable relationship pointing to the consistency of the
responses and adding to the perceived validity of the questionnaire
replies.
There appears to be a role for both direct deliveries and wholesaler
routes. It is suggested that the question of use of wholesalers
could with benefit be scrutinised in greater depth. In particular
it may prove beneficial to perform a detailed cost comparison of direct
deliveries against normal wholesaler supplies against prime vendor
wholesaler contracts as seen in the United States. The long-term
viability of the wholesaler operation must be adequately deliberated
in any investigation.
Question 31 sought further information on delivery strategy. The
advantages created by a wholesaler delivery system were the speedier
service, more frequent deliveries, cheaper delivery for small orders,
more local siting of stocks, knowledge of customers on the part of
wholesalers, less administrative effort, fewer phone calls from
hospitals, less complaints from buyers and more streamlined service.
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The suggested reasons for preference of direct deliveries were cost
savings (wholesaler franchise reduces manufacturers' profits), feedback
of information on the influence of promotion on sales, objection to
wholesalers being in a position in which they can make prices known to
third parties for example retailers, more accurate monitoring and stock
control, standardised accounting procedures, better production planning
and more efficient deliveries.
Clearly the reasons for route of servicing preferred are varied and
in some cases contradictory. Whereas one route may be reasonable to
one company for a particular drug, another firm may legitimately feel
the other route beneficial. Given the wide variation in character and
size of companies such opinions are hardly surprising. Both routes
appear to possess applicability, and the prospective role of the
wholesaler in the strategies and undertakings of manufacturers seems
assured.
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CHAPTER 10
PRIMARY RESEARCH FINDINGS AND THEIR INTER-RELATIONSHIPS
In order to attempt to derive most benefit from the data generated
by the surveys and analyses the conclusions are summarised below
under specific subject headings. Those are
1. Organisation (i) Authority level
(ii) NHS personnel and influence
(iii) Dissonance and concordance within each RHA
(iv) Stages in contract award process
(v) Changes over last five years
(vi):Duration of contract
(vii) 'Variation between RHA's
2.-: Attitudes towaras- drug contract organisat1on
(1) Interest of companies in hospital sales
(ii) Satisfaction with current procedure
(iii) Disadvantages of contracts
'(iv) Advantages of contracts
(v) Beneficiaries
(vi) Improvements suggested
3. Pricing, tendering and negotiation
(i) Inter-regional variation in prices
(ii) Factors affecting price
(1ii) Price discussions
(iv) Estimates of uptake
(v) Communications
(vi) Retendering
(vii) Restrictions on buyers to allow price
reductions
4. Patents
5. Deliveries
and 6. Political control
1. Organisation~
'(i) 'Authority level
In general contracts are at Regional level but there is in addition
a small role for District/ho~pital, multi-Regional/Regional, and
.:l!lulti-Regional/Regional/hospital contracts· (Table 8.1).
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The RHA's serve an array of populations with a dispersion of
pharmacy numbers situated in a range of geographical areas.
(ii) NHS Personnel and Influence
There will be a ?eclining role, a view more strongly held by
pharmacists than supplies officers,·for those supplies officers
formerly classed as area supplies officers and this reduced input
meets the ideal exoectations of NHS staff. There is forecasted
an increasing role for Re~ional Supplies Officers, meeting the ideal
of respondents (Tables 8.2 and 8.3).
There is a predicted greater involvement of pharmacists than five
years ago though less than at present and that role reflects the
ideal. Those views reflect a high degree of parallel thinking
among the two relevant disciplines. Compared with present arrange-
ments there will be an enlarged role for Regional Pharmaceutical
Officers but reduced role for other grades of pharmacist ('!abIes8.4 & 8.5).
At all stages of the historical scene and ideallY,the pharmacists
playa bigger part than supplies officers. Pharmacists generally
see themselves as more important than supplies officers think of
themselves, with some evidence to suggest supplies officers seeing
a greater importance for pharmacists than supplies officers, and
pharmacists thinking supplies officers less important than pharmacists.
There is some support for thinking that consultant medical staff will
playa bigger part in contract organisation· in the future.
There is greater involvement of quality control pharmaCists now than
1n the past but this is predicted to diminish in practical terms as
well as ideally. Attitudes toward quality control involvement show
little difference between the two categories of respondent pointing
to the concern of both disciplines for quality assurance (Table 8.6~
The most influential discipline in contract organisation and award
appears to be the pharmacist at all stages of the historical time-
scale. Supplies officers are generous in su~estinp, a greater
influence of pharmacists than themselves in contract organisation
and award. No pharmacist thought the supplies officer should be
the most influential discipline in contract award and or~anisation.
,Each of the two main disciplines see their own influence wanin~ and
the other's increasing slightly in contract organisation. (Tables8.7~.9) •
(iii) Dissonance and concordance within each RHA
There was a large measure of agreement between respondents of the two
disciplines in each RHA. Out of a maximum dissonance score of 60 the
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responses ranged from 6.6 to 16.8. Those results reflect the scenario
in twelve of the fourteen RHA's of England. No assuMptions can be
made regarding the remaining two. (Table 8.101.
The largest measure of disagreement within RHA's arose on the topics
of the most influential discipline in contract award and whether or not
there should be the option to retender when a drug comes off patent.
(iv) 'Stages in contract award process
All RHA's conform to the set guidelines with no price negotiation
pre- or post-award and no requests for cost breakdown submitted to
potential suppliers.
(v) Chan~es over last five years
There is a considerable body of NHS opinion that there is now increased
involvement of quality control pharmacists (14 RHA's represented), that
contracts are now longer (9 RHA's represented), and more consideration
is given to packaging (9 RHA's represented). The two main NHS
disciplines give equal attention to supplier service and packaging.
Eight RHA's were represented in.the opinion that there are now fewer
items included in contracts. (Table 8.11).
Suppiiers provided information to confirm the change in relative
involvement of supplies officers and pharmacists (44% of respondents).
Other major points of note were the changed duration of contract, noted
by 51%, and different starting dates, remarked upon by 41% of respondents.
Larger companies are more likely to note changed conditions and more
complex form filling than their smaller counterparts (Table 9.1~
(vi) Duration of Contract
Pharmacists and supplies officers showed the general preference for·two
year contracts than those of one year duration in the ratio of 2.3 : 1.
This does not reflect the reality in which six RHA's posse~s one year
contracts and seven possess two year contracts, (Table 8.12). Table 9.2
shows that suppliers in a ratio of 2.5 : 1 preferred one year contracts.
It is suggested that an objective assessment of administrative costs
to the NHS be performed in the hope of determining the relative merits
of the two contract durations.
(vii) Variation between RHA's
Suppliers were thought most likely to provide objective comments on
this topic. They suggested a variation in starting dates (83%),
variation in number of drugs on tender forms (73%), durations (70%),
complexity of documents (66%) and relative officer involvements (61%).
Given that the size, complexity, duration and staff involved are
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contract characteristics which must have an ideal value, it appears'
, .
hard to justify the existence of those differences between portions,
albeit large ones, of a single NHS organisation. It is suggested
that decision mak~rs ponder On this topic and attempt to define the
ideal arrangement.The results are depicted in Table 9.3 •
2. Attitudes towards drug contract organisation
(i) Interest of companies in hospital sales
More than 90% of companies questioned have tendered within the last
two years. Direct distributors are more likely to have tendered
than other companies. Out of a maximum of about nineteen tenders,
a majority of companies have submitted sixteen or more. Larger
firms submit more tenders than smaller ones, (Table 9.4).
Compared with five years ago, about half of the respondents are
submitt1rgthe same number of tenders, about 12% are submitting less,
with 31% submitting more. Tendering is considerably less popular'
now than five years ago among community suppliers and those with
mixed distribution methods. There is some'evidence to suggest that
companies who distribute through wholesalers are less interested
now than five years ago in tendering (Tables 9.5 and 9.6).
(ii) Satisfaction with current procedure
Pharmacists expressed a less pronounced opinion than supplies
officers on the degree of satisfaction felt towards current
contract procedure. The majority view (54%) suggested "satisfactory"
as the descriptive term to be applied to the contract procedure with
23% remarking "very satisfactory" and 23% remarking neitlier
satisfactory nor unsatisfactory (Table 8.14). Table 9.7 shows that
ih contrast the suppliers showed responses toward the dissatisfied
portion of the spectrum, with 36% dissatisfied and 21% satisfied.
Of companies with large absolute volume of hospital sales 60%
expressed a degree of dissatisfaction.' Companies with relatively
large hospital sales considered hospital sales'very important
{Table 9.8). In terms of sales relative to the community sector,
it would appear that the RHA's are confronted with a considerable
untapped reservoir of companies who sell little to hospitals, but
which regards hospital sales as being generally of some importance.
(iii) Disadvantages of contracts
Regional Supplies and Pharmaceutical Officers consider that local
needs or preferences not being satisfied, rigidity of contract
(little or no freedom of choice), no drug cost saving, lack of
'. ,
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continuity of supply at the end of contract period, and costly
admi"nistration are important disadvantages of contracts. The
pharmacists in particular noted the concern for local needs and
lack of flexibility so restricting choice.,
Unprompted disadvantages volunteered were the inflexibility of the
system, views particularly strongly held by pharmacists, poor
utilisation of management information and communications within the
NHS, views held particularly by supplies officers, lack of commit-
ment to adhere to contracts, and problems. created for the supplier.
A large majority (77%) of the pharmacists regarded the absence of
positive negotiation as a disadvantage. By way of contrast supplies
officers did not share that volunteered opinion. Since negotiation
would logically require and utilise the skills of supplies officers
preferentially, the absence of any strongly held expressed desire on
the part of supplies officers to partake in negotiation must be noted.
A large body of opinion regarded too few delivery and ordering points
as not a disadvantage at all. In particular supplies officers would
wish to see a reduction in both those points (Tables.8.15 - 8.17).
Suppliers regarded the following as important disadvantages of
contracts in descending order of importance:- no guaranteed uptake,
bias of health authority, inflexibility, impersonal and paperwork.
By far "no guaranteed
concern of suppliers.
important disadvantage
uptake" looms markedly within the expressed
45% of respondents noted it as the most
,
of contracts (Tables 9.9 to 9.22).
Combining the views of both sides of the buying process the slogan
"For all its guidelines the system does not guarantee supply or
cheaper supplies to the user and business to the supplier" could
be promulgated.
(iv) Advantages of contracts
The NHS survey suggests that the most noted unprompted advantages were
"cost savings", remarked upon by 85% of pharmacists and 62% of
supplies officers, "predictable quality", noted by 46% of each group,
"the lack of need for individual hospital price negotiation" referred
to by 46% ofsuppl1es officers, and the "continuity or guarantee of
supply" noted by 38% of supplies officers. Following prompting in
order of decreasing importance were "cost saving on drugs", then
"obviates the need for individual hospital price negotiation",
followed by "predictable quality", (Tables 8.18 to 8.21).
The suppliers list of advantages in descending order of importance is
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"spin off sales in general practice" at 35% response rate,
"encouragement of brand loyalty among prescribers" at 16%, "obviates
individual hospital price negotiation" at 16% and "predictable
usage allowing eqsier satisfaction of needs" with 12% of responses.
"Standardised pack sizes", "standardised labelling" and "standardised
deliveries" were not considered important. Those advantages
considered of most importance by suppliers warrant deliberation in
the context of hospital savings producing family practitioner price
rises ~·Tables 9.23 to 9.35).
(v) Beneficiaries
NHS senior staff felt both the NHS and suppliers derived benefit
from contracts (58% of responses), with small minorities opting for
the NHS deriving most benefit (19% of responses) and the supplier
(8%). Given that both parties must derive benefit for the system
to work well, the survey results point to a reasonable view of
suppliers' needs adopted by NHS staff generally, with almost equal
concern being shown by the pharmaceutical and supplies officer
disciplines (Table 8.22). Examination of Table 9.36 shows that
by way of contrast the majority of suppliers, 55%, perceive the NHS
as most benefiting, with a further 40% suggesting neither party.
4% feel the supplier is the most benefiting party. Clearly the
industry considers itself at a distinct disadvantage. This must
be regarded as an indictment of the system and demonstrates the
need for greater emphasiS to be placed upon the mutual benefits which
contracts can and should confer upon both parties. When asked for
reasons for those responses the general message was that they felt
they were unfairly treated and in return for a more equitable
system and more flexibility they would be prepared to lower prices.
(vi) Improvements suggested
Spontaneously derived responses on the topic of suggested improvements
to the contract system ranged over the whole spectrum of contract
facets.
The NHS staff referred to the need for more flexibility in the
system (46% of pharmacists and 23% of supplies officers). A smaller
percentage would wish to see more commitment to the contract (23% of
supplies officers and 8% of pharmacists). Other suggested improvements
included more utilisation of staff skills, and improved management
informat~on (Pages 217-8).
328
Whereas pharmacists are more likely to desire a more flexible
approach, supplies officers are more likely to wish for a more
rigid commitment. Apparently supplies officers have mixed
feelings about a more flexible framework for contracts despite the
enhanced utilisation of their skills which that change would confer.
Suppliers suggested many improvements including standardisation,
information, clarification, simplification, more flexibility in
certain matters and less flexibility in others (Pages 276--7).
It is suggested that those improvements proferred be investigated in
depth. In the absence of such analysis it is suggested that
contracts could be improved by the NHS guaranteeing to buy fixed.
quantities of applicable drugs or moving from tender to negotiation.
Since the latter would require a deviation from government
regulations it would require further investigation.
3. Pricing, tendering and negotiation
(i) Inter-regional variation in prices
Differential pricing is confirmed by suppliers, with 29% of
respondents admitting to it and 58% knowing or believing others
to do it; (Table 9.37 and 9.38)~
In the statements of NHS officers the information is put forward
that prices charged are not systematically compared with other
Regions' prices. 69% expressed that answer whereas only 23%
stated that prices are compared (Table 8.23).
Five RHA's were represented among those who do compare prices
compared with eleven of those who don't. Pharmacists are slightly
more likely to compare prices than their supplies colleagues.
No NHS officer considers his prices to be dearer than in other
RHA's, a remarkable result bearing in mind the previously noted
findings.
Data generated by secondary research highlighted some glaring
differences in prices charged to the various R.H.A. 's, and primary
research confirmed that finding with one RHA paying 15.3 times
that of another for one drug. An objective observer would
question such a variation .within a National Health Service.
A comparison of actual price charged, shown in Table 7.2, and
perceived price is shown in Table 10.1. Table 8.24 pointed to
a more cautious perception of price on the part of supplies
officers than pharmacists, with 46 per cent of those supplies
officers refusing to estimate the relationship between prices
paid by their own Health Authority and those applying elsewhere,
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compared with some 31 .per cent of respondent pharmacists. Most mis-
apprehend the true price situation. The responses are depicted in
the scatter diagram shown in Figure 10.1. If the perception of
the ~espondent~ had coincided with the actual prices paid, the
correlation coefficient would hav~ a value of + 1 and, as shown,
the regression line would be straight bisecting both axes at the
100 pOint.
Instead the scatter diagram produced shows a correlation coefficient,
r, of 0.0216. There is therefore almost'negligible/~orrelat1on
between actual and perceived price and this is further demonstrated
by the significance value, p, attained 0.953. Hypothesis 2 (a) (xii)
was validated.
The attitude adopted by DHSS toward one RHA comparing prices with
others has been at least equivocal if not totally hostile and so it
is not unreasonable to assume that prices would vary without full
realisation by NHS staff.
What is of note appears to be the dogmatic assertion on the part of
so many NHS staff that prices are no higher than elsewhere, in fact
in some cases lower, when not in a position to prove or disprove
that statement.
Respondents' perception of ~rice paid is more a reflection of their
desires than of reality.
The lack of confluence of the actual and the perceived price paid
taken together with the wide inter-Rep,ional price variation often
seen gives support to the need for more interchange of price
information between RHA's and adds force to the argument that more
centralised control of contracts would provide greater ~armony of
prices charged throughout the NHS. Instead of the RHA's consolidating
their influence they appear to act independently if not in competition
with each other with the theoretical monopSony giving way in practice
to oligopsony tending toward atomism.
(ii) Factors affecting price
The industry staff, having confirmed the presence of differential
priCing, were very forthcoming in specifying those factors perceived
as being considered in price offers to regions. They are, in order
of menti~ns, estimated uptake 63%, duration 51%,total volume 52%,
actual previous uptake 44%, number of delivery pOints 29%, number
or buying pOints 21%, population served 8%, competition/market
factors 8%, geographical spread of region 6%, need for business 4%,
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and type of packs ordered 2%. The large response for. "estimated'
uptake" conflicts with the inaccuracy and relative Lack of usefulness
of contract estimates reported below (Tables 9.39 to 9.4,).
Those factors perceived by industrialists as important in price offers
were shown to bear no statistically significant relationship to price.
Therefore hypothesis 2 (a) (xvi) is shown to have been validated.
vfuen the prices paid by the various RHA's are compared to confirm or
refute those stated influencing factors Table 7.3 shows there is
little correlation between the drug price on one hand and, on the
other hand, contract duration, number of delivery points, number of
buying points, population served and geographical spread of region.
Hypothesis 2 was shown to be validated by the research findings.
Table 7.6 depicts a high degree of positive correlation between number
of firms contracting nationally and the standard deviation of price
paid, that relationship being statistically significant. The more
competition seen nationally the greater the spread of prices charged.
In terms of local competition within a specific RHA there is evidence
to suggest (Table 7.7) that price variation is directly related to
'the number of firms tendering for an individual drug though that
association is not statistically significant. The local picture mirrors
the national one and lends support to the view that the desire for
business is a ;.Ie-jor,if not sole, constder'at.Lonof firms in price
setting. Clearly those factors perceived by industrialists as being of
consequence in price determination do not coincide with the reality of
the system. Research finding~ demonstrate that drug price bears little
relation to those elements combining to determine delivery charges, and
there is a negative though not significant correlation between price and
the degree of divergent thinking on the part of the senior RHA pharmacy
and supplies staff. There is a negative correlation between price and
number of hospital pharmacists, but it is of low magnitude and of
little statistical significance. Those are depicted in Table 7.3.
Low price of contract drugs is spearheaded by generic manufacturers
who play a disproportionate part in this NHS cost saving exercise,
whereas higher priced contract drugs often represent the products of
the patent holders. The purchase of the latter represents a residual
brand loyalty resulting from dearth of competition or concern for
quality. Tables 7.4 and 7.5 illustrate that point.
Drug prices under contractual agreement are significantly lower than
trade price but the lower price is more significant in a multi-source
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'supply environment than in a monopoly market. Sometimes the contract
price is so much lower than trade price that it must be suspected as
being uneconomic within the narrow hospital market perspective but
obviously not uneconomic within the broader NHS context (Table 7.10)
With the modal number of local tenderers being 3 in a range from 1
to 6 and that of the number of contractors being 2 in a range of 1 _to 5,
the oligopoly is confirmed (Tables 7.7 and 7.6).
(iii) Price discussions
The NHS officers thought that they spent on average slightly over six
man days per year in negotiation or discussion on prices with
potential suppliers before contract award. That average value conceals
a wide variation ranging from zero to 30 with pharmacists suggesting
, '
slightly less effort than supplies officers (Tables 8.25 to 8.26).
A considerable body of opinion suggested that price discussion effort
was too little or about right. None thought it too much. There was
evinced a clear desire on the part of members of both disciplines to
see more negotiation and discussion with potential suppliers so as to
improve the service and prices charged. No apparent relationship
between perceived time spent on'price discussion and its considered
adequacy was highlighted (Table 8.27).
Suppliers presented a distorted reflection of that picture, with, on
average, a little less than four man days effort expended by each
company in price discussions with each Health Authority in a year.
The 'range extended from zero to 30. The company profile most likely
to favour more price discussion is a United States based, proprietary
manufacturer which distribut~s direct to hospitals, not through
wholesalers (Table 9.50).Tables 9.51 and 9.52 show that
~jority supplier opinion suggested that the effort expended was
about right with a slight tendency towards the opinion "too little".
Suppliers generally shared the views of the NHS officers. As with the
NHS staff, no apparent relationship between perceived time spent on
price discussion and its considered adequacy was highlighted.
In both surveys effort must be presumed to include all stages of the
contract process since no real negotiation occurs, and there is
some evidence of considerable in-house price formulation effort on
the part of companies.
That conclusion is derived by examination of companies'exertions.
The effort of the 84 respondent companies in discussing contract
prices with each Health Authority in a year is about 325 man days.
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An assumption can be made that the total for about 100 companies
discussing prices with 14 RHA's is about 5600 man days.
This must be contrasted with the N~S officers' responses. Even if
one assumes that all the efforts expended by pharmacists and supplies
officers 'are independently performed, a weak assumption, the total
effort would amount to merely 280 man days per year. Clearly the
industrialists either indulge in hyperbolic fantasies in their
perceptions of price discussions or expend ~onsiderable energy in
formulating prices prior to contact with the Health Authorities.
The latter is thought the more likely.
(iv) Estimates of uptake
Some 62% of industry staff respondents describe estimates as
"inaccurate" or "very inaccurate" as contrasted with 33% suggesting
them to be "accurate" or "very accurate". In view of the large
amount of time, admittedly unquantified but nevertheless known to be
substantial, expended by NHS staff in gathering and collating such
data, those responses must serve as a major criticism in that there
is a waste of scarce human resources.
Despite the inaccuracy of estimates 62% of manufacturers claim them
to be "very" or "fairly useful" as against 35% noting them as "not
of much use" or "of no use at all". Of respondents who find
estimates accurate a larger than expected proportion feel them useful
and of those who suggest that they are useless a significantly larger
than expected number find them inaccurate (Tables 9.46. to 9.49).
(v) Co~munications
.Manufacturers felt that the period allowed to complete tender forms
is about right, that there is too long a gap until the offer is
accepted or rejected, and once the award is made the time period
before the award winner is informed is about right with some feeling
that it is too long, (Table 9.53).
To create the ideal the deliberation process needs to be speeded up
and the winner informed more speedily. This confirms verbal comments
that sometimes hospitals order under contract before the award winner
itself is aware of the adjudication decision. The ideal time scale
promulgated is four to five weeks to complete tender document, four
weeks for the Health Authorities to collate and deliberate on the
information and award the contracts, and within two to three weeks
the award winner would be informed (Table 9.54).
Passage of years has, for a typical RHA, resulted in a diminished
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time allowed to companies' to complete tender documents yet has
increased considerably the time allocated to its own staff to
deliberate upon the data submitted by the firms.
It is hoped that this information may be of help to those Health
Authorities who might feel able to remedy the more traumatic episodes
claimed to have been experienced by some companies.
(vi) Retendering
Almost all responding NHS senior officers feel that poor service or
deliveries and an unacceptable request for a price increase are good
grounds for retendering. Of slightly less ppominence as justification
for retendering was the category "product subsequently shown not to
specification". Supplies officers considered that situation of
more importance than pharmacists. Various other responses were
provided suggesting the general opinion that there should be scope
to change or cancel contracts. As regards unacceptability of
requested price rises no clear consensus was apparent to define that
percenta~e price rise which should require retendering, though 31%
would allow price rises of up to 10% before retendering would be
instituted (Tables 8.28 and 8.29).
Suppliers felt that retendering' would be justified when suppliers
give poor service or deliveries (74%), bankruptcy.or total inability
to supply (73%) and quality of drug not matching pre-award samples
(70%). Moderate majority opinion supported retendering if a price
increase was unacceptable (61%) or the product subsequently shown not
to specification (58%).
The companies adopt a constructive, ethical approach to behaviour
expected of competitors, and implicitly of themselves, on award of
contract. Foreign owned companies attach-more weight to supplier
service than British ones. Proprietary manufacturers give more
weight to product conforming to specification than generic producers.
For the criterion "arrival of a new significant drug" the companies
more likely to require retendering were community sellers, proprietary
manufacturers, and companies using wholesaler or mixed distribution
methods (Table 9.55).
Significant change in prescribing habits is thought to require
retendering,more so by proprietary manufacturers than generic ones.
A majority of firms felt that price increases of up to 10% should be
tolerated before retendering occurs, (Table 9.56).
(vii) Restrictions on buyers to allow price reductions
Buyers 'in the NHS consider payment at the beginning of the year
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•unacceptable. A reduced number of buying points would be an acceptable
restriction with 85 to 92% responses. Almost as acceptable was a
reduction in number of delivery points (73 to 81%), less frequent
deliveries (62 to 73%), and;a two year instead of a one year contract
(77 to 81%). Most pleasing would be, in decreasing order, two year
contracts (54%), reduction in buying points (42%), reduction in
delivery pOints (31%), guaranteed uptake (23%), and less frequent
deliveries (8%) (Table 8.30).
Consideration was given to a statistical analysis of a Region's views
on acceptability of restrictions and the prices paid. The small
number of Regions which displayed a strong view on this subject
prevented such analysis being performed. Perusal of the 2 x 2
contingency table (Ta.ble10.2) shows no apparent relationship
between degree of acceptance of restrictions and price paid.
Hypothesis 2 (a) (xiv) was validated by the research findings.
TABLE 10.2: POPULARITY OF RESTRICTIONS AND PRICE PAID
PRICE PAID
REGION VIEWS OF
RESTRICTION HIGH LOW
Rejector 3 2
Acceptor 2 2
TOTAL 5 4
TOTAL
5
4
9
Suppliers would be prepared to offer price reductions of over 10%
for payment before delivery (10%), guaranteed uptake (7%), less
frequent deliveries (9%), reduced number of delivery pOints (6%),
two year rather than.one year contracts (4%), and reduced number of
buying points (2%) .(Table 9.57J.
Many companies felt able to offer price reductions of up to 10%. For
example, guaranteed uptake attracted 38% of responses, reduced number
of delivery points 31%, less frequent deliveries 24%, payment before
delivery 24%, reduction in number of buying points 19%, and two year
rather than one year contracts 11% of respondents. The profiles of
companies most likely to offer price reductions for those
restrictions can be identified from examination of the detailed results.
In order to assess the relationship between price formulation
policies and potential for price reductions correlation coefficients
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were calculated.
There appears to be little correlation between those factors volunteered
by companies as being considered in price formulation (Table 9.39) and
those elements which, if acceptable to buyers, would result in reduced
prices (Tables 9.57 and 9.58).
The correlation coefficient for elements likely to reduce prices by up
.to ten per cent was - 0.487 with a significance of <0.6. For those
elements likely to reduce prices by more than ten per cent, r = 0.266
with a significance of <0.8.
Since those factors perceived by suppliers fail to coincide with the
reality of the price structures it is not really surprising that those
perceived factors bear little relationship to those promulgated in this
section.
While sounding a note of caution it must be suggested that there is some
scope for savings which would satisfy both manufacturer and NHS officer.
4. Patents
Manufacturers generally believe that contract inclusion is of more use
for unpatented than patented drugs (Tables 9.59:and 9.60). Table 9.61
shows the greatest benefits received as a result of a patented drug
being on contract are "brand loyalty encouraged" (76%), "G.P. sales
indirectly encouraged" (63%), "obviates need for individual price
negotiation at hospital level" (63%). Brand loyalty appears of equal
consequence for patented drugs and drugs generally, and companies
obviously seek to have their branded products included in contracts for
the spin-off· benefits of general practitioner prescribing. This factor
must be borne in mind when health authorities receive cheap offers which
exceed those expected from economies of scale. There is evidence of
some companies selling products to hospitals at a loss. It must be
concluded that any savings made by health authorities as a group are
reflected in price rises to the family practitioner sector as a
consequence of the method of price regulation which the government
currently adopts. This subject is ventilated elsewhere.
5. Deliveries
Delivery route, as predicted, varied with some 61% claiming to deliver
direct, 1910through wholesalers and 18% by both routes. Small order
size and inaccessibility of hospital favour the wholesaler route,
whereas product limited shelf life and extremely high unit cost favour
direct delivery.
I
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Unprompted additional factors favouring direct delivery were products
under major promotion, special pricing, large orders and use of
specialised orders.
Wholesaler delivery would be preferred in the case of high transport
costs, identical competitor products, stock shortages and ·urgent
deliveries (Tables 9.62 and 9.63).
Clearly both routes play a part in ensuring that the drugs reach
the patient but it is suggested that it may prove beneficial to
examine in detail cost comparisons between direct deliveries,
wholesaler supplies and prime vendor wholesaler contracts.
6. Political control
Secondary research demonstrated the number and depth of guidance
notices issued by central government. It is hypothesised that
there is an inverse relationship between the d~gree of centralised
political control, as represented by political party in power, and
the emphasis given to locally organised drug contract. In order to
strictly test the·hypothesis a comparison should be made between
the monetary value of national/Regional/local contracts.
Unfortunately a dearth of such data makes such fine testing of the
hypothesis unrealistic. Nevertheless some subjective dudgements
can be applied to the topic by noting any reference in public
material to a recommendation on the administrative level of
buying and relating that to the political party in power at that
time. It may be assumed that a high·degree of centralised political
control would be a characteristic of a Labour government whose
philosophy would be a strong involvement of central government
in all aspects of society whereas a low degree of control would
be expected of a Conservative government whose political platform
supports maximum delegation to local level with restricted
involvement of central government.
An examination of the advice issued to health authorities shows that
since the inception of the NHS more than sixty papers referring to
purchasing in general or drug purchasing in particular have been
issued. This considerable amount of guidance creates a quasi-
legal framework within which drug purchasing has evolved. Many of
the documents referred to have no bearing on the hypothesis but
those that do, about 35 per cent of the total, were tested to
determine if they reflect the political climate prevailing at that
time. The advice issued takes the form of circulars, memoranda,
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letters or reports. Their differentiation is related more to the
length of the communication than to the actual importance of their
information.
Table 10.3 demonstrates the numbers of directives with the differing
degrees of emphasis and the political party in power at that time.
Those communications which merely cover publication of reports but
which themselves have no impact on the administrative level of
drug purchasing have not been included in the table.
Table 10.3 portrays the findings from which the inference must be
drawn that the administrative level of purchasing of goods generally,
and drugs in particular, by health authorities follows closely the
political thinking at the time. Hypothesis 5 must be considered.
as validated.. Chi-square was~papplicable due to paucity of ·data.
It is not suggested that with a change of government there has been
a reversal of attitude toward purchasing, but clearly there have
been over the years major shifts of emphasis with little time being
allowed for a system to prove itself efficient, or otherwise,
before a change of direction occurred. The result of this could
well have been a decrease in NHS buying efficiency.
It is to be expected that the government of the day decides on the
allocation of resources to the health service and how it should be
distributed, but should it involve itself with constantly changing
modes of administration? It should be possible to decide on the
most appropriate level of purchasing using :.sound economic
reasoning and for the arrangement to be divorced from the prevailing
political environment at Westminster. The recently created NHS
Supply Council provides such a decision - making body and, given the
goodwill of health service staff and suppliers and an absence of
interference from politicians, the Council should be able to
formulate policies based on economic grounds.
The author's examination of the political influences upon health
authority drug purchasing was published elsewhere.
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TABLE 10.3: DIRECTIVES ISSUED AND POLITICAL PARTY IN POWER
Number- of publications and administrative·
level to which emphasis in buying is given
Political party in power
and years in office
Local Neither Central
Labour
1948-1951
Conservative
1951-1964
Labour
1964-1970
Conservative
1970-1974
o 2
4 o
o o 2
2 o
Labour
1974-1979 o 4
Conservative
1979 to present 4 o
Total Conservative 9 4 o
Total Labour o 2 8
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CHAPTER 11
SUMMARY
The research effort provided an insight into the system. The secondary
data established a foundation and the primary work defined, clarified,
extended, confirmed or refuted, and explained the derived information.
A complex bureaucratic conformation manifested itself. The realistic
system bears little resemblance to that which is stated or implied,
and, in order to facilitate comparison, the two systems are presented
in Table 11.1. Identification of many possible associations between
the practical and theoretical schemes was prevented by paucity of
data, and so, by default, the startling contrasts-are seen. The
picture depicted is that of a scheme meandering, changing direction
on the road towards an obscure goal, hampered by an absence of suitable
published data on which judgments can be passed, and consequent
incapacity to perform the role required of it. Portrayed is a
contrivance of passive, bureaucratic, risk-reducing purchasing by
individual, independently-acting NHS segments, and marketing by
companies practising opportunistic pricing. It could be said that
NHS staff, by participating· in the scheme, are performing a marketing
exercise on behalf of drug firms.
The research project clearly helped to establish a body of knowledge
applying to the topiC under investigation. What has emerged is a
picture of NHS hospitals buying drugs under contracts organised by
the Regional Health Authorities (pages 191-2). Those RHA's show
considerable organisational (pages 232-4) and demographic
disparity (pages 170-2), but their contract systems slavishly follow
national guidelines with no evidence of any major attempts to-exploit
the bargaining power of the NHS to the full (pages 199, 220-2, 291-6).
There is however, some variatiori in detail, with some Regions having
altered the contract duration, length and format (pages 199, 201, 202,
232-4), and estimates' collation and utilisation (pages 94, 199,
287-91).
Members of two disciplines, pharmacists and supplies officers, are
primarily responsible for the organisation of contracts (pages 191-8).
The schemes owe their conception to the initiative of pharmacists
(page 59), who have retained the pre-eminent role (pages 195, 197
and 198) despite the establishment and consolidation of the specialist
supplies officer calling (pages 64-78). Those disciplines appear
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to enjoy an amicable working relationship at a local level
(pages 198-200), but there is apparently an underlying tension
between them nationally (pages 191, 193-8), reflecting the undefined
boundary between their respective roles (pages 64-73) as well as the
under-utilisation of some of their skills (pages 204, 206, 217, 218).
Although not apparent at the outset of the research project, the
crucial role of the PPRS soon materialized. Price Regulation Schemes
arose because the cost of the NHS was greater than expected and the
drug bill was considered a major factor. The first Price Regulation
Scheme, introduced in 1957, sought to regulate industry profits by
control of prices of individual drugs. The Scheme was modified in
1961 and 1964 but it was not until 1969 that overall company profits
were examined rather than individual drug prices (pages 108-110).
Prior to 1969 lower prices agreed with hospitals would have decreased
the Government's drug bill, but after 1969 any lower prices in the
hospital sector would be counteracted by correspondingly higher prices
in general practice, producing no change in the Government's drug
expenditure.
Any reductions in company' income resulting from one product or in
one sector of the NHS are submerged in company profitability from
all products sold in all portions of the Health Service (pages 110,
124, 127). Thus PPRS and contracts fundamentally conflict.
A second conflict manifests itself in that the Scheme endeavours
to encourage research-based industry (page~ 115, 125), whereas
contract savings emanate particularly from generic or "copier"'
companies rather than from the original patent holders (pages 177-9).
In theory, therefore, the two schemes, PPRS and contracts conflict
provided PPRS is functioning as intended. There is a lingering
suspicion that'PPRS, with the wider scope, is not working as
efficiently as possible, so improvement in the Scheme must be
considered of greater urgency than improvement in contracts (pages
124-8).
Hypothesis 1, namely that prices of contract drugs are significantly
lower than trade prices, was validated by the research findings
shown on page 187. Also on that page hypothesis l(a), that the
variation in price will be greater in multi-source situations compared
with single (monopoly) supply situations and in both cases lower than
trade price, was validated.
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At first sight the apparent savings seem startling (pages 187-8),
but in the context of theNHS market as a whole those savings pale
into insignificance. The financially restricted hospital sector is
subsidised by the NHS sector with the open-ended budget, the family
practitioner service (pages 126-7).
The NHS funding system differentiates between those two sectors,
each receiving its own allocation. Staff in the hospital service,
faced with budgetary constraints and the need to save resources,
pay little attention to overall NHS cost implications in their
decision making.
General practice prescribing of branded drugs at the disproportion-
ately higher price is encouraged by pharmaceutical manufacturers
(pages 107, 125, 312-318). Unwittingly, by indulging in the fantasy
of saving money by buying on contract, the RHA's are essentially
competing with each other (pages 180, 183-6, 277-80).
Employees of individual RHA's, aware of their own Region's budgetary
constraints, welcome opportunities for drug cost savings and
disregard the wider ramifications including likely expenditure
increases elsewhere. In a similar fashion DHA staff concern
themselves with their own DHA's restricted resources and pay little
regard to the broader consequences of their activities having an
impact on other Health Authorities.
A formidable array of Regions presents itself to the shrewd marketing
executives of the industry, and the irrationality of the exercise
is compounded by the differing starting dates of Regions' contracts
(page 94). Firms easily adjust prices on the basis of previous
contract adjudications. The NHS buyers luxuriate in a bureaucratic,
long-winded contrivance, the administrative cost of which is
unquantified but undoubtedly considerable (pages 104-5). The
consequence is a range of prices (pages 172, 173, 183-6), which
defies any satisfactory explanation (pages 174-6). Whereas there is
little evidence of price collusion between suppliers (page 180),
individual firms indulge in a pricing policy which may be described
as expediency (page 177). Thus hypothesis 2, which stated that in
relation to the demographic/industrial/attitudinal variables tested
there is a random distribution of pric~s, was validated, as seen
on page 333.
Subsidi~ry hypothesis 2 (a) specified the variables tested and all
were validated. They were (i) physical size of area served, (ii)
population served, (iii) population density, (iv) number of hospital
pharmacists and (v) pharmacies, (vi) buying pOints, (vii) delivery
points, (viii) delivery point density, (ix) manufacturers, (x)
industry employees, and (xi) contract duration.
All are referred to in the text on page 176. Additionally variables
(xii) price perception by NHS staff (page 331), (xiii) divergence
of opinions between pharmacist and supplies officer (page 176),
(xiv) popularity of restrictions among NHS staff (page 337), (xv)
price paid by diverse RHA's (page 186), and (xvi) factors perceived
by industrialists as major price determinants (page 333) were
validated.
Hypothesis 3, namely that there is a direct relationship between
the spread of contract prices and the number of sources of supply,
was validated as shown on page 180.
In addition to those hypotheses, as presented in Chapter 5, which
concern prices, and which are summarised above, those dealing with
the organisation were validated by the research findings. Those
were that:
(i) there is no relationship between perceived time spent on
price discussion and the considered adequacy of that time
in the view of both buyers and suppliers (Hypothesis 4,
pages 220 and 294);
(ii) there is an inverse relationship between the degree of
centralised political control and the emphasis given to
locally organised drug contracts (Hypothesis 5, page 340);
(lli) the weighting of criteria considered import~nt in purchase
of drugs has altered over time (Hypothesis 6, page 201);
(iv) the importance allotted to certain purchase criteria is a
function of the relationship between the pharmacists and
supplies officers involved in the purchasing process
(Hypothesis 6 (a), page 210).
Hypothesis 4 demonstrates the lack of definitive knowledge of the
importance of price discussion and to a large extent the lack of
concern. Price discussion occurs, not in response to need, but due
to other circumstances. Clearly absence of true price negotiation
finds expression in the unrelated perceived time and adequacy of
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price discussion. A less restricted buying system with a defined
role for price discussion might ensure the relevance of the need
for time to be allocated to price discussion.
Hypothesis 5 pOints to the implications for buying of party political
thinking. The intrusion of politics into Health Service buying is
demonstrated.
Hypothesis 6 shows the dynamic role played by contracts despite
the severe restraints posed by public buying systems.
Hypothesis 6(a) illustrates the role played by the personalities
and professions involved. "Whatever the state of a system it is
markedly affected by the character and behaviour of the individual
participants.
The research identified more efficient purchasing methods which
might encourage firms to offer their products at lower prices.
Payment before delivery, though unpopular with buyers, would
probably lead to lower prices. -Guaranteed uptake, though not very
popular with NHS staff, would also lead to lower NHS expenditure.
Other means of reducing prices identified by the research were less
frequent deliveries, reduced number of delivery points, reduced
number of buying pOints and two year rather than one year contracts.
Those changes would be acceptable to many NHS staff (pages 224, 226-7,
304, 309-10).
Many disadvantages of contract purchasing were demonstrated by the _
buyers' responses. Local needs or pref~rences are not satisfied by
contracts and the system is too rigid allowing little or no freedom
of choice. Some respondents questioned whether the scheme produced
costs savings, several noted the costly administration and several
referred to lack of continuity of supply at contract end (pages
204, 206-9) •. Suppliers made reference to no guaranteed uptake,
bias of Health Authorities, inflexibility of the system, its
impersonal nature and the paperwork involved (pages 242-57).
Several improvements in the scheme were identified by th~ research.
NHS staff referred to the need for more flexibility in the system,
more commitment to the contract, more utilisation of staff skills
and improved management information (pages 217-8). Suppliers noted
standardisation, information, clarification, simplification and
changes in flexibility (pages 276-7).
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CHAPTER 12
CONCLUSIONS
A dearth of definitive data on the sums expended on contract purchases
as well as an absence of documentary findings on administrative costs
of the systems have placed a restriction on the quantitative
inferences which could be drawn. An improvement in the level of
management info~ation in the NHS would make the drawing of such
inferences an attractive proposition.
A major ... casualty of the "conf'Leent.Lal.Lty" ascribed to drug prices
paid by NHS Authorities was the incompleteness of reliable information
for all RHA's. Whereas "confidentiality" was adduced as an over-
riding necessity, it must be thought that some RHA's were reluctant
to expose to scrutiny details of those prices paid in the belief, now
.shown to be misplaced, that price paid might be regarded as a direct
measure of their efficiency in purchasing.
It is recommended that contracts should be viewed and examined in
the context of the PPRS and the total NHS expenditure. The potential
advantages or otherwise of negotiation or prime vendor purchasing
should be explored.
Contract procedure should be altered to take advantage of price
reductions offered by firms. Consideration ~hould be given to the
immediate discontinuation of contract awards for drugs under patent,
because in monopoly supply nominal hospital savings are likely to be
outweighed by costs of contract administration and increased sales
and expenditure in general practice (pages 92 and 107).
The DHSS should give active encouragement to the freer flow of price
information between RHA's (pages 134-9) and ensure that appropriate
action.is taken on'the findings. The optimal administrative level of'
contract organisation should be decided on the basis of objective
economic criteria, not party political dogma or historical power
centres. That contracts are at present Regionally organised does not
necessarily imply that they are best organised at that level.
With regard to del~veries, it is recommended that the DHSS or
Health Service Supply Council support the initiation of a detailed
cost/benefit comparison of direct, wholesaler and prime vendor
wholesaler supplies, and take appropriate action on the derived
conclusions. That analysis should fully take into account the
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cost to the NHS of drugs' stockholding and warehousing facilities.
To summarise it is recommended that consideration should be given
to the following:-
1 Improvement of management information. The
administrative costs of·contracts must be
calculated and published. Each RHA must be
informed of prices paid elsewhere.
2 The secrec~ euphemistically termed confidentiality,
shrouding the system should be examined to ensure
that NHS buyers are in possession of adequate
information on firms, prices and quality on
which to make decisions.
The divulging to competitor firms of accepted
price offers is governed by confidentiality
constraints. An examination should be conducted
into the possible consequences of a relaxation
of such constraints.
3 An examination should be ~onducted into the NHS
funding system. The separate hospital and family
practitioner budgets, the former limited the
latter open-ended, create an artificial competitive
framework for drug purchases reducing NHS efficiency.
The possibility of combining those budgets for each
NHS Region should be explored.
4 Discussions should be initiated between the DHSS
and suppliers to achieve realistic drug prices
related to production and distribution costs, and
purchase quantities.
Contracts should guarantee quantities purchased.
5 The Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme should
be reappraised.
6 An examinatLon of and comparison of direct buying,
wholesaler buying and prime vendor purchasing should
be conducted to assess the potential advantages
or otherwise of those types of supply.
7 The administrative level at which contracts are
organised should be scientifically evaluated. The
political or historical factors, while being
recognised, should not take precedence.
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8 The fundamental basis on which public purchasing
is conducted, namely tendering, should be
reappraised to determine if a role should be
found for negotiation.
9 Those disadvantages and potential improvements
highlighted by the research should be examined
critically.
10 Contracts should not be awarded for drugs from
monopoly suppliers.
11 An examination should be performed to determine
the ideal contract duration, starting dates,
timescales, format and threshold value for
inclusion in a contract.
Whereas much has been achieved, the challenge of those facets
not examined by this research study will doubtless serve as a
stimulus to future research workers who should be able to build
upon the foundations constructed by this work. The satisfaction
to be derived from the realization that scarce health resources
would probably, as a consequence, be more judiciously spent will
hopefully encourage others to tackle the outstanding tasks.
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13.1 Abbreviations APPENDIX 1
Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry
Annual General Meeting
Area Health Authority
Area Pharmaceutical Officer
Area Supplies Officer
Board of Governors
Comptroller and Auditor General
District Health Authority
Department of Health and Social Security
District Pharmaceutical Officer
Dear Secretary Letter
District Supplies Officer
Executive Council
Editor
Family Practitioner Committee
Guild of Hospital Pharmacists
General Practitioner
Health Circular or House of Commons Paper
Hospital Memorandum
Hospital Management Committee
Her (His) Majesty's Stationery Office
Health Notice
NHS Reorganisation Circular
Health Service Circular (Interim Series)
In the same book etc. in the reference
immediately preceding
Inter Company Comparisons
Minister (or Ministry) of Health
National Economic Development Council
National Economic Development Office
National Health Service
In the work cited
Office of Health Economics
page
.Public Accounts Committee
paragraph
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme
Regional Health Authority
Regional Hospital Board
Regional Pharmaceutical Officer
Regional Supplies Officer
Supply Council Circular
Statutory Instrument
Voluntary Price Regulation Scheme
13.2 Questionnaire to NHSOfficers
Univ~rsi~y of Bradford,
~ • .&> •..?-acu o::-a.,
~Test Ycrks1:ire,
'ED7 1:DP
1,!ersey R.E.A.,
Uilbe:-!'orce ?:ouse,
T.ae Strar-d.,
Li-v'e:-pool,
L2 7F..!
Liverpool Pol~~ec~~~
:Bj"':'cm S~=eet,
Live!'pool, -
L3 3_d.F
~ie are l,;:-itine; to ~rou i!: coznect i cn .:ith a resea=ch p:'o,jec:; bei1::; ~-:de=-
take:1 i~ the !:e=sey ?:-..A. Tl1e l'ror]: i~':'lol-"eZl an !!::a::~i!:atio::: of the ccnt rac t
syste::; of c.n:.: pu=c!:a.se in 2:-;cla:-:a. and ::-es1..ut s alread;:,- obtai:r:.ed su:ccs't tl:a.t
the !,=oject .:ill be of :,c11e::i -;; en a na~.;ie:la.1 acal e , The -;~e:':: is c·:.i!!Z u!:.de:'-
take!! hy a. ilosz>i ";,-1 =,l·:2.r~;a.cist, K:r :Davie. :Jolfson, and yJ:!en cOin!'lei: e ,·:ill be
c:'fe=ed in pa=t fulfil!:!e!l~ for a hi;::e:- deG"!'ee of the C.1':- •. LA.
Ir. prelimin~!':t sur......te~,.. 't·:ork, I·!= ;·701=-5011 vas offe::,eo. the servaces of a.
........'.", .. researcn -"'-:>"'~s"''''l.·o''' """e .;'u· ...l·.,l ....'.,...,~e-.,.00&' -e~o""" "' "'-- ......o··-l.·c"'l'.4 .. . :..._ . _ .:;...,c;.:._ ... "'_\.:I ....... ~.. "" _•• _ ...... __ \,r ~ a;)""'-'-"., ~ .. u. J..l(;.,_ .:-' _, ... ~"".,.~ ... ~
a:lc. s'.l!,?lies ,o:':'icc:'s pro-v·ided. u~e:-ul i:,':o!"!ila.tio:~ ::'1.1.-: a hic;::'er !'cs:?o:-.se =~.t.p.
a.na. 3i~~iei.!';:.tio:, ~:o'.ll.a.clc::.=l:r ht:;c becm T:iO!'e satisi"actc:::-y. It ~:a.s co::sir.?:--Gc
that 2. (,:1.1cstior':'lai::'e ";o";~ll=.' incle:?er.c.e~t of a~1:" cO:7".:.-:lerciF.l i::~.ert:!st ~··o':~L~.
elicit cor.sidc!'e."olr bette!' !'es~onse end. to this end ~~ ~l?-cloEle~c~. a.. pos~~J..
~u.e~t..tonna.ir~ ,
~·;cs;:O"J.ld. be :nes"; s-rate:ul i:' Jr:J'J. ..:o1..ud hel!, by cC::l?leti:'-C ~!'lc. rctu.:.'~.i!'_:;
it as soon as 1'055i "ole in the pre-paie. reply envelop.::. T:"le i:-":o::'Ulation ;,e
see;~ is co~~id.e!l-:ia.!.. J.: is co!";c,=:,;:ec.. -:·~~h ::,es:?o!'lc.e~~s a:tti ti:~:~S+.C' "~;"~e
co~;-::·a.ct sj'storJ. r.C'le::-eis r.o ;;is::' to i::'~n-:ify C'..I!y =esponde!:": a.ne. a::s,.l'l":e
2.no~:.":'li ty bo·;h of =espondent &:-:0. of the ::,e1a-:ed. ::-ezicn is 5'Ua:-ar.'":ec~.· :;0
iden".;ificaticn of sou:-ce ;·n.l1 be p!'ovic.ed in any t:'lE'sis 0:' publica-:ic::..
~';eere a:'t·:are -;r.at the" ccwplc~io!'l of a.:fI::! q....1 estio:'.naire is -:eCio'..ls. If
you .~ouldp=efF.!:' to a::.sYe!' q_ues-:ic:13 posed Ye!''ball:l', this ca::: :0 ::!'::':'<"-l';cec.ii'
you cc=ple:e a~d ~et~~~ the enclosed ca:-~. This epp:-o~c~, T.cce:he:- ~~th the
objectives ol' ·.;he e:.::e:'cise, ::'a·te bce!l c!isc ....lssed. -;:i~!: cz'fice:'s o~ 't}:e ::es.l";='
~r ...ice S:.z:pply C~·J.ncil i:~O haye e::c:?!'essec.. -:hei:o interest in the =esul:s.
l:e she:.l1 'he most crateful for you:: co-ope=aticn -;:1th t!lis prcjec"'.;.
Yours sincerely
.' _.
T G 30cth,
Pi:ar::.::.cy ?rac·~ic~
Resea:-:h Ur.i-:,
A::e.lU'O,::U. '~,h:i\'ersi "t.~'"
133 Pil e:.r,
?.eCioi12.1 P!!a=:!:c.cm:·~ieal
(;':f'i'icE::r,
!l€'!'~e:r T!.:!.#...
/J/~
'Wi/":I; ·
O
'v( I) 1./\/ r :.. ()Vry_i...,~)../,,-=------
p 1: ~rillia.::'lscr:,
S~r.i~:" I..e,C-:l~C=-,
Dep~. co"! :·:a.r.~Ce::~!lt
Stt!clies,
Li-;e:'pool Pol;;rtec:-_"'!i~_
T'.nis Q,uestioIlr.aire has been desj.~ed for easy cc:npletion. L"l!!lost
cases, only a tick is required in ~he appropriate box(es).
Q1 Thinking of yOU:!: ext st Lng, dr:..'!~ corrt ract s , in general terms, a.t
'YThatauthorit] level(s) p..re th'.'!se c:u:"!'t:ntly orga.:'!ised?
I
~.~ulti-resional
Multi:-area
Area.
District
Hospita.l
Other (Please specify)
Q2 The stages in tee organisation of a contract are d.efir..ed as
fo110'115:-
1. Preparation for tender including definition of speci!'ic3.~ions.
2. L~i~ation to tender.
3. Cpening and assessment of tenders.
4. A~ard of contract.
Does you authori t:r differ subst;::mtia.lly from the above procedures
by ~he addition of any further stages? .
Incorpora-:.es procedures add.itional to standard pro-
cedure. BAdheres to standard procedures (as above )
Q2a. If addi ';ional atagef:l Clr~ :i.n~orpora~ad :plea3t9 give st andar d pro-
cedUres.
· .
· .
· .
· , .
· , .
3· .
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In your opi~~on, hoy satisfacto~J is the current prccedure, in
general terms, for drug contract orga.r~sation ~-ithin Y''JUX R.E.A.?
Very satisi'actor:r
Sa.tisf.:-.ctory
Neither satisfa.ctory nor unsa~isfactory
UnsatisfactorY'
Ve~Junsatisfa.ctorl
Q4 Please give the reason for this degree of satisfaction.
I
• ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
• I •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
· .
• t.• of • •• • ••••••••••••••••••••.
Q5 In "That ",-a:ls,' if any, does the present organisation of d=U.3
contracts compare ....-ith that existing 5 years aeo, in youx R.E.A.?
Increased i1I'lolvemen~ of quality control pbarnacf sz s
Smaller number of items on contract
Longer duration of contract
Shorter duration of contract
More formalised RH.<\. s:aff involvement
More considera,," Len given -"0 packagil"',e
More cor..'3i~era.tion given to sUPI'lier service
Cthers (Plea.se state)
4
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Q6 Thir~r~ of 5 7ears ago, which specific ~isci~lines ani grades
of staff .;-ereinyolvad in drug contract ol~~isation for your R.?:.)'.?
Cnearea Supplies. ~ficer
Sever~l area s~pplies officers
Cne )~ea Fha~aceu~ical Cfficer
S·3'rerD.l..:\rea Fb.ar.na.ceuticalCfficers
Racior-a! Su;plies Cfficer
Regional Fhc.::::-.ace'Lt';ica.lOfficer
Cor~ultant medical staff
Lay member of Authority
Others (Please state)
El
~J
Q7 ~1hieh oi1'.glediseiplir:e, if any, do you feel had. the !':lOS"; influenoe
on drug ccnt rac t orgar.isation £'i7e yea..rs acro?
Supplies Officer
Pha.~aceutical Officer
Consultant mec~cal s~aff
Others (Please s~ate)
Q,3 j':hichspecific discipli:r..esand e;!'a.desof staff are currently imd ved in
dru:g contra.ct ore;~.nisation for y01xr R.E.A.?
Cne area Supplies efficer
Several area su~~lies officers
Cr.eAre~ Phs::maceutical Officer
~everal Area Pb~aceutical Officers
Regicr~ ..l S~pplies Officer
!-:eeior.alPharmaceuc ical Cf'ficer
Co~sultant medical staff
Lay member of Authority
Others (Please state)
5
-4-
Q9 'ilhich si:r-.gle discipline, if a:n.y, do you believe cas ;;r.e most
influence en d.~ contract orgar~sation for your R.~.A.?
Supplies Officer
Pharmaceutical Cfficer
'r
~o:1sul·~a.nt medical staff
Others (Please state)
Q10 'l'hir"!dr..; ef 5 :fea.rs ahead, ~jhich specific disciplines and. gra.c.es
of staff do ;'"OU fe"3l are likely to be ilrrolv-ed in dr-J,J' contract
organisatio~ for your R.R.A.?
One Area Supplies Officer
Several Ar~a Supplies Cfficers
Ona District Pharmaceutical Officer
Several District Pharmaceutic~r-Officers
Regional Sup1'lies Officer
P~gior.al Pha~aceu~ical Cfficer
Consultant medical starf
Lay me~be~ ef Authority
Others (Pl~ase state)
Q11 i'rhichsinz;le discipline, if ar.y, do you feel ;.;1.11 ha.ve the most
influence on d.rtl€ contract ore;anisation, five years from nov? '
Supplies Officer
Pharmaceutical Office:"
Consultant medical" staff
~~hers (Please s~ata)
6
- 5 - .
Q12 1'ihichd.isci~lir.esand g:-ades of staff, in you::'opfrn.on, should
id.~~ll:7' be irr ....olved in d_~·necontract organisation for yow: R.lf.A.?
Cne area Su?plies Officer
~evero.l area Supplies Cfficers
C1e ?harmaceu~ical Cfficer
Pharmaceu~ical Cfficers
Regiona.l Phar::2.~eu;ica.lOfficer
Consulte.nt meiica.l staff
Lay ce~ber of Authority
lrursir.g Sta.ff
Ctilars (Please state)
-
----!
I
~13 1fuich si~5le discipline, if any, do you feel should 'ideally have
the ~ 1nflueuce on d..'"'1.lZ contra.ct orca~isC!.:;i on fol' jOU= R.n.A. ?
Supplies Officel'
Ph~aceutical Cfficer
Con.CZ1.lltant :r:edicalstaff
ethers (Pl~as9 Atate)
Q13a. Eave you systematically compared those prices bei~~ charged to you
by contractors w~th those charged to other Regional Sealth Authorities?
7iES
7
-,6-·
Q14 Usi::g one of th~ comparisons listed below, c.enote how you believe
~rices being charged by dr.lg comra.cto!"s, for you:r regic,n, compar-e
with those ot other rec~ons?
Our l'7'icesare on a.verage much cheaper (101- or more)
O.lr pl"ices a=e on 2"'-' to 1O'~ chea.peraverage. ,?
eLi.r prices a=~ on average the same blus or minus 2%)
Cur pricez are on a....ere,se dearer (2~ to 10~)
'Ou.r :prices are en average much dearer (1 O;~ or more)
I
Q15 ifnat,
terms,
in yOT.,U' opinion, are the main adv~nta.ges offered,
by the existing drug conc~act system?'
in genera.l
· .
• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
• ••••••••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• e· ••••• ' •••••••••• ' ••
· '. .... . .
· ' .
• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• eo .' •••• ~ •• eo eo
· , .
8
- 7
Q16 Please denote, by a tick in :he approp~iate box, the degree to
lnch aach of those listed below is conside=ad an ~ivantage of the
ccnt rac t purchase sys-;;emand if possible give reasons for you:: ··:iew.
! .
j.~l~::':T..!..CiZ 'lSIr! F'AIF.LY :rCT A V:SZ:Y 1-~""''T' All" F.EASC2T FOR_, \....
J:.:J?CRT_-'.:iT ::::.~CRT_~~T :C.!PC~A:~T A!lVA1TT_\·:;-":: STATED tE:JPS'S
~..DVAlrT.AGE ,8VA1:TAE AD~,,"_~r'rAGS AT ALL !
AdminisT.rative savir~ I
!
Contin1rl ty of bra.nd for jIcontract period .. l
I
Predictable quality I!
1-
Cost savir-s on c:'.rugs j
I.
i
P:'~~:!:":s.'":!ec9li-.",rhs !i
:
t
:·:a.rn:!a.e-:'re~ can predict I
us.....le !od. so more ea.sily II
sa;:is£:r :leeds II
Stan1a:ri :Y-l.ck sizes II
Appropria.te laoelling, I,
indi·'id.-
I
Cbviao;es r.eed for Iual price nlt6otiation at·
hospitl\l level for each d..'M..18" • II
t
Others (Please state) I
I
9
-8-
)
Q17 Of t.he ];)069i:,le adVa.I1ta;;:es plee.se li!3t, in ord",:, of i::'!:pc'l:'t~.nce,
ttose ~hreg t~cugtt to be the mest irn?ortant.
ncsr r·l'ORTA!TT •••••••••••••••••• t· •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
.........................................:;
...........................................
Q,13 ~1ha.t, in your opiniol'!, are the main cliSac.'Ta.ntases, j.n eene:-a.l
terms, of the e~~s"ing dr~ contract sJstem?
• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• t •••••••••••••• '•••
· .
· .
• •••••••••••••••••••••••••• t· •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
· .
· .
· .
· , .
10
-9-
Q19 " Please d~note, by a tick in the appropriate box, the degree to
ldlich each of t~ose listed belo~":is considered a. disa.dv'-r.~aGeof
the contract pu~oha.sa system and give the reasons for your view.
DI3.\DVA1:TAG3 VERY FAIRLY aor V!;RY HCT A F~tSC1~ FO!!
r:.::POR'l'~lliT I!.:PC?TAlTT ~·::PCr~T..&UrT DIS!GVA!T'_r.,. ST.HE.D D:£a~
DISADV..urT- "DIS"\DVa::r- DIS)~lnST- AGE IAGE: A::8 Aa:!: AT .4_LL
I
Qua~tity of order makes
excessive de:!:ar.dson small
storage sI'Me
Too rigid i.e. little cr
r.o freedom of choice Ca.e
hospital level especially)
::rod.....",.g 0081; 8"v1,ng
Does not satis!:! loca.l
neads/prsferer.ces
U'r.suitable pack sizes
Lack er cor..timl1"':yof
sup~17 a.: e:tl'iryof
contr!.c";
Irregular/unpredictable
deliveries
COAtly to ~~inister .".
.
Reduced pO$sibility of
utilising deliveries
II. Too few delivery points
I Too f9W ordering points
I I, Others (Please st.ate)
".- 11
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Q20 Of those possible disadvantages please list in order of im~ortarce,
those three thought to be ~he most impor;ant.
Most iJltportant ..................................................
Second most important •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Third Gl()St i::p~rtant ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Q21 ;'ihg,t; il!l!,=o'Te!l:en::s, if any, 'ioioulJ. J'ou like 'to see in a.r-J aspect ef
the eXil5ti!~g d.:'ug cent rac t system?
.........•....••..•••.•......•.......•..... ~ - .
· .
• •••••••••••• • •••• 4! •••• • ••••••• • ••••• • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
· ' .
· .
Q22 Which.siI"-$le discipli::e is mos-c lnfluenoial in deciding on the
award ~ta specific drug co~~raot?
Supplies Officer
Pharmaceutical Cfficer
~e1ther
Q.23 Thi!'.kine of just the disclls1'!io!!!3 ~d.th potential suppliers raea.=dil"..['
prices prior to the nardins of a dr......'S' ccrrtrsct , i': has been seid
~hat o~ ave=~~~, six man days per year are. speno on these discussions.
~;01l1d you say :his :::'ig'.lI'e is above, belo·., or about the S~T.e a!3 the
truln days spent on these discussio:1ril in you: lrogion?
!lelow tha.t spent in my Region
Above tha.t s~e!!t in my Recion
About the saee as in my Region
~4 ApproXimately how many man days, do y~1.1 feel, a:"e spent on d.iscussir~
prices with potential suppliers, from Y01.l:J: Region's pOin';;of viel~?
•• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• days
-1?
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QZ5 Do you feel tha.t the aacurre of time spent by your Region Mgotia.ting
prices ~~th potential suppliers is ~oo ~uch, too little, or abou~
right?
Too much.
'foo little
About right
~6 Please state Y'ou:rreason for the reply to q'.l.es1;ion25·
.•.•••.••..••.•...••..•.•.•......•.••.............................
· .
· .
· ', ,,' .
027 1\ho, in yow: opinion, derives the most: benefit from the d_-ug
con~racts, the N,H.S. or the supplier?
supplier
N.H.S.
Both equally
~28 Please sta.te your reason for the repl] to question 27·
· .
· .
· ~ .
· .
· .
13
- 12 -
Q,29 Of those below, tick the circulllstances in ~;hich there should be
the option to re-tender durin.:£an existing contract period.
If d_-ug comes off patent o
If & request for & price increase is 1.l.naccel'table o
If supplier is givire poor ser.ice;ldeliveries o
It a new product has been fo~d unsatisiacto=y o
It prod.uct aubsequent Iy sbcwn not 01;0 :neet exact
specification o
If & firm ver-J likely to have been awarded oontr~ct
failed to tender in time ·0
oThe arrival of a new si~ificant ~~
! significant change in presc~ibing habits
,
D
! char~ in price structures BTender documents lost or failed to arrive
Others (Please state) o
. '14
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0.,30 Thinkir.g about ;?!'ice increases by cemrac ecrs du=i!".g the ccr.c ract
lll;r10d, t.-:;"atis ~b.e r.la.xim·~perCenT.aJ9 1nc:-easa ,,;hich, you feel,
should be tolerated before re-tenderi~~ should ~ake place.
1 to 3 l=er cent
.. to 10 ~er cent
11 to 20 per cen~
=~ore than 20 per cent
Q,31 Given the chct ce , t.-ould yeu prefer a. ~'tTO or or-a year oontraot?
T\-:o ye9.r
No p!'ei"erer.ce
CU2 Please state the reasons for yo·J.r a.ns~;"'!rto que st.Lon 31.
• ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1.1 .
· .
· .
· .
"· .
· .
· .
15
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~3 ~~aceutical supplie~s have ~~~5ested, as a means of ~educing
prices, sene res~:'ictlo11S. Plea.se ::ick in cclur:::lA those ...hicb.
you would ba ,repared to accep~. Pl~asa tick those in col~r. B
wilic!l ytju l,·ould not accept !.t all. -Plea.se ;ick ,,;hose in oolu;~n C
l±icll you .,ould be ClOS; pleased -;;0 accept.
Guaranteed d.~ quantity uptake
R'3duced r.tu:tcer of buying poin~s
Raduce~·number ot delivery poin~s
Less frequenv deliveries
Paymen. for ~~-s at the beginning
of the fir~r.cial year
A t~ yaar cor.~ract inst.ead of a
one year con~ract
All
!fone
R
This f'~r::I, ..men cocple~ed, should. be returned unsigned in -;he
accompanyinz addressed. envelope.
U you ...culd l1.1.:ea su.."l!llarycOTJY'ot tee r'9sults of t!lis Bu.-vel, plea.se
indicate below.
IT.AHZ:
PCSITICI:
.........................................
.....................................
ADD?J::SSl ......................................
· .
· , ,..,.,.., .
• ••••••••••••••••••••• , •••• , •••• e·, ••••••••••• , ••
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13.3 Questionnaire to Companies APPENDIX 3
St Helens & Knowsley Health Authority--_ ..._ ......--'.... WHISTON HOSPITALPRESCO-r
Me~SEYSIOE
L..s SOR.
y_".,.:_--- --------_._---
051-'35 1800
! am W%'1"tine' !or jOur assist&1lC. in coml~'tion -.rith some :'$ses.r:n c'I:.-:"ently
be1::.g undero:alcm i;l'to con't:'3.et d..-.Jg ~ha.ail:.g in the N&n~ ~&l-:ll Serrice.
~1' tCllic e:eM:'S'tea ma.:I1 .~l.y held views, ~'t news wll1e!:.!ore &lso oa.sl'td
on & pa.uc1t7 o~ seien't1t1c evi.d.er.c.. '!he ~l!Sent reseL""C!l ia desie'!'le:' to
=emed;r t~ Ii ~.l&t1o!l "oj" C&:lVUI!Si.~ the Views ot both st."'PPlie:-s and. pu..-ehasers
.. to ~. d:1cacy a.nd. et'!!ci.ncy ot the p:"esec'" s1'8tem.
In :t~1 connection could I a.sk iau to oo!!!plete the er.closed q:ue~rtion:l&1r'!? It
has been speei~1c&11j designed ~or j"~ easy eo~letion and sbouli not take=~ than & taw m~~'tes. I .r.elas. a st~ed add--essed envelope fOT y~~ oon-
v.ni,nce.
I should. stTess that &.If'J i:='o:o:nstion :'0'1 -ay pro..-1d.e -.rill be t~&ted 1."1 l'l~:t-
est cor!!!:ienee.· .No indiV'id.lJAl or oomp~ '..'i,ll ev"!!' be ~fer.:'ed to !.l'..d. iat'l.
g"nera.ted will be pu:-elj" st&tistic&l. ~:.s surrey :'5 ,u:r''!ly academic i:l pu..-s-..u t
of pOIS~~&h q,u&ll:!cat1on &nd. is :101: i"i::anci&lly !V'1':?or'tedby '!.rlY ve!!~~
1r.t!'nst. ~. joint ~ltT'V'1sors &:'8 Dr l' !! ~f1l1iamson, Depa..-=:nent of :·1a..'la.gernent
Stud1." Liverpool Pol.:n:ecl:nic and. Dr T a :3oot.h, ?har.nac:r ?:'actice Resee...-e::
Ur.:,':,Ur.!ven:"~ o~ ~ord. •. ~~ a~proa.cA, together wt'th the obJectives of
the uerei .. , has ;,een discussed. Wi th o~icers ot the :~ ~l:r Council ;rho
bave ~.eed th.i: u:tenat 1:1 the reeul tao
May ! t~ :rau tor :IOu;' o~eration in thi!l surve!'. r: you would lil·:e a.
II'UC!!IL.,- of the :"e8ea...~;' =esul to! pleu~ t'!"ldic&te a.t tt~ end of tn8 q_u~~;r::ior:.ai::-~.
2).{.tD4--
D J ilCW-sar
!>:":.::.c i 1=&1 ?h.s.:r:na.c i s1:
-l7
12
3
This questionnaire has been dee1g:ed tor- easy completion. In =ost 4
Oas88 onl1 & tiok is requ1-~d in ~he appropriate OOX(8S).
~1 ?'.a.s your ocmpar,;r submi ttad te::.ders for an Englisil ~a.l";b .-w.tnoti.";.7
d..'"'Ug oontn.c:1: '011-:b1n tbe last two yea..,,'
10
Col 1
Q1 (a) I! yea, could 7011eive an estimate ot hoy :l8Jl1' have been submi toted.
'd thin. the ila&S~ wo 7eara?
am OR '1",,0
~'D'!£11tU3
Co12_
Is yem: oolll1'~ cu...-:oentlysubm1t.t1l'.gmore, abou-: the same or lass:
tenders than say five years &go?
ws
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Col 3
Generally how satisfied is your CClD~ v1,<;h tte d...""'t:8' eon1:ra.c~
sY'Bt8lll, a.s ~s.ntly illsti tilted?
Col 4
~4 :.1Latchanges have jC1U noticed 1."1 tee d...-ug oontl'act .:procedure i:'1 t::lS
~ five yean?
D~".E:IT RE!..1.Trr.: DVctVE::-!E:rT OF'
PEAAMACI:sTS A..'rn SL""P'1'I.nS OFFICERS
DL'B'!!!'tE1lT Ccrnll'lCNS er CClITl'..ACT
~lER DRUCS eN' 'l'!llDER E'ORM ~!0':1
~l~ (?~\SZ STA~) •••••••••••••
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...........•.......................
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~ noea :row: cOlII'panyquo ta dit!'eNnt ,rices to -:he various
~egional 5eal"h ~~horities?
Col 1
NO B
Do you. boy (i.e. have eV1d.er..ce)or 'believe ~~!!.t sue!: ,r~":ioe8 of
d.itterc~t1a.l ,ricing take ~la.ce among-other ~o:n~anies?
cei a
m:~ mew ~CR m~ 'rE::.
?~C 'I'!C:: '!1XES PLA.C];
20 _
~ (a)
"'1': Co ).....' 0
-4-
?leue t~ck those ta.cto:-s in colu=. ~(&) ·"i'.ich a.~ t3.1=ec l.."lto
considerat1on 0:/ :feU: c~ 1:1. 7au:r" ol':e:-s <:0 r-s:,ons.
nease ~icl.;: ~ o! those i::. col:.::m Q6("0) ~ich ':'s ~o~~i:il""!',,<i
the :nO:l't i;npor.a.n";;.
•• e·••••.•• e" ••••••• ' •• e'.
........ - •.............
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~o(a) :actors
considered (tiel"
as m~ as
appropriate)
Qfi(o) Most
~or:a.:t !l.Ct,::
(tick o!!e er~)
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"1 Listed: halow are factors whic.h might be conl!!id.ered ItA adv&llta.ees 1:0
jOu:r conrp~ in having d:'ugs il:clud.d in .. :It''al."h Allthon~y eon'.ra.ct.
l'l..... indicae. the 1:portanc• ..micA eacil, in your opinion, war.&llts.
SPnT OF? SALES I:f
~. PRACTICE
~Ccmu.C'!D
':::rCctmACES B~'iD
tOL\LT!' AMara
PH£SCRDERS
PREDIC'tI.l!U: USAGE
er DRO'O AND SO m:JEI)
.lRE MOREEAsnr SA.
·ISFD:ll
S'I~A.1mlR!)ISED pACX
SIZES
ST.AllDARDISED
UBF:u,nro
C1lvun'S NEEDpeR
mIVIJjUAL P~!CE
NECor!ATICN AT
ffCSPIT.\L LEVa::. Fe.!1
:::ACR DIDO
ST.urnA..aDISED
DEtIVEmS
CTRERS (P.LE1SE
STATE).......•..........
.•.•.............
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.................
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VER!' Dl:PCRl'.1..'fl' =·U.E!O~IAU.'{ ma:"pOP.'I'.A::T TorULI
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1 1
~ 1
~ 1
;
4 1
.:: 1'"
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2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
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2
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~
3
3
3
3
1
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3
3
,
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Q8 et the possible ~dvan'tages tioked i!l the ~vious question, ~leue'
liat in order ot i:por'tar~e those t~~.e thought to be ~r..:os't i~po~~t .
...............................
s:a=~ MCST ~ORT.u"T· •••••••••••• e·' ••••••••••
~ MO~ IXPCRl\'NT •••••••••••••••••••••••••
~ U.ted below are factors which might be oonsidered as d1sad.var."~s to
lOW: compan7 in having lour Ii..-ugs included in & Seal th Autnori't'1 con"Craet.
Ple .. e·~1ck those· categories to which. each, in 'lour opi~on, belo~~.
Tee m1C1i ?J.P!R-·
',lORIeTO 3E m:.u.T
iiIT!'
J:'lF"~
I:.~CNAL. LCSZS
CCNT.!CT 't1!'rn mrr-
I:tL\I.. R'CSPIT.U ..s
TOO !'.ANY CCNT~C rs 1
~'l'ICNALL! ,
TOO :'E'J CCN't'!'.A.CTS S
Y.A.T:OUL!.!'
~RCANISATI~ CF 9
~~CT :USE"D rs
JlA rorn OF !I!Atr.r
.\~ClU'!'T
Ol"HERS (?LE.\SE
STA~) •••••••••
..•...•.•••••....
• • • • • e·. • • • • • • • • •• 12
••••••••••••••••• 13
'lERI' ~ORTA.1'fr
mCRTANT DISADV~·
DISA.DVAllT- A.Ci:E:
.UlE.
10
11
23
!U.RGDALLI NeT T::R! ~:CT!
r=<!PORl'ANT !:·tPCRTA..'iT ~I3.AtVA.'iT-
DISd.DVA.'rr- DISADVA..'fr- AGE AT ALL
AGE AGE
~
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Q10 r:r the- possible, disad.vamagee ticked, pleue Ha-; in order of 1JD'Po".smea
~ho.e th.-ee·~ough~ to be tb., moe; important.
POR Cc:~ USE CNtr
Col 1
SECCN]MOST ~ORr.~ •••••••••••••••••••••
!(~ n.1l'~T •••• '••••••••••••••••• t- ••••••
~ lOST' I::a'CR!'UT' ••••••••••••••••••• '•••
'~11 il1Uch pany-, the !iealth Serr1ee or the cL-ug supplier, do :lOU feal gai:o.s~o.,benefit, trom the contract &rat.m?
Col 2
Q12 1'18&.e' state the reason for the answer to the' !''T'ecriOWl q_uesl;io!l•
...•.......... - ~...•..•.....•..•...................... - ..•.............
...•.••...........••...........•...••• ' •.••.•.•..........•..•...............
...•••.•••..•.•..••••••.•..........•......................................
~13 Please deno'!;., hov ~ !11&n days jr:ru. teel ~-e. spen: ~ jr::ru::: cOJl11:la!'!'! i:1
d.i.cu.ai1'~ contract price" with each Ee&J.th,Authority in a le8.r.
Col3
LESS THAN· <lTE U!
!:' ~,tCR!!: '!'!YAH 'l,!,,!;i..::J:: ~ '!'S P!ZA~
~~T!:,UT: ~rTJ!·rnER••••••••••••••
~;O TO 'I'!!~ DAYS
Q14 Do .7OU :'e81, r.hat t!'\e !Jlloune of ~i.l:le Silent h~~ you: comil&I1;T in con'::'!.c-:'
71"'108 discusasion.s io~th :~&l.'.;h Aut!lori~ies is, from .7OU:: poi"~t ,,! "i.~'r,
~oo ~cn, &bout right or too lictle?
Col !1
TOO MUCff
'rca LI'l"!'tZ
3
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...•.••••...•.....•......••..•••.•.••.....................•...........
.•.•.•.•.••.......•...••.•....•••.....................................
Q,16 1r0llt yr:JIJr e%j;leri.nc. how acOUl'St. geners.l.l3' are the figures ot estimate
o~ U'p'talce- prov1ded 'oj" Eealth. Auth~tie8 prior ~o tender?
Col 5
VERI" ACCURATE (t 5~)
J.C~ et 5~ to 20'%)
InCCt'""~~ (!- 20% to ;0%)
VERr ~C"JP.A.TS (t' 50% or ;non)
Q17 Zov ws.tu.l to yau. are :faalth .1uthorit7 eati=ates of up1:ake?
Col 6
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Q1a Ecw a.d.eq,u.a.te d.o you t"l is the time beheen the followir..g?
-,
TCOLela
rca SHORT
C~T
(b) l':OIll tender. bei=g- "turned by-10U to offer bei.'lg accepr; ed.-
Co1-·a·
(0) ~om'otter beir_g accepLed to lOU beir..g1nfo~ed ~taccep~ance.
TOOtarO
Col 9
Q19 '1'ar each of <;hes... tU": sta.gee, what ·.rould you. consider ::0 ~e a.:l ideal
time- soale.-
ram TO SI! ~
't'1L1'l'.EJllT TO tU'!SEU ~
26
~ ~. ~'S..~ .:\.CCZl?'!'.A1!C~
aEl:EJIIl!'f ~ TO' TO ~rC'l'f .~iIC_t::'IClT C!"
TO .Eil!:ffEN' ~~ ACC'SP1'AIlC~ ACCz:?'T'.~~~!
Col 10
. 1
2
"\
<1
~
e
Col 11 ::c1 1~
1
2
'1.
<!.
c:
6
c:
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;20 Listed heloy &.~ some ci.-eumstancee &f:eet~ & cocpetito= ~~d &
eon't:'S.Ct... 'linen do yatl. tHl the=& ahould,oe- -:ne req~~en,,: 0;0
re-teJ:der ~~ an e::::.s~i::g ccn~t period.?
••.••.................••..............................
................ - •..•.•.....
~1 ""'~nld "0 a.bout price i.=:'ee.ees :"y ;rot:' eompeti ters .1''- "go tbe co!:."::'~,,:
,mod, 'll'b.a.t 13 the :l&Xi:n:I1 :ilereeT!":&S'e i:c=!!ue ·.mi:h., you feel, ai:ould
be tclers.t.d. beton' re-tend.erir~ si:.C'U.l.d -:ak!J ~a.ca'l
4 TO 10 ~- CEfT
11 TO 20 zsa C!:l'!'
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Civen ~h.. ch"ice, wilat ~tion of Contra.c"t woula. you prer'er?
Col '-
LESS: TEA3 ONE-r::.\R
cmt !!AR
TWO Y!1.RS
MeRE TR..UT T'..iO mtas
rca pm.:.1lE:lCZ
••••••• & •••••••••••.••.•••• '••••• '•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••• '•
.............•......... - ' .••............
...-••.•.............................................. ' .
••.•••.............•.•...............•................•..............
• • •• • • e·' e· ••
....•..................... ' •..••....•.........•....................
re -
C24.
- 12 _.
~liers have 81.lgeesl.ed, u a. means of !'educ1ne; ~ees, 80me·
:-estnc"tions ot ~.!lg pr~e~s on !ie&.l~h A.ut.ilt't"1t.iu.
?laue ~ick those in oolUIIID..1 ...n-.ieil :lou wotl.U ~.:eleot:le :rut -.."01.I1d.::esw:t
i."l llttle or !lO rl!)d.uc~ion il1 price.
?lea.se :.ielc "thoee 1;: oolt.:mn 11Wie!! jOll ~uli ~1.eome a.:::d ;rould. resul:
1:1 a. :-educt ion i:: r-:,oes of U1' to 10%.
!'lease ticK those Ul eol~ C '.mien ,:rOll ...'OUld. '.ar1 :'.lCil -;.-el-::ome"1:ld
"Would.=esul'~ i.":l 5. !"9duc~ion i.,. prices OI~:lIore i.can 10%.
Col A Col :3
I
LA
Col C
~~ w"'hs:: i:J1'rovemema, it' allY-, waul':' yot.:. !.ike ~o see in a..V aspeCt. of ~~e
e:c..,;1::e: ;-~ Clom rae't SY'SUIII?
?A~·:'C."It ~P.rmSJ.'! ~';"11l1lJO c:F
~A1l'C:w.. ~
A 'Mm "f"::1R C~.AC'!' ~ OF .1. cm:
':"!'AR CC1'!'3A.C T
0 •••••••••••••••• ; ' • ••• t ', -, ••••• -, ••.• e" -.- ••••••
e- •••••••••••••. , e.. e . ••• - •••• t·••••••• e' ••• - •••• , ." .-, 't-' t' •••• t·, ••••••••
•..•..•.••••••..••....•.••......••..•..•••......•...• ~••......... ' ..•.......
• ••••••••••••••••••••••••• - ••••••••• t_ •• ' •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
•.••............. -~ ••.•........•...............•...........................
• •••••••••••••••••••••• ' ••••••• t •••••• t- ••••• t ••• '••••••••••••••••••••••••••
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Q26 Ii: 'J'OfJl!" d.ee.Ur~ with ~e various Health A.utllor1t1es in eOl".ll8Ction wi.~~
~ c:om=ac't., &re :rou. aware-ot. lllajor vul.&1:10llS, i: a.rr:]' or all ot the
tollcwi::g, preoedm-ee?'
'_"
..............•... - .....••....................•............
1llLtT!Clf ~ ?SL.L."TIE mCli';]la:lT CF' ~ac!STS" A.N1) SUl'PU:::S
crncl:RS
VA.P.:llTICN"II Cc:mIT:OlS CF C~.ACT
o.rs:ER:J (PL:!:ASE ST.1'!!E) , •••••••••••••••••••••••• • • • ~ • • • • •• •
......~ ~ , .
~7" :0 you teel that the &wrd ot ~ c:ontrac't: is of" mors' use- for' patented, or
unpatented.. dru.sS? '
Col 1
CF =tCST' US' FOX ?\S'::::::Jj" ~RmiS
CS' !(C5'r' USE FCR IDlP.A.1'S:l'::::::D '0R[1CS
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~d ?or patented. ar.:gs, vb.&t benefi -:15 vouJ.a. "]'OU:- eompa::y e::pec't tQ
rec.1v& by be:i::g &__ -:ied. .. ecntnct?
~1:'!:13I3 ~...&.CiE CS'" ~ .!ltD SO zr.::s::DS .tEE MOE!!:!lS!LI
SJ.!!::::::L!'!2!D
'~....lT!:! ]:::l!:D ?OR Inlrr.:::o.u. p~ ~Ol""....l~ar A.T
~1:1L U:J~ ~ ::.lC:i~.
~ (~ S!1.~) •••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••
~.•................................................ ~.
•••••••••••••••••••••••••• " e·•••••••••••
...•.........•.................. ' - ~ ' .
Q,
i~_ ...
.10
11
12
13
~ When 1au::" Q~a.."'!3' 1!1&warded. .. d.:".:g ccu'::'SCt noy voulli you llCr-••.a.ll.1
,ntsr to .et""r4_ee the Qon't:'act, ~l:....~ .. ,mol.saler ar di~c't ~
10'-: compa::: t:) ~ hosp1tal ?
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-15 ..;.
r.: 'lour ~tbod ot 8Ul'Pl:r vui.s according t.t) ei=eulr.s~ances, which of
those beloY would. tend to uk. 1'011supply either directl~ or -:h-rou.gh
& mol.sale!"?
.......~ .
......••.........•.......•............
......•.•..•..•........••.............
ElTCClJRAm::rr~
!)!..::!C ~ DEL-
~
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iihat degne' ot :..nportance (ir.:'es~ective et 'lol:.:J:le)d.o lOU a'C~?.cc to
lOU:: I1Qlpi tu lIal.S: compa.nci. "<11th, you::: tOT.a,l sales?
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~J ?l..... lI'tat. the :-euons t~ jour answer ":0 the ~r~vtous ~'.les-;;ior..
• ,-, ,- ,,' ••••••• .e •••••••••••••••••••••••
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· - ,' ' .
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